1. Epicurean Criticism of Aristotle's Theology

Of the entire collection of fragments and testimonies related to lost writings of Aristotle, none has provoked so much comment and such heated controversy as the passage in Cicero's *De natura deorum* 1.13.33. In this passage an Epicurean, Velleius, sharply criticises the philosophical conception found, according to him, in the third book of Aristotle's *De philosophia*.

W D Ross has translated the passage as follows:

Aristotle, in the third book of his work *On Philosophy*, creates much confusion through dissenting from his master Plato. For now he ascribes all divinity to mind, now he says the world itself is a god, now he sets another god over the world and ascribes to him the role of ruling and preserving the movement of the world by a sort of backward rotation. Then he says the heat of the heavens is a god, not realising that the heavens are a part of the world, which he has himself elsewhere called a god. But how can the divine sense-perception which he ascribes to the heavens be preserved in a movement so speedy? Where, again, are all the gods of popular belief, if we count the heavens, too, as a god? And when he himself demands that God be without a body, he deprives him of all sense-perception, and even of foresight. Moreover, how can the world move if it lacks a body, and how, if it is always moving itself, can it be calm and blessed?

A long line of scholars has studied this text and commented on it. But their opinions are so deeply divided that no generally accepted explanation can be offered on the basis of the information adduced in the discussion hitherto.

There is, however, a consensus on the overall division of the text.

1. In the first place it is clear that the Epicurean reproaches Aristotle for the complete confusion of his (philosophical) theology.
2. In the second place he notes a difference of opinion between Aristotle and his teacher Plato. There is a complication here, in that the most reliable manuscripts read *uno* instead of *suo*.
3. Confusion is caused by the fact that Aristotle seems to have spoken in four different ways about 'god' and 'divinity'. According to the text, he used the
word 'god' or 'divinity' in relation to:
(a) the mind;
(b) the cosmos;
(c) another figure;
(d) the substance of the heavenly region.  

4. Finally, Velleius triumphantly demonstrates the internal contradictions and complete absurdity of the theological system outlined.

2. Main Points in the Modern Debate

W Jaeger

It was W Jaeger who really got the debate going on this fragment. In the *De philosophia*, according to Jaeger, Aristotle, after his earliest Platonising phase emerged for the first time with a philosophical conception which differed radically from that of Plato.

The God to whom the world is subordinated is the transcendental unmoved mover, who guides the world as its final cause, by reason of the perfection of his pure thought. This is the original nucleus of Aristotelian metaphysics.

Moreover, Aristotle is supposed to have developed his doctrine of the fifth, celestial element in this dialogue, and with it his theory that the world is ungenerated and imperishable. The Epicurean's claim that Aristotle also called the world divine is based on a misinterpretation, in Jaeger's view: by the 'cosmos' Aristotle must have meant the celestial sphere.

H von Arnim

One of the most important proposals to correct Jaeger's scheme for the development of Aristotle's philosophy was the theory that Aristotle had become so anti-Platonic in his first independent phase that his rejection of Plato's world of transcendent Ideas resulted in a form of immanentist philosophy. His theology in this period supposedly became a purely cosmic theology. The doctrine of a transcendent Unmoved Mover was not developed until later. This theory was forcibly argued by H von Arnim. And an important part in it was played by his interpretation of Velleius' speech in our text from Cicero.

Von Arnim is convinced that the term replicatio cannot refer to the influence which the Unmoved Mover exercises as causa finalis on nature as a whole. He thinks it stands for ἀνακύκλησις, which can only be taken to indicate the 'rückläufige' movement of the planetary spheres. The alius quidam of the text is
not identical with the *mens* and we can infer from the text that in the *De philosophia* Aristotle distinguished between the Mind of the external celestial sphere as the highest divine entity and the subordinate region of the planets, which is characterised by a rotation running counter to the furthest sphere. 11

In view of his interpretation, von Arnim naturally has problems with Velleius' statement that Aristotle conceives god as a being *sine corpore*. He cannot accept the interpretation 'immaterial'. 12

**W K C Guthrie**

Von Arnim's line of thought is pursued by W K C Guthrie. 13 Jaeger was too hasty in concluding that the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover was expounded in the *De philosophia*. 14 And Guthrie draws the conclusion that Aristotle's first independent phase must have been a purely materialistic one. 15 The doctrine of the Unmoved Mover was not developed until later, but did respond, it seems, to an inner need felt by the philosopher, for 'whatever Aristotle's temperament may have been, it was not that of a materialist'. 16 According to Guthrie, however, this addition did not have far-reaching consequences for the existing structure of Aristotle's philosophy. 17

**J Moreau**

The French scholar J Moreau prefers to speak of 'un véritable hylozoisme' in connection with Aristotle's *De philosophia*. 18 He considers this characteristic of its psychology, in which Aristotle must have regarded the fifth element as the substance of the soul: and of its theology, since the deity in the *De philosophia* was not yet a metaphysical deity.

In his interpretation of fr 26, however, he corrects von Arnim by identifying the *alius quidam* with the sphere of the fixed stars. This external sphere governs the movement of the world by a 'révolution inverse'. 19 The Greek term άνειλιξις which Moreau mentions here establishes a link with the myth of Kronos the world archon in Plato's *Statesman*. 20

**H Cherniss**

A new direction to the discussion was given by a perceptive contribution of H Cherniss in an Appendix to his book *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*. 21 His attack is particularly aimed at the theory that the original form of Aristotle's new doctrine of the fifth element necessarily presented this heavenly element as independent, and that it rules out the possibility of an Unmoved Mover.
He concludes that fr 26 of the *De philosophia* posits as the highest deity an immaterial *Nous* which is the final cause of all nature. A subordinate divine entity must be assumed who, in a way that is not quite clear, causes the retrograde movement of the planets.22

J Pépin

Even after Cherniss there proved to be room for new hypotheses. In his impressive study *Théologie cosmique et théologie chrétienne*, J Pépin made an extensive analysis of the identifiable remains of Aristotle’s *De philosophia*.23 For him too, the mysterious *aliae quidam* is the crux of Cicero’s text. He thinks the connection of *replicatio* with καταλληξις and κατάκυκλησις is relevant, but points out that Plato’s conception in the *Statesman* differs essentially from that of the *De philosophia*, since Plato only talks about a single god.24 Like Cherniss, he dismisses Moreau’s view that the sphere of the fixed stars brings about the movement of the planets by a retrograde revolution, because it is clear from the *Corpus* that this movement is in the same direction, though at a different speed.25

But he gives short shrift to Cherniss’s view as well, since Velleius cannot have meant to say that the sphere of the fixed stars governs and maintains the motion of the cosmos by means of the retrograde motion of the planets.26

Pépin then comes up with a somewhat curious solution. While maintaining the connection of *replicatio* with the term καταλληξις in Plato’s *Statesman*, he proposes to give it a different meaning, namely that of a circular motion in general, without the implication of a change in the direction of rotation.27 In this way, *replicatio* can easily be taken in the sense proposed by Moreau, as the movement of the sphere of the fixed stars.

Here, however, Pépin adds a very special qualification. He argues that reliable indications suggest that Aristotle developed the notion of a hyper-cosmic ether, ie an ethereal sphere which lies even farther than the sphere of the fixed stars. This is supposedly referred to by the words *aliae quendam... tueatur*.28

B Effe

In B Effe’s monograph on the main aspects of Aristotle’s *De philosophia*, the speech of Velleius is left to the very last.29 The passage contains so many problems, according to Effe, that first a reconstruction of the dialogue must be made on the basis of other data, so that with the aid of this reconstruction the intentions of the Epicurean criticism can be investigated. Now in other parts of his study Effe argues that the *De philosophia* talked about god as the ordering
principle of the cosmos and as pure mind. For him, this theology is clearly indicated by Velleius' words *menti tribuit omnem divinitatem*. With Pépin, Esse also assumes that *replicatio*, as the equivalent of ἀνειλίξις, can simply be taken as 'circular motion', but unlike Pépin he concludes that the *alis quidam* must therefore be identical with the Unmoved Mover (the *deus-mens*), which as *causa finalis* brings about the rotation of the furthest celestial sphere.

B Dumoulin

There is no need to discuss every modern contribution, but finally, we mention the view of B Dumoulin set out in a recent study on various important lost works by Aristotle. In the first place this author infers from Velleius' way of summarising, which he also uses in his critical account of other thinkers from the non-materialistic tradition, that the god who governs the world in the *De philosophia* must have been emphatically distinguished from the world itself. In this god Dumoulin sees the transcendent Unmoved Mover. The *replicatio* caused by this god is not something like a 'contrary movement', but is 'le double mouvement du ciel (le mouvement du ciel des fixes d'Est en Ouest, et le mouvement des planètes d'Ouest en Est)'. Thus Dumoulin thinks the words *replicatione quadam* should be translated as: 'par un mouvement qui revient en quelque sort sur lui-même'.

Naturally Dumoulin also identifies the *mens* and the *alis quidam* with one another.

3. Critical Remarks on the Modern Debate

The various problems raised by fr 26 of the *De philosophia* are not all equally weighty. By far the most important is the question of Aristotle's philosophical position. Did he embrace a metaphysical theology in this dialogue, as familiar from the writings in the *Corpus*, or was his theology still a purely cosmic, immanent theology, without any transcendent god?

Von Arnim and his followers were of course right to criticise Jaeger's overhasty identification of the *alis quidam* with the transcendent Unmoved Mover. But this is not to say that the defenders of a 'cosmic theology' have won the day. The most recent authors again accept a metaphysical theology for the *De philosophia*.

Von Arnim himself was too quick in concluding that *replicatio* obviously stood for the 'counter-movement' of the planets. For the movement of the planets cannot rightly be described as responsible for the order and continuity of the *mundi*.
mot.t.yt., since in the same text mundus stands for the 'cosmos as a whole' or possibly 'the heavenly region' (including the sphere of the fixed stars).

In view of the fact that no writing in the Corpus displays a purely cosmic theology either, and that such a writing can at most be 'reconstructed' by regarding parts of the De caelo as later additions, we have to conclude that here too a preconception about the development of Aristotle's thought has dominated the interpretation of the text.

Scholars who wish to avoid von Arnim's problem by taking a different view of the movement caused by the alius quidam are forced to give a rather strained explanation of replicatio, as if Cicero had no other, more current ways of indicating a 'circular motion' (such as 'conversio'). Sometimes they go so far as to interpret replicatio as a 'double movement'.

In effect, Pépin also accepts a cosmic theology for Aristotle's De philosophia. But at the same time his highly curious notion of a 'hyper-cosmic ether' takes him in the direction of the opponents.

In turn, the recent champions of a metaphysical theology in the De philosophia are forced to identify the mens with the alius quidam, against the apparent purport of Velleius' speech.

4. Is There an Alternative?

Given this unsatisfactory situation, do we have to accept that the finer drift of Velleius' speech must remain unclear to us, or can we attempt to interpret it on the basis of an entirely new approach? We would like to sketch such a new approach by connecting parts of Cicero's text with other texts which make it possible to form a new conception of the speech's content. We shall concentrate on the following three elements:

(1) alius quidam;
(2) a magistro suo Platone dissentiens; and
(3) replicatio.

And we shall conclude that the words of Velleius, to speak with H Cherniss, are based on 'a myth, the significance of which could not even be guessed without knowledge of their context'. At the same time we shall have to heed this author's word of caution: "All interpretations of 'fragments' of the περὶ φιλοσοφίας must be conjectural."
4.1 The *alius quidam*

We start by noting that the text, if read without the benefit of extra information, states that Aristotle awarded divinity exclusively to the *Nous*; and that besides he qualified the world, another figure, and the *caeli ardor* as 'gods'. At first sight this statement seems to suggest that none of the four entities mentioned is identical with any of the others. This is plausible in the case of the *nous*, the cosmos, and the *caeli ardor*. It also seems a natural assumption in the case of the *alius quidam*. Secondly, one can suppose that the ascription of *omnem divinitatem* to the *Nous* and the bare characterisation of the other entities as *deus* involves a subtle difference, in our text just as in 1.14.37 where Cleanthes is discussed. No doubt the *Nous* would also be typified as *deus*, but perhaps *omnem divinitatem* would not be assigned to the *mundus*, the *alius quidam*, and the *caeli ardor*.

In the second place, it should be noted that the *alius quidam* acts as *rector mundi* and is responsible for the continuity of the cosmic movement. As such this figure recalls the world archon Kronos in the myth of Plato's *Statesman*. However, Plato's myth only talks about Kronos as world archon. It is true that he is served by his subaltern gods/daemons in the execution of world government per region. But Plato leaves no room for a deity of equal or even higher status than Kronos. There is, however, a periodicity in the activity assigned to Kronos; sometimes he is actively occupied with ruling the world; other times he withdraws, together with the daemons that surround and serve him. What does he do during such periods? Only one answer is possible in the Platonic system: if the world archon is not occupied with the government of the world, he is engaged in contemplation. This is how Plato presented it in his *Phaedrus* myth and in his *Timaeus*. And it is also the dialectical pattern in his description of the ideal philosopher-king.

In Aristotle's *De philosophia*, however, apparently there was not just a single deity, who rules the world, but at least one other as well. And we are told that this other god was awarded divinity even more exclusively and was characterised specifically as *Nous*.

The activity of government was always classified by Aristotle as belonging to the sphere of *praxis* and was sharply distinguished from *theoretical* activity. It may be assumed, therefore, that the two activities of *theoria* and *praxis* which Plato had joined in a dialectical unity and a personal union were separated by Aristotle in the *De philosophia* and assigned to two distinct divine entities. His main motive for doing so, it would seem, was to exempt the supreme divine principle from any trace of changeability, in order to arrive at a theology free of contradictions. This was also the reason for his criticism of Plato’s myth of the divine Demiurges, a criticism which he set out at length in the same *De philosophia*. Aristotle held
that the distinction between philosophical and governing activities should also be applied to human society; he replaced Plato's ideal of the philosopher-king by the ideal of the sovereign who closely follows the advice of a philosopher.  

Now in other texts by Aristotle it is clear that he sees contemplation as the activity of the Nous. By contrast, praxis is typical of beings possessing a (rational) soul. It seems, therefore, that Velleius' words can be interpreted in the sense that Aristotle awarded the highest degree of divinity to the purely contemplative and perfect Nous; and that he distinguished another divine being, the World soul, to which he assigned the role of guaranteeing the movement and order of the world.

The separation of these two divine entities naturally raises the question of their relationship. We shall have to speak about this later. But nothing in the text itself seems to gainsay such a distinction.

The consequence of this distinction is that the divine world archon, who in Plato's Statesman, in the figure of Kronos, appeared to be the highest deity, is subordinated in Aristotle's De philosophia to a higher divine being.

Having arrived at this point, we may ask: can it be that Aristotle too gave his divine world ruler or World soul the name of the old leader of the Titans, Kronos? Should we assume this from Tertullian's remark that Aristotle at some point talked about a 'dreaming Kronos'? In that case we would have another example of the subtle way that Aristotle adopted and transformed motifs from Plato's dialogues, even when polemicising against his teacher. The fact that the qualification 'dreaming' suggests the idea of a higher, vigilant deity favours such an identification. More than once Aristotle uses the two concepts of 'sleeping' and 'waking' to illustrate the opposition between 'potential mind' and 'actual mind'. Moreover, the ancient Greeks will have immediately linked the figure of Kronos to his subordination and imprisonment by Zeus as described in Hesiod's Theogony. And in the eschatological myth of Plutarch's De facie in orbe lunae, of which we argued that it must have been strongly influenced by lost works of Aristotle, we find the figure of Kronos taken into custody and bound by Zeus with the bonds of sleep. There it is also said of Kronos that in his sleep, when his Titanic pathe have been silenced, he participates in the divine counsel of Zeus and mediates it to the daemons around him.

If these connections may be assumed, then the words of Velleius would also be an abstract account of a philosophical myth which Aristotle used as a kind of counterpart to Plato's myth in the Statesman (and the Timaeus). For the Epicurean, Aristotle too would count as a narrator of futiles commenticiasque sententias. He reckons Aristotle, like Plato and the Stoics, among the
philosophers who 'do not reason but dream'. This philosophical myth would then also have to be seen as the source of the motif of the 'sleeping World soul' which surfaces in the Hellenistic period.

4.2 A magistro suo Platone dissentiens

If the foregoing argument is correct, it follows that the De philosophia propounded a double theology in which a god, qualified as world ruler, was subordinated to a transcendent, metaphysical, purely contemplative Nous. As a cosmic god, the former must have been bound to the celestial sphere and thus to the substance of the special fifth element. The difference in divine quality between both beings must therefore have been explained by the fact that the cosmic god belonged to the cosmos and was psychically qualified, or in other words was bound to an ethereal soma. In his ability to participate in the highest intellectuality he corresponds to the highest Nous, but in his connection with psyche he has undergone a degradation with regard to the supreme divinity.

Indeed, the Epicurean clearly has good reason to posit that there is dissensus between Aristotle and his teacher Plato. We find in Plato neither the concept of a purely contemplative mens, nor the notion of a world ruler subordinate to it, nor the notion of a special, divine element, the ether. And in fact we argued that they were specifically developed by Aristotle in his polemic against Plato. The text as read by Ross, a magistro suo Platone dissentiens, is therefore entirely clear and without complications. A problem, however, is that suo is only found in a usually inferior manuscript tradition. A number of manuscripts of good quality read uno at this point. One manuscript moreover puts uno after rather than before Piatone. This variant raises problems, since it is not natural to assume a 'correction' of the uncomplicated text a magistro suo Platone dissentiens by a copyist who thought he knew better than his example. If the text originally read uno, however, it is easy to understand that a scribe may have been puzzled.

We can start by establishing that uno between magistro and Platone produces no satisfactory sense. If uno is to be considered at all, it must be connected with dissentiens: 'disagreeing on one matter'. We would therefore have to accept the position of uno after Platone in ms. M, or suppose that Platone is an old gloss added by a pedantic scribe, since Cicero would not have thought it necessary to mention the name of Aristotle's magister. One notes that in itself the juxtaposition of multa turbat and uno dissentiens has a certain rhetorical appeal.

Now in Cicero's writings dissentire is usually followed by the preposition de. Nevertheless there is one place in which we find an ablative without a
A decision about whether *uno* is acceptable will therefore have to be based on a consideration of linguistic factors and of the possible meaning which the statement would have. For we are not convinced by the verdict of A S Pease: *uno* 'gives no satisfactory sense here'. At the same time we cannot agree with A J Festugière, who thought that only the theory of the fifth element as substance of the celestial sphere was indicated as being fundamentally new with regard to Plato's views.

Rather we want to point out that all the aspects of Aristotle's theology mentioned by Velleius can be seen as consequences of one all-important point of dissent between him and Plato, namely a disagreement on the essence of the *nous* and the *psyche*. Aristotle seems to have reproached Plato for linking the functions of contemplation and *praxis* with each other in the macrocosmology as well as the microcosmology, and for thus creating an internal antinomy. For in this way Plato was forced to make his supreme divine principle productive, world-creating, and world-ordering, besides contemplative. In doing so, Plato accepted a form of changeability on the highest ontic level. This problem led Aristotle to draw a distinction between a purely contemplative supreme *Nous* and an ordering and moving World soul. As a result, the cosmos as a whole was presented as being ungenerated and imperishable. And directly connected with this is his introduction of the theory of the divine celestial element. In this way the four aspects of the theology of the *De philosophia* mentioned by Velleius can be understood as naturally resulting from a single radical point of disagreement between Aristotle and Plato.

Interestingly, the Christian author Hippolytus is also familiar with a tradition in which the differences of opinion between Plato and Aristotle are presented as culminating in a single point, namely the doctrine of the soul. In his psychology Aristotle took a step in a direction already indicated by Plato: he assigned the psychic to *Physis* and the cosmos to the divine part of *Physis*, it is true, but not to the sphere of reality supremely characterised by divinity and unchangeability, ie the sphere of the transcendent *Nous* outside the realm of nature.

In view of the foregoing, we think it quite possible that the Epicurean criticism expressed by Velleius proceeded from a single point of disagreement between Aristotle and his teacher. The reading *uno dissentiens* cannot therefore be simply brushed aside. We add that if this reading may be accepted and interpreted as above, it would reinforce the connection between Aristotle's *De philosophia* and the work *Eudemus or On the Soul* attributed to him.
In our foregoing discussion we argued that the notion of a special, divine element, the ether, was one of the results of Aristotle's criticism of Plato and as such part of his theory of the soul of human individuals and of the world. In our opinion Cicero's information about Aristotle's theory of a special fifth substance can be given a meaningful place and can be seen in close connection with the theory found in the *De caelo*. In our view there is no need to ascribe a materialistic psychology to Aristotle but neither are we forced to assume two completely different versions of Aristotle's doctrine of a fifth substance.

Recently, however, D E Hahm has strongly argued against the soundness of the information provided by Cicero. He concludes: 'The net result is that the testimony of Cicero and the Clementine Recognitions is all but useless as evidence for the presence of the theory of a fifth element in the lost *De philosophia*.' Hahm's view is all the more remarkable since many modern scholars have claimed, if only because of the more elevated style of *De caelo* 2,1, that this chapter almost certainly used material from a lost work. Almost invariably they cite the *De philosophia* as the most likely source.

First of all, Hahm argues that it is not certain that *caeli ardor* in Cicero's *De natura deorum* 1.13.33 must be taken to refer to a fifth element, as it usually has been since the last century. According to him, it is possible that in an early phase, before writing the *De caelo*, Aristotle thought that the celestial bodies consisted of Fire, while recognising their divinity. It is besides uncertain, in Hahm's view, that doxographical information attributing a fifth element to Aristotle in a way that cannot be explained from the preserved works necessarily goes back to the *De philosophia*. Finally, Hahm argues that the statements of Cicero according to which Aristotle assumed a 'fifth nature' as substance of the soul and the mind are hard to reconcile with Aristotle's philosophy as we know it. We are faced by the choice of interpreting this 'fifth nature' as 'corporeal', in which case there is the problem of a materialistic phase in Aristotle's psychology; or as 'immaterial', which leaves us with the problem of reconciling this with the theory of the *De caelo*.

Besides rejecting testimonies frequently regarded as evidence for the theory of a fifth element in the *De philosophia*, Hahm goes on to show that other texts argue against the presence of this theory. In particular he adduces one of Philo's proofs of the eternity of the world. Hahm concludes by proposing to distinguish three phases in Aristotle's cosmology, the first represented by *De caelo* 3 and 4, the second by *De caelo* 1 and 2, and a third attested to by the *Meteorologica*. Naturally, the *De philosophia*, which has his special attention, is included in the first phase.
In the first place we must make an objection to Hahm's method. If he claims that
the theory of the fifth element in the *De caelo* does not imply that this theory
played a role in earlier writings, he is turning things around. For the onus of proof
lies with whoever argues that a certain authentic Aristotelian theory was absent in
various early works.

We must also criticise the way he uses Philo's proof of the eternity of the world.
For if its origin is agreed to be in the *De philosophia*, there can be no doubt that
the proof forms part of an argument against the position of Plato's *Timaeus*. As in
the case of the other proofs which Philo includes in his *De aeternitate mundi*, we
must consider the possibility that Aristotle argues towards his conclusions on the
basis of positions accepted by his opponent. Aristotle seems to want to show his
partner in discussion that some of Plato's basic ideas lead to different conclusions
from those presented in the *Timaeus*.

To the main point of Hahm's argument, however, there is another, more serious
objection. It is inconceivable that in his lost works Aristotle did not develop his
theory of an eternal, divine fifth element. For the doctrine of the fifth element is a
necessary component of Aristotle's opposition to Plato's *Timaeus*, a component
which must have been central to his lost oeuvre. Aristotle's rejection of any kind
of dialectic in the supreme deity leads him to reject Plato's Demiurge and the idea
that the cosmos is generated. His conviction that the world is eternal, in the sense
of ungenerated and imperishable, forces him to dismiss Plato's theory of the World
soul. The theory of the eternal, fifth element which by nature moves in a circle
and which differs radically from the four 'earthly' material elements enables him to
replace Plato's theory of the World soul and to expose this theory as a view in
which the celestial gods are unnaturally bound to a perishable body and thus
condemned to a fate more miserable than that of Ixion. While maintaining his
belief in the divinity of the celestials and their eternal existence, Aristotle bases
this stance on his own new theory of the fifth element. The natural, circular course
of the latter differs qualitatively from the finite movement of the 'earthly' elements.
Like Plato, therefore, Aristotle distinguishes between two essentially different
components of the universe. There is, however, a profound difference. For Plato,
the cosmos is filled by the four elements, while the entire cosmos is pervaded by
the World soul. For Aristotle, the sublunary is the region of changeable and
perishable life. From it he sharply distinguishes the region of the celestial spheres,
consisting of the divine fifth element.

This new element is according to Aristotle a *soma* and can therefore be counted
among the 'natural somata'. But it does not share in the *hyle* of the four earthly
corpora. For this reason it is described as *ahylon*, as a kind of 'immaterial matter'
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('matière immatérielle'). The opposition between 'corporeal' and 'incorporeal' used by Hahm does not apply to this *soma*.

As soon as it is recognised that in Aristotle's theory this fifth element takes the place of Plato's World soul, we can assume, even without testimonies like that of Cicero, that it also played a part in Aristotle's anthropology. In his keen analysis of the various Aristotelian expositions of human psychology, Ch Lefèvre has shown that the *hylomorphic* discussion of the *De anima* is inextricably bound up with an *instrumentistic* one. To supplement his study, we shall have to talk about both modes of approach in relation to Aristotle's theory of the fine-material substance of the soul.

4.3 *Replicatione quadam*

Finally, we shall have to ask whether the above theory about the background of Velleius' critical speech can help to explain the mysterious words *replicatione quadam*.

The first thing to note is that the term *replicatio* cannot refer to the purely intellectual activity of the transcendent *Nous*. It must refer to an activity which mediates between the contemplative activity of the transcendent *Nous* and the variety of Nature's dynamic processes. And we may assume here that Aristotle accepted an analogy with the mediation which the *psyche* carries out in the individual human being between the intellectual activity of the human *nous* and the processes and movements of the human body.

If Aristotle in fact connected the *replicatio* with the Titanic god Kronos as symbolic representative of the World soul, hypotheses can be developed in two directions. In the first case, *replicatio* can be interpreted in the sense of the 'unrolling' or 'development' of something which is rolled up or wound up. Secondly, the meaning 'reflection', 'mirroring' can be considered.

(a) *Replicatio = 'unrolling', 'development'?*

First we shall review the possibility that Aristotle, in his myth about a world archon Kronos, introduced a contrast between a phase in which the irrational *pathe* hold sway over Kronos' intellectual powers and another phase in which the *pathe* have been silenced and are dominated by the superior power of the mind.

Such a contrast seems aimed at in the above-cited description of the god Kronos in Plutarch's *De facie*, although an objection here is that the exact text cannot be
determined. Moreover, such a periodicity in Kronos' condition can easily be linked to Aristotle's theory of cosmic catastrophes.\textsuperscript{71}

*Replicatio* could thus refer to one of these two contrasting phases of tension and relaxation, and presumably to the phase in which the typically 'psychic' rules over the pure intellect. This phase was probably presented as a loss of concentration and unity, of connection between pure intelligible Forms and the order of space, time and number. Through the movement of the cosmos which it brings about, the dynamism of the World soul 'develops' in time that which is united in the transcendent *Nous*. In such a train of thought, a close relationship with the Kronos myth of Plato's *Statesman* can be maintained. Using the image of a reel of thread, linked to an eye attached higher up,\textsuperscript{72} this myth describes the process toward unity and harmony of the cosmos as the rolling up of the reel by the world archon Kronos, and the evolution toward chaos and disharmony as the unwinding of the reel in the opposite direction (\attic{άνακόκλησις}, \attic{άνειλιξις}), after Kronos has let go of the reel, i.e. has withdrawn from the government of the cosmos. In Latin texts using forms of *replicare* the sense 'to unroll' is applicable more than once.\textsuperscript{73}

In this connection it is remarkable that in the *Corpus* Aristotle also uses the image of wound-up ropes or strings which cause a certain movement by being unwound. And he uses this image as a model of the way that the soul functions as motor of the body.\textsuperscript{74} In the *De motu anim* Aristotle compares the muscles, whose condition is governed by psychic processes registered by the vital *pneuma*, with the strings of a winding mechanism. Once the strings have been wound up or tightened, and as soon as a catch has been removed, the automaton starts to move as a result of the unwinding of the strings.\textsuperscript{75} One might consider the possibility that Aristotle represented the double movement of the motor of the world by the double condition of the World soul or Kronos. We suggest that in that case the term *replicatio* in Cicero refers to the phase of unwinding or 'development' in time of what is joined in thought.\textsuperscript{76} And this would again be an example of Aristotle's creative transformation of Platonic themes. In the *Statesman* Plato uses the ancient Kronos myth to describe the twofold condition of the divine *Nous*, namely a condition of self-sufficiency and a condition of being orientated, not to itself, but to an outside world. Aristotle appropriated this theme, but used it to make a typical correction: in his conception Kronos is not the *Nous* who winds and unrolls, but the World soul who 'gets wound up' and 'relaxes'. In the course of time, through the dynamics of the celestial spheres, that which is joined in the divine thought of Zeus comes to 'develop', just as a spring which is coiled is kept together until it 'develops' in a process of unwinding.
(b) Replicatio = 'reflection', 'mirroring'? 

But there is another direction in which our conjectures might go. Our identification of the *alius quidam* with the 'dreaming Kronos' mentioned by Tertullian entails that this cosmic figure as symbol of the World soul is subordinate to a supreme god Zeus, who transcends the cosmos and is characterised as ever-vigilant and ever-active in contemplation. What, then, is their relationship? In his lost oeuvre Aristotle indicated that there is a relation between these two levels of reality which does not exist between the transcendent *Nous* and the sublunary: so much can be inferred from the repeated assertions that Aristotle confined god's 'providence' to the region of the supralunary spheres of heaven. But this says nothing further about the specific nature of that relation. Nor should we be too quick in concluding that in his lost work Aristotle assumed an *actio ad extra* of the supreme deity on the cosmos which he went on to reject in the work known to us. For as we surmised above, Aristotle introduced the distinction between *Nous* and World soul precisely in order to guarantee the self-sufficiency and complete self-identity of the highest divine principle.

Is it possible to interpret the relation between Zeus and Kronos in a way which does not imply an *actio ad extra* of the highest principle? Here we should consider the information indicating that in his lost work Aristotle repeatedly used the motif of sleeping and dreaming to explain the phenomenon that mortals acquire superhuman knowledge, mantic knowledge. According to Sextus Empiricus, Aristotle held that sleep loosens the bond with which the body fetters the human soul, so that the soul regains its own nature. Through the removal of unnatural obstructions, the human soul manifests itself as possessing by nature a higher kind of knowledge such as daemons and gods presumably possess.

Now Tertullian's remark about the 'dreaming Kronos' in Aristotle is also found in a passage where he talks about the reliability of prophetic dreams. He makes his remark after listing a long series of pagan authors who accepted the mantic nature of dreams. We shall therefore have to assume that, in the Aristotelian context to which Tertullian refers, Kronos too was presented as a dreamer of mantic dreams.

In this context it is significant that two other Greek passages discussing a sleeping Kronos call sleep the means by which Kronos participates in 'the most perfect vision' and 'the divine counsel of Zeus'. The latter passage in Plutarch also mentions that Kronos' *pathe* must be calmed before his royal and pure *nous* acquires knowledge of the counsel of Zeus, in order to mediate it to *daimones*. This passage too carefully avoids speaking of any action by Zeus directed at
Kronos. In his cave Kronos, bound by the chains of sleep, participates in the cognition of the truly free Zeus through a change which takes place within himself.

But is the knowledge acquired by Kronos on a par with that of Zeus? It is possible that Aristotle assumed a difference in level between the knowledge acquired by the nous of the World soul and the knowledge of the transcendent Nous.

Here it seems legitimate to digress briefly on a striking theory found in the Arabian author Al-Farabi (± 870-950 AD) and discussed by R Walzer in an article in 1957. Al-Farabi described mantic activity as a natural activity of the soul, not as a condition of being possessed by supernatural powers. The mantic faculty supports the rational faculty and is as such an indispensable element of the whole man. Walzer sees a parallel between this view and that of Plato and Sextus Empiricus' statement about Aristotle. According to Al-Farabi, the phantasia is the seat of mantic activity. The phantasia is on the one hand the place where impressions (τύποι, τυπώσεις) are formed as a result of sense-perception. On the other hand it is also capable of activity by itself in which it is not dependent on sense-perception. In particular this activity takes place in sleep and during dreams, but in exceptional cases it also occurs while the subject is awake. It is called a kind of 'imitation' (μίμησις). This imitation may concern matters of man's physical existence. But the phantasia can also be creatively occupied with realities of a higher order, matters which are supplied by the mind.

Great prophets and seers, according to Al-Farabi, are people of superior quality whose phantasia is particularly strong. At the same time their phantasia is supplied with material by a particularly strong intellect which has reached the highest metaphysical knowledge of which mortal beings are capable. Their phantasia reproduces through 'imitation' the abstract intelligibilia of the nous in sensible symbols.

Walzer gives many details about the theory. He also notes that there are differences compared with Aristotle's views as we know them. And he carefully tries to point out influences from the period between Al-Farabi and Aristotle. It is certainly not possible to indicate the exact relationship of Al-Farabi's theory to the views in Aristotle's lost oeuvre. But perhaps it is legitimate to hypothesise that authentic traces of Aristotle's lost work may be found in this Arabian philosopher. In his lost work Aristotle had assigned an important role to mantic phenomena, and on the basis of what we read in the Kronos myth of Plutarch's De facie we have good reason to believe that he also considered manteia a significant factor in the transmission of the content of the transcendent divine Nous to the cosmic World soul.
On the basis of the information in Al-Farabi we may also assume that this relationship was presented by Aristotle as a participation by the *nous* of the World soul in the transcendent *Nous*, with as a result an influx of intelligibilia in the *phantasia* of the World soul, resulting in turn in a *mimesis* of the intelligibilia in the *phantasia*. 89

It might be considered that the term used by Velleius is meant to be a Latin rendition of this 'reflection' or 'mirroring' of the intelligibilia of the transcendent *Nous* in the *phantasia* of the World soul.

NOTES


4. *Loc cit* : 'Aristotelesque in tertio de philosophia libro multa turbat a magistro uno Platone dissentiens'. For the textual tradition and proposed emendations, see M Untersteiner, *op cit* 255f. See also section 4.2 below.

5. In Cicero's text:
   (1) modo enim menti tribuit omnem divinitatem;
   (2) modo mundum ipsum deum dicit esse;
   (3) modo alium quendam praeficit mundo eique eas partes tribuit ut replicatione quadam mundi motum regat atque tueatur;
   (4) tum caeli ardorem deum dicit esse.


7. *Op cit* 139. Jaeger, therefore, identifies the *alius quidam* with the *mens*. 
8. Ibid, 140.
11. *Op cit* 3-7; repr. 1-4. According to von Arnim, Aristotle still entertained a purely cosmic theology while writing the *De caelo*, in which the movement of the celestial sphere was conceived as a self-movement. Only later were passages added mentioning the theory of the Unmoved Mover, *op cit* 8ff; repr. 6ff.
12. *Op cit* 7; repr. 4-5.
15. *Art cit* 169.
16. *Art cit* 169. In his *Aristotle On the Heavens* (London 1939) xxxii n. Guthrie in fact corrects himself somewhat: 'I consider my earlier assertion of a materialist stage in Aristotle's thought to have been too positive in expression'.
17. *Art cit* 171.
20. Plato, *Statesman* 270d3; 286b. The connection of *replicatio* with this passage had already been made by W Theiler, *Zur Geschichte der teleologischen Naturbetrachtung bis auf Aristoteles* (Zurich 1925; repr. Berlin 1965) 84 n.1.
27. *Op cit* 156.
33. *Op cit* 47.
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34. Op cit 50.
36. Loc cit
37. Plato, Statesman 272e.
38. Cf Plato, Phaedrus 246e-247e; Timaeus 42c-5 and Republic 7, 519c-520a.
39. For example, Nic. Eth. 10. 8, 1178b7-32; De caelo 2 12, 292a22-25.
40. Cf Arist., De philosophia fr 18; 19 Ross.
41. Themistius, Or. 107c-d = Arist., Π. βασιλείας fr 2 Ross.
42. Tertullian, De anima 46.10 = Arist., Protrepticus fr 20 Ross. On this text, see A P Bos, 'A "dreaming Kronos" in a lost work by Aristotle', forthcoming in L'Antiquité classique 58 (1989).
43. See in particular H J Drossaert Lullofs, De ogen van Lynkeus (Leiden 1967) 16-18.
44. Cf De anima 2.1, 412a25-26; Metaph. (Theta) 6, 1048a30-b2; Nic Eth 10.8, 1178b18-20; Magn. Mor. 2.6 1201b12-20.
46. Plutarch, De facie 941f-942a.
49. See A S Pease, M. T. Ciceronis De natura deorum (Cambridge 1955) 1.240. The reading uno in the manuscripts ACPNOBF was rejected by O Plasberg (Leipzig 1908). He was followed by W Jaeger, Aristotle 140 n.2; W D Ross, Ar. Fragm. Sel. 94; M Untersteiner, Op cit and B Effe, Studien 158 n.7.
50. Cicero, Acad. 2.5.15: 'Peripateticos et Academicos .. a quibus Stoici ipsi verbis magis quam sententiiis dissenserunt'.
51. A J Festugière, La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste (Paris 1949) 2.243 n.1; so too J Pépin, Op cit (1964) 137 n.1 and 140, followed by us in Providentia divina; the theme of divine pronoia in Plato and Aristotle (Assen 1976) n.89.
52. Hippolytus, Refutatio 1.20.3: καὶ σχέδον τὰ πλείστα τῷ Πλάτωνι σύμφωνός ἔστιν πλὴν τοῦ περὶ μυχῆς δόγματος, ὅ μὲν γὰρ Πλατόν ἀθάνατον, ὁ δὲ Ἅρ. ἐπιδιαμένειν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ ταύτην ἐναφανίζεσθαι τῷ κέπτω σώματι, ὅ ὑποτήθηται εἶναι μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων τεσσάρων.
For this remarkable position, compare also Hermias, Irrisio 2.3. Although Aristotle did assume the eternity and imperishability of the celestial element in his lost works, there too he apparently attributed eternity in the proper, individual sense only to the nous. Cf Themistius, In De anima 106.29-107.5 = Arist., Eudemus fr 2 Ross; Olympiodorus, In Pl. Phaed. 124.18-20 (Norvin). (The idea of the 'deposition' of the soul by the nous is also found in Plutarch, De facie 28 944e-f; Corpus Hermeticum 1 (Poimandres) 25-26.)
53. In an earlier article I debated whether the traditional titles *Eudemus* or *On the Soul* and *Protrepticus* refer to two different writings or are two titles of one and the same work, *Dionysius* 8 (1984) 19-51. It is remarkable that the catalogue of Ptolemaeus el-Garib lists, instead of the usual two titles *Protrepticus* and *De philosophia*, one entry, 'Exhortation to philosophy', and that the *Eudemus* is absent. Cf I Düring, *Ar. in the ancient biographical tradition* (Göteborg 1957) 222.


55. As defended by H von Arnim, *op cit* ; W K C Guthrie, *art cit* (1933) 169. In his preface to the French edition of F Nuijens, *Ontwikkelingsmommenten in de zielkunde van Aristoteles* (Louvain 1948) xii ff, A Mansion also talks about 'materialism' in Aristotle's psychology, as do R A Gauthier, J Y Jolif, *Ar.*, *L'Ethique à Nicom.* 1 (Louvain 1958) 10*, (19702) 28* n.70. For the question of 'materialism' and 'hylozoism' in Aristotle, cf P Moraux, 'Quinta essentia', 1216-1224. See also Ph Merlan in A H Armstrong (ed), *The Cambridge Hist. of later Greek and early Medieval philosophy* (Cambridge 1970) 40ff. According to this author, 'the possibility cannot be discounted that at some phase of his philosophical career Aristotle identified the soul with ether, thus explaining why it is permanently moved ... Much in the history of the Peripatos can better be understood if we side with Kampe and Arnim and take into account that the materialistic interpretation of Aristotle was in antiquity very frequent and started very early' (*loc cit* n.9). And 'undoubtedly, ether was meant to replace the astral soul and be elevated to be the only cause of the circular movements of the celestial bodies, and it is reasonable to assume that at times, at least, it was also meant to replace (or to explain) the human soul' (41).


58. *Art cit* 67; cf 70. He already expressed his doubts in his important study *The origins of Stoic cosmology* (Columbus, Ohio, 1977) 101 with n.27.

59. For a more extensive discussion of *De caelo* 2.1, see A P Bos, 'Manteia in Aristotle', *de Caelo II 1*', forthcoming in *Apeiron* 21 (1988).

60. Arist., *De philos.* fr. 26 Ross.

61. *Art cit* 60-63. It may be noted that Cicero in his discussion of Cleanthes in *ND* 1.14.37 speaks about the 'ardorem qui aether nominetur'.
62. Art cit 63; cf 70.
63. Art cit 65. This particularly concerns the texts included in De philos. fr.27 Ross; cf n.54 above.
65. Art cit 70ff, where he discusses Philo. Aet. 28-34.
66. Art cit 73.
67. Ibid.
68. Cf J Pépin, Théologie cosmique (Paris 1964) 243. P Moraux, 'L'exposé de la philosophie d'Aristote chez Diogène Laercé (V 28-34), Rev. philos. de Louvain 47 (1949) 37, also still accepted that in De philos. Aristotle had presented the fifth element as 'une sorte de matière subtile douée de fonctions psychiques'. Moreover, he still believed in the influence of this Aristotelian theory in Heraclides, Critolaus, Diodorus of Tyre, Philo of Alexandria, Plutarch, Plotinus, Porphyry, and the Corpus Hermeticum.
69. Ch Lefèvre, Sur l'évolution d'Aristote en psychologie (Louvain 1972) 282-284. Of this author we mentioned already his 'Quinta natura et psychologie aristotélienne' with its very careful refutation of P Moraux, 'Quinta essentia' (1963). Lefèvre concludes there 'que les doxographies nominatives ne méritent pas ... la suspicion où les tiennent divers critiques' (p39).
70. Plut., De facie in orbe lunae 942a in the text as read by H Cherniss (Loeb CL).
71. For this theory of catastrophes, see De philos. fr 8 Ross; Meteor. 1.3 339b20 ff; 1.14 352a28; De caelo 1.3 270b16 ff; De motu anim. 3 699a27; Polit. 2.8 1269a5; 7.10 1329b25; Metaph. Lambda 8 1074a38 ff; cf also De mundo 6 399a25-34.
74. Arist., De motu anim. 6-8; cf the commentary of M C Nussbaum (Harvard 1978).
75. De motu anim. 7 701b2 ff. It is remarkable that the image of the movement of the automaton is applied macrocosmically in De mundo 6 398b13-16: τούτο ἢν τὸ θειότατον, τὸ μετὰ ραστώνης καὶ ἀπλῆς κυνήσεως παντοδάπας ἀποτελεῖν ἰδέας, ὡσπερ ἀμέλει δρόσιν οἱ μεγαλοτέχνοι, διὶ μίας οργάνου σχαστηρίας πολλὰς καὶ ποικίλας ἐνεργείας ἀποτελοῦτες.
76. Cf also the use of 'replicare' in Cic., De divin. 1.56.127: 'non enim illa quae futura sunt, subito exsistent, sed est quasi rudentis explicatio sic traductio temporis nihil novi efficientis et primum quidque replicantis'; in the translation of W A Falconer (Loeb C L): 'the evolution of time is like the unwinding of a cable; it creates nothing new and only unfolds each event in its order.'

78. *Corpus Hermeticum* 10.5.

79. Plutarch, *De facie* 942a.


81. *Art cit* 142 with reference to Pl., *Tim.* 72a; *Phaedr.* 248d; *Rep.* 9 571c, and Arist., *De philos.* fr 12a Ross.

82. R Walzer, *Art cit* 143f; *cf* H Daiber, 'Prophetie und Ethik' 730ff.

83. R Walzer, *Art cit* 144.

84. *Art cit* 146.


86. *Art cit* 146: 'Aristotle's cautious attitude towards phenomena of this kind seems to be abandoned (it was evidently not appreciated in late Greek philosophy).'

87. H Daiber, 'The ruler as philosopher' 6, 'Prophetie und Ethik' 729-741, judges that Al-Farabi's theory of prophecy through *mimesis*, for which no parallels are found in preserved Greek texts, is not a product of Peripatetic (Alexander of Aphrodisias) and Middle-Platonic notions, but an independent combination of scattered Aristotelian thoughts made by Al-Farabi himself: 'wer ... eine verlorene Griechische Quelle postulieren wollte, unterschätzt die Selbständigk... eines islamischen Philosophen vom Formate Farabi's', p.737.

88. As said earlier, we suppose that Aristotle's primary concern was to avoid the assumption of an *actio ad extra* on the part of the transcendent Nous. Mantic dreams were not presented as *theopempta* in the dialogues either, but must be understood to result from the restored relationship between the *nous* of the soul and the ontologically superior level. cf A P Bos, in *Apeiron* 21 (1988).

89. We can consider the possibility here that Aristotle used Platonic motifs in describing the 'dreaming Kronos' in his 'Cave'. In that case Aristotle may have spoken about the images projected in the *phantasia* of the World soul in terms such as Plato used in his 'Allegory of the Cave'.