Time is not a unitary notion. There are many sorts of time. We ourselves today live with at least two very different kinds. One of them obtrudes itself constantly, in fact 'rubs itself in' by the sight of the position of the hands on a watch or clock, and by the date in the calendar. This sort of time dominates all people in modern western societies, at least in the cities, though less so in the countryside. Of the other kind of time we are not so explicitly aware, because it is inherent in our experience, and does not come 'at us' from outside. It is well known that when we are in pain or hungry or bored, even ten minutes 'feel' a very long time, and when we are happily absorbed in something interesting, we hardly notice even the passing of an hour. If we speak of a certain date as a red-letter day, we combine the two sorts of time, the quantitative and abstract and the concrete and qualitative. The one regulates our lives in relation to institutions, whether social or technical; the other we experience as sensitive individual persons. One could maintain that this latter sort of time should not be called 'time' at all. This would, however, not be appropriate, because in Homer the word χρόνος, the very word with which the term 'chronology' is formed, is used to express a quality of temporal experience, as Hermann Fränkel has shown. It appears in the description of Odysseus' shipwreck after he has left Calypso's island (Od 5,313ff):

A great wave drove down from above him / with a horrible rush, and spun the raft in a circle, / and he was thrown clear far from the raft (tr Lattimore).

After a description of the demolition of all but the platform of the raft, we hear (319ff):

He himself was ducked for a long time (πολύν χρόνον), nor was he able / to come up quickly from under the great rush of the water, / for the clothing which divine Kalypso had given weighted him / down. At last he got to the surface and so on. The duration of the 'long time' that Odysseus was under water is not a matter of how many minutes, but of his suffering when he is desperate to come up quickly; he is kept under by the onrush of the wave and the weight of his clothes, until he comes up at last - what a relief! - to spit out the salt water he has swallowed and look for his raft. The word χρόνος in the phrase πολύν χρόνον here is remote from measured time or time as an orderly, factual sequence as in the concept of chronology. It implies an experience of 'waiting'; and, as Fränkel infers
from a range of other examples, χρόνος in Homer is mostly an experience of 'painful waiting'.

To turn to Maori, the word for 'time' used today is taima, an English loanword which tells us nothing about the thinking of ancient Maori. The word wā which can be translated by 'time' is much wider in meaning. In addition to meaning 'time, season', it means 'definite space, interval, area, region', 'indefinite, unenclosed country', and as an intransitive verb 'to be far advanced'. So it comprises both space and time in a general way.

Let us then change our approach and look at a specific text, as we did in Homer. The story of Maui was composed and written down in 1849 by the Arawa chief Te Rangikaheke. When Maui in the shape of a pigeon perches on a branch above his parents (who do not know that the pigeon is Maui), and hits them with hard fruit, everybody gets up in anger and pelts him with stones:

For two hours perhaps they were pelting him, according to the Pakeha; according to the Maori, it was said to be going on for a long time.

Let us note that the word for 'hour' is haora, a loanword from English. The second passage is concerned with spatial distance, but similar. The occasion described is quite illuminating. Maui persuades his brothers to paddle out to the open sea further and further. Again and again the brothers plead that they should let the anchor down now, but Maui urges them on:

They paddled, and paddled, far out. His companions said, 'Here!' He said, 'When the line of the land on the horizon has disappeared, when it is completely gone, then let the anchor down, perhaps 184 miles out, according to the way of thinking (tikanga) of the Pakeha, according to that of the Maori when we are far out into the open sea'.

The Maori word for 'miles' here is maero, again an English loanword.

It is plain that this highly intelligent and discerning Arawa chief is aware of a fundamental difference between the Maori and the European in their views of both space and time. The most obvious feature of the European view is that lime and space are determined by quantitative units of measurement, hours and miles, and that exact numbers are required to give a proper estimate of duration and extension. I strongly suspect that Te Rangikaheke makes fun of the Pakeha's love of exact figures when he mentions, however tentatively (pea means 'perhaps'), the 184 miles, which are really quite absurd in a mythical tale.

What is expressed by the Maori word roa, 'long' for time in this context? Is it merely a rather vague indication of what should properly be expressed in hours? Or
is it something different? Only the context can show this. The futility of all those people pelting Maui, the pigeon, with stones for a long time is made apparent by the way in which it is brought to an end. I translate:

He was struck by his own father, behold! he was hurt! But it was he himself who decided that he should be allowed to strike him. If he had not done that, he [that is, his father] could not possibly have struck him. He [that is, Maui] deliberately injured his left wing by a spell. Behold, he fell right down...

Here the 'long time' is experienced as a series of impotent attempts the futility of which was obvious to the listeners who would know from the preceding story that the pigeon was Maui, and therefore the pelting could have continued indefinitely without any effect. For Maui was more than human and in full control of the situation by his power of magic.

In this passage the Maori words convey duration in an emphatic but vague way, but also - and that is more important in the context - a considerable load of feeling, a feeling of futile persistence. While the quantitative element is limited, the qualitative aspect which is a matter of psychological experience is strong. It is remarkable that Te Rangikaheke saw the difference so clearly.

The difference is described by M I Finley:

We are in thrall to the highly sophisticated, highly abstract scientific conception of time as a measurable continuum, a conception which is largely meaningless for ordinary human purposes ... Duration of time, if it is a consideration at all, which is not always the case, is not experienced as a measurable quantity, but as an associative or emotional quality.4

Prytz Johansen describes the difference in relation to Maori specifically:

Our time is first of all a quantitative phenomenon; as it proceeds it is measured accurately by days, hours, and minutes. The Maori's time is first of all qualitative, its most important function is that of containing [the idea of 'containing' is I think too spatial to be appropriate for qualitative time] definite events. There is no word covering 'time' in our abstract sense; at most we may speak of a 'period', wa, takiwa, or tau, the last word, however, often being more concrete: 'season' or 'year' ... There is then no technical word for 'years'.5

It is also interesting to note what the African scholar Mbiti says:

The question of time is of little or no academic concern to African peoples in their traditional life. For them, time is simply a composition of events which have occurred, those which are taking place now and those which are immediately to occur. What has not taken place or what has no likelihood of an immediate occurrence falls in the category of 'No-time'. What is certain to occur, or what
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falls within the rhythm of natural phenomena, is in the category of inevitable or potential time.6

I want to explore the qualitative notion of time in two areas, first in the time-reckoning of early Greece and ancient Maori, and secondly in the 'directedness' of time envisaged in those early cultures and how this affected their storytelling.

In both cultures, time was not anything in itself, nor was it continuous, but it was inherent in concrete and distinct events, as Mbili calls it, 'a composition of events'. Such events were, on the one hand, the course of the sun for the day, and the moon's waxing and waning for the month. The year was articulated by the seasons with the variations in the sun's presence, in the rising and setting of the stars, in the life of plants, trees, and animals. In close connection with these events in nature, time was, on the other hand, inherent in the activities of man. As Arthur S Thomson puts it so neatly: 'The sun was the people's clock by day and the moon by night'.7 In Il 16, 779, after the Sun had moved around the middle of the sky, it changed its course towards the 'loosing of the oxen from the yoke', βουλυτόνδε. In his book on the Nuer, a Nilotic people, Evans-Pritchard speaks of their 'cattle-clock',8 and Mbili 9 sets out the times of day among a people of Uganda in terms of milking cattle, driving them out to pasture and so on.

A very telling description of Maori time-reckoning is given by the missionary Yale in his Account of New Zealand of 1835:10

They compute time by moons, of which they count ten in the course of the year, reckoning three moons for one at the latter end of the season. The reason they give for this is that during two months between autumn and winter they have nothing to do in the way of cultivation; their time, consequently, is then occupied in comparative idleness.

Best comments:

This writer adds concerning the two unnamed months: "These two months are not in their calendar; they do not reckon them, nor are they in any way accounted for".

It could not be clearer that in this way of thinking time is inherent in events; when there are no events, then there is no time. The same gap in the sequence of months occurs in ancient Roman calendars,11 and the Latin phrase for 'the dead of night' is nox intempesta, that part of the night which is, or has, no time.

In Homer, words for 'day', 'all night' and 'dawn' are particularly interesting. Ημα can mean 'day' or 'daylight', but also night and day together. More quantitatively, it denotes a point of time, eg in ηματι κείνῳ, or one in a series, τρίτῳ ηματι. On
the other hand, it expresses quality of temporal experience in a typically Homeric phrase like δούλιον ἡμαρ which means practically 'slavery', 'the state of slavery' where the idea of time almost disappears within the experience and suffering of being in that condition.

Perhaps the most striking instance of Homeric time being tied to human psychological experience is the word παννυχίος or πάννυχος which occurs in the two epics 21 times, 19 times of people being in a certain state or doing something: they are 'all-night-persons', as it were; 'all night' is a quality of these persons in whatever it is they are doing. Once only it is said of a ship pursuing its course (Od 2, 434), which is hardly any different, because ships were anything but inanimate objects, nor are they always today, I believe. At the end of Odyssey 1, Telemachus 'all-nighter, wrapped in thick sheep's wool, was turning over the journey proposed by Athene':

ενθ' ὁ γε παννυχίος, κεκαλυμμένος οἶδς αὐτρ.
βούλευε φρεσίν ἡ σιν ὀδὸν τὴν πέφραδ' ἀθήνη.

The word ἡώς does not always simply mean 'dawn' or 'daybreak'. It can be a portion of the day. Achilles says to Lycaon when he is about to kill him (II 21, 111) έσσεται ἡ ἡώς ἓ δετή ἓ μέσον ἡμαρ, 'there will be a dawn' or better 'a morning or an afternoon or a middle day when someone will take my life in battle'. Here the span of the day is divided into three parts: the first is ἡώς which comprises the dawn and the time of increasing light. Next comes the day which has the quality of 'being in the middle', μέσον ἡμαρ, and the third part is the afternoon, δετή. Here, each of the three parts of the day has its own quality, the first and third parts through the increasing or decreasing of sunlight. Both these temporal notions are determined by events in nature as experienced by human beings.

But in the best known Homeric indications of daybreak, something more happens: ἡμος ἐν ἡριγενεια φάνη ροδοδάκτυλος ἡώς. Here, ἡώς is the 'dawn' proper and not the 'morning', as ἡριγενεια and the aorist of φάνη show. But beyond that, the experience of dawn is developed into the mythical image of a young woman coming up over the horizon, and the spreading of the first rays of rosy light is transformed into Dawn's 'rosy fingers'. The experience of dawn has not remained passive, but has been moulded by active imagination into something much brighter, so typical of Homer and of Greek. If it is simply labelled as 'personification' it is stone-dead.

I will compare this with a passage from the Maori myth of Maui catching the Sun, where the situation is somewhat different and yet comparable. It is sunrise rather
than dawn that is described. Also, it must be realised that in the tropics where the story of Maui originated the sun was not necessarily a friend. Its heat was inimical, even dangerous for human beings. In this myth, the Sun goes too fast so that the day is not long enough for man to work for his food; and the heat is too deadly, and parches both man and all nature. So Maui and his brothers travel to the place of the Sun's rising, and there build a complicated trap in order to catch him:

The peerless champion came forth [that is, the Sun], like a fire which spreads over the land [note the simile]. Up he came, up he came, the head went inside [that is, into the trap], next his forelimbs went in. Then the ropes were pulled tight, and the spring and the snare jumped. Behold, the hero was caught firmly by the ropes of those people. Up leapt the other peerless champion, Maui-tikitiki-o-Taranga [his full name contains his great mana] with his club [that is, the magical jawbone of his ancestress]. Behold the Sun cried out loudly, he cried out as he was being beaten, for a long time. Then he was allowed to go, and he went off crying.

And a little later:

Then he was allowed to go. Marvellous: for the first time that hero went slowly, Tamanuitera, that Great Person, the Sun! 13

Later in the story, Maui tells this exploit to his father in order to convince him that he, Maui, has the strength to wrest immortality from Hinenuitepo, the 'Great-Night-Woman':

he [the Sun] was constrained by me to go slowly, he was beaten again and again, his strength is small, and his journey takes a long time, and his heat is small.

Since my blows struck him, he is divided hither and thither; that is because his rays going out are many, and they come forth in various places.

The origin of the Sun sending out rays instead of one, devastating blaze is here described in terms of myth. Myth-creating imagination has been at work here as in Homer. But its 'feel' is very different. In this originally tropical story, the Sun is closer in character to the Greek Cerberus or other monsters defeated by Heracles.

For Hesiod, the month had thirty days (Erga 766) which were distinguished by ordinal numbers, a roughly quantitative procedure. But those days varied in quality: they might be propitious or not for planting, reaping, sheep-shearing, getting married, building a boat and so on.14 The ancient Maori counted, not the days, but the nights of the moon or month (the word is the same for both, marama),15 and there are lists of names of the nights extant, usually thirty, varying among different tribes; and these nights (which included the daytime, as our days include the nighttime) differed in quality, like Hesiod's days. Some were propitious for planting kumara or catching certain sorts of fish and so on, others were not.
As for the year, the 'cyclical' nature of the ancient notion of time is well known. It is directly experienced in the phases of the moon and the ever returning seasons. Homer speaks of 'the year coming round back again', ἴχνεν περιτελλομένου ἔτεος (Od 11, 295). Correspondingly in Maori, huri means 'to turn round, to turn':

huri ana te pō, huri ana te ao, 'night is turning, daylight is turning', and huritau means 'recurring at the interval of a year, anniversary'. The title of a book edited by Michael King is 'Te Ao Hurihuri, The World moves on'. More precisely translated it would be 'The World of Light turns around'.

Any time span longer than a year was viewed from the perspective of human life, namely as a number of 'generations', both in early Greek and in ancient Maori society. In both societies, the ancestors were of primary importance. In Homer, the heroes are called by their patronymics in addition to or instead of their own names, Atreides, Peleides and so on. The longest genealogy given in the Odyssey is that of the seer Theoclymenos whose ancestral lineage included the famous seers Melampus, Amphirhaos and Polypeides. M I Finley sums up the attitude of the Greeks:

The profundity of the Greeks' kinship attachment, throughout their history, is immediately apparent from their passion for genealogies. That never changed radically at any time.

It is obvious that determining past time by 'generations' is not a quantitatively exact measurement, although it can be used for an approximate estimate, and was so used by Solon to determine the time of the 'Flood', according to Plato's Timaeus (22a-b). But the real meaning of the descent line of a person's ancestors is something completely different, as we shall see later. To a Maori his genealogy was, and is, supremely important. It represents the source of his own life and of his status. We shall return to this presently.

To turn to my second question, what is a people's attitude to life or 'living life' as a temporal process, if 'time' is of the sort I have described? Stanford, in his commentary on the Odyssey, 24, 452, gives a clear answer for the Homeric world. He translates the characterisation of wise old Halitherses ὥ γὰρ ὁ ὄρος ἑρεῖα πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω (which is literally 'for he alone saw in front [πρόσω] and behind [ὀπίσω]') by 'a man unique in his vision of the past and the future'; 'their [the ancient Greeks'] mental orientation was towards the known, the traditional and the customary, unlike the modern "progressive" outlook which tends to turn its back on the past and its face towards the future'. According to Cunliffe's dictionary, the range of meaning of that pair of words in Homer is the following: πρόσωθεν means 'in front of, before, preceding someone or something; before, in the front part; in front or in advance of others', when it is used of place. When it is used of
time, it means 'before, in time past, in days of old' (cf also πρότερος). In contrast to this, διασθένει means 'behind, in rear, in hinder part; remaining behind' when it refers to place, but when it refers to time it means 'afterwards, hereafter, thereafter, in the future, in time to come, later'. In addition, διάσω where -σω indicates direction means 'backwards' locally, but temporally 'afterwards, in the future, in time to come'. It is interesting to note that Herodotus still expresses 'in the books yet to come, the following books' by ἐν τοῖς διασθέν Λόγοισι (5.22; 7.213) or ἐν τοῖς διασώ Λόγοισι (1.75), but in a scholion on Od 3, 366 διασθέν refers to what has gone before. By that time, whenever it was, a notion of continuous time moving from past through present to future would have been firmly established.

In Maori the traditional attitude to 'living in time' is extraordinarily similar. The Maori time-notion is described by Joan Metge in this way:

Pakehas take it for granted that human beings stand in the present with their backs to the past and faces to the future. Maoris on the other hand describe the past as nga ra o mua, 'the days in front', and the future as kei muri, 'behind'. They move into the future with their eyes on the past. In deciding how to act in the present, they examine the panorama of history before their eyes, and select the model that is most appropriate and helpful from the many presented there.

S M Mead unfolds the linguistic complexity more fully:

The key words are mua, meaning 'front', but which also means 'before', 'in advance of', 'formerly', and 'first', and muri which means 'behind', 'the rear', 'the hind part', 'the sequel', 'the time to come' and also 'the future'.

Mead comments:

Thus the past is usually in front of ego and the present is changing into the past as each event occurs. Logically, the known world is the past ... The unknown is the future which cannot be seen. What has happened to us is history and it is this that defines our present position ... It is the future that we cannot see and hence it lies behind us, not in front as the Europeans would have it.

Is there then in the idea of 'being in front of, in advance of' or 'preceding' other people or events an idea which is active in both cultures - is there something that has a claim to primary importance?

B A van Groningen has drawn attention to the word δρχή, using mainly examples from Herodotus. In Homer, δρχω means, according to Cunliffe, 'to make a beginning or start, give a lead, set an example, be the leader or chief'. Correspondingly, δρχός is 'a leader, commander, chief', and δρχή is 'a beginning, first phase or origin'; and after Homer it also means 'supreme power, sovereignty' or 'empire'. So then, the person or event that comes first has authority and power.
This applies most of all to those who have gone before, to the ancestors. When Phoenix tries to calm Achilles' wrath (ll. 9, 524ff) he puts before him the fame of forebears who were willing to accept a supplication. He says:

Thus we have also heard of the fame of the πρόσθεν heroes, when furious wrath came to them: they were ready to receive gifts ...;

and he goes on to tell the story of Meleager. This is intended as an example for Achilles. Although it is rejected by him at the time, the pattern of the story of Meleager's wrath is repeated in the pattern of Achilles' wrath and its end. The past informs and is alive in the present. As Romilly says in her book on *Time in Greek Tragedy* 24

these past actions and dead persons, for Aeschylus, are still alive and still active; and one can acknowledge their presence in what is actually going on. In other words, the past is not wholly past.

I owe this reference to Robin Hankey, and he has shown, in an unpublished lecture, how true this is in detail in Aeschylus' *Persians*, the *Eumenides*, and particularly in the *Choephoroi*.

In Maori, what 'comes first' or 'is at the beginning' is supremely powerful. *Ngā rā o mua*, 'the days at the front, at the beginning' or 'of old' are the 'time of myth and legend, the time when the ground-work of the universe was laid down by the gods and later by the original ancestors. Genealogy has played, and still plays today, a decisive role in Maori life. For it is through his genealogy that a Maori reaches up to those who came 'first'. Also, as Metge says (p 70),

their ancestors far from being remote and shadowy figures as they are to Pakehas are entirely real and supportive in present crises, especially those who founded their tribe or sub-tribe or gave them their personal name. Significantly they talk of them in the present tense.

The immediate presence of the Maori ancestors is most palpable in the meeting-house which represents the body of the original ancestor or ancestress, and on the inside of which many ancestors are represented in carvings around the walls. Genealogy is then all important for the Maori, and within that sequence those who come 'first', the oldest child and the senior descent line have the highest status or mana. A Maori, therefore, who knows his or her genealogy knows 'who he or she is'.

It should be clear now that who or what came first or was at the beginning will be of primary importance and therefore claim constant attention both in ancient Greece and Maori. In consequence, in living through time, the beginnings in the past, known, revered, and ever present, are in front of the gaze, and the future out of
sight and of little importance. Why is the future bound to be so unimportant? If
time consists in the qualities of events as experienced, the future is non-existent,
because being future means that events and experiencing them have not yet
occurred. In relation to the future, the ancient Greeks and the ancient Maori knew
only questions and fear, so that they turned to omens, oracles and seers for the
knowledge of what the quality of events, that is the time to come, might be.

If at this point we turn to a characteristic stylistic form of oral narrative both in
ancient Greece and in early Maori, I suggest that this form is related to living in
qualitative time. Telling a story means unfolding a sequence of events in a
temporal series of words. The question is whether the fundamental and habitual
way of living in time, as described above, can be shown to come to expression in
Homeric and ancient Maori narrative.

In Homer, it appears in the construction of many sentences, especially in
descriptions, and also in longer stretches of narrative. Bassett has called it Homer's
'normal method of exposition'. Homer, he says, begins with the 'essential idea
which is always the one which is new'. I call this the 'initial statement' (statement
in the broadest sense). Here is a typical Homeric example (Od 10, 314). Circe
offers Odysseus a seat.

έπι θρόνου
ἀργυρόηλου καλοῦ δαιδαλέου
υπὸ δὲ θρήνυς ποστὶ ἤν

The sequence of the words as a spoken series of events (and this is oral literature)
moves, as word is spoken after word, in each case, from present into past. 'On a
chair' is a bald straightforward statement of fact, which I call the 'initial statement'.
The 'chair' is elaborated by three adjectives describing it and in 'agreement' with it, let us say 'in apposition to it' or as an 'expansion' of it, in order not to restrict this
term to adjectives or nouns. The first adjective 'with silver nails', by its ending and
its meaning, guides attention back to the 'chair'; so does the adjective 'beautiful',
and so does 'artfully wrought'. The next elaboration is in the form of a whole
sentence: 'underneath [the chair] was a footstool for the feet'. This also looks back
to the 'chair', since the footstool is a feature of the chair. This is a small and
almost 'pure' example of speaker and listener at every stage looking back to what
has come 'first' so that the temporal experience of this utterance is a steady facing
the 'beginning'.
In another brief Homeric example, namely the description of the corselet in Agamemnon's arming-scene (II 11, 19ff), a new element appears:

1. δεύτερον αὖ θώρηκα περὶ στήθεσιν ἔδυνε,
2. τὸν ποτὲ οἱ Κινύρης δῶκε ξεινήιον εἶναι,
3. πεύθετο γὰρ Κύπρονδε μέγα κλέος, οὖνεκ' 'Αχαιοι
4. ἐς Τροίην νήεσσιν ἀναπλέψεσθαι ἐμελλον,
5. τοῦνεκά οἱ τὸν δῶκε χαριζόμενος βασιλῆι.
6. τοῦ δέ' ήτοι δέκα οἴμοι ἔσαν μέλανος κυάνοιο.

Agamemnon putting on his corselet is the 'initial statement'. It is elaborated by nine lines; the first four are concerned with how Agamemnon came into possession of the corselet, the rest with its colourful material and ornamentation. 'This Kinyres gave to him at some time or other [ποτὲ could refer to the past or the future] to be a guest-gift.' The demonstrative τὸν connects this clause (2) to the initial statement and expands on it, and so looks to what precedes it in terms of the sequence of the words. But something else happens: this expansion moves much further into the past than Agamemnon's arming, in fact, as we shall see, to before the beginning of the war; and this is not indicated by the aorist which could have described a subsequent action, as the aorist in line 29 does: 'round his shoulders he threw [βάλετο] his sword'. So it is the meaning within the factual sequence of events which makes it clear that Kinyres' gift of the corselet must have long preceded Agamemnon's arming before Troy. It is the fact that neither Ancient Greek nor Maori possess a verb-form expressing relative time in the past which makes this procedure so different from Latin and from English. Relative time is, of course, a concept only conceivable within a continuous time notion. The reason for Kinyres making this gift to Agamemnon was that he heard a great piece of news (3): this being the reason again refers back to and precedes the gift. 'Namely that [οὔνεκα] the Achaeans were going to sail out to Troy in their ships.' This line (4) refers back to the 'news' by giving its content which itself precedes the news of it being brought to Cyprus. 'Therefore he gave that [the corselet] to him as a gift of grace to the king.' 'Therefore' (the beginning of 5) refers back to 4 and 3, and the rest of the line is a varied 'return' to 2, a 'circling' back, if you like, to the gifting of the corselet. Again the aorists of πεύθετο and δῶκε give no indication about movements in time, except that both point to some occasions in the past. But the meaning of the words within the context is clear: attention moves right back to the 'beginnings' preceding Agamemnon putting on his corselet, namely the time when the Achaeans were setting out for Troy and the corselet came as a guest-gift from Kinyres, king of Cyprus. Little is known about Kinyres and his kingdom of Cyprus at the time, but that he and his land were famous for his wealth and craft in weaponry is obvious from the further detailed
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description that follows. This description begins with τοῦ which ties back what
follows to the initial statement about the corselet.

Three points should be noticed here. First, from every feature in the sequence,
attention is led back either to the beginning or, at least, to something preceding.
Secondly, one could speak of 'ring-composition', since δῶκε χαριζ ὁμενὸς βασιλῆς
(5) is a 'return' to δῶκε ξεινήιον εἶναι (2) in a varied form. But an explicit
'return' is quite frequently not made, and then the term 'ring-composition' prevents
the recognition that an 'appositional expansion' is the same stylistic form whether
with or without an explicit return to the initial statement. Thirdly, Homer's style
is by no means always 'appositional', but this form is certainly frequent and, as we
shall see, determines quite long stretches of narrative.

To turn to Maori narrative, there is very much less straight description than in
Homeric narrative. Here are two examples. 'Left behind was the net, left behind
were the canoes; the canoes were of rushes', and a little later, 'Left behind was the
net, the net was of flax'. And again about the suicide of a woman who had
thrown herself from a cliff (ib. p 198): 'They saw her lying there, she was
shattered; the carved canoe was wrecked on the beach, it was broken to pieces'.

The next example is from a story in which a woman, held prisoner by a monster,
escapes from him and brings about his death. This is the beginning of the story:

That fellow was found sitting there by that woman. Then she was encircled by
the tail. That woman did not see the tail, she saw the head, and then she ran.
Because she ran, she was then encircled by the tail. The woman stood in the
midst of this fellow.

As soon as the woman of this story is said to have found the monster, the
storyteller proceeds straight to the rather startling event that she was 'caught' or
'encircled' by his tail. This is the initial statement. The audience wants to know
immediately what happens to the woman. An expansion explains how it came
about that the woman was caught by the tail. Those events precede her being
cought, and so are told 'looking back to the past'. The initial statement is then
repeated. The prompt account of the outcome of the encounter avoids any suspense
about her future, and turns the narrative into a story about past events.

One of the Maori migration stories is shaped on the same pattern, though on a
bigger scale. From Tamatekapua's decision to emigrate, because of the
devastating fighting in Hawaiki, the story immediately advances to the main events
of any emigration from an island, namely, the felling of large trees and the building
of canoes. So the tree called Arawa was felled, and adzed into the Arawa canoe, and
seven more canoes were also built. This decision and the consequent tree-felling
and canoe-building are the initial statement, but also the endpoint of many events which are told in a complex expansion into the past.

In the events narrated as they shift between the initial statement and a point far in the past, the two main ideas are the discovery of Aotearoa which is crucial, of course, for the decision to emigrate, and the story connected with it of greenstone which led to that discovery. Greenstone is first mentioned in relation to the tree-felling, because the adzes used for it are made of greenstone which is, mythically, the Fish of Ngahue, the carver. Attacked by the Grindstone Woman, Ngahue had to flee from Hawaiki, and by good fortune discovered Aotearoa. He returned to Hawaiki in time to make the decision to emigrate 'right' (tika), because a goal for the migration had been found. The event in the most remote past is the attack of the Grindstone Woman to which the storyteller returns once again in order to give much more detail about the events following it. In this stylistic form, the narrator does not represent a series of events as moving chronologically from the past to the present, but he starts from an important event which he reaches quickly, moves backward and forward in the past as seen from that event, and finally returns to that event from which he then moves on again.

To return to Homer, the beginning of Book 21 of the Odyssey, for instance, is formed on much the same pattern. Penelope goes to fetch the great bow with which the Suitors will compete for her hand and the kingdom and with which Odysseus himself will kill the leading Suitors. Penelope going to fetch the bow from the treasure chamber where it is kept is the 'initial statement'. An extensive expansion with a number of backward and forward movements within the past details the story of how this bow had come into the possession of Odysseus. The crucial event that it was given to Odysseus by Iphitos, son of Eurytos, recurs three times; and the fact that before that, great Eurytos used to carry it, and left it to his son when he died' (32-33) is furthest back in the past. It is the very 'beginning' of it all, the source-event. The ownership of the bow by Eurytos is highly significant. For when Odysseus, as an Homeric hero would, boasts of his own excellence with bow and arrow, he says: 'But I will not compete with the men of old, neither with Heracles nor with Eurytos who used to compete even with the immortals in archery' (8,224ff). Eurytos is one of the great archers of the Homeric world, and this expansion establishes the prestige, the mana of Odysseus' bow. Finally, the expansion is rounded off by a return to the initial statement: Penelope comes to the treasure chamber and approaches the threshold (42-43).

In Nestor's tale about the generosity of his youthful prowess, two of his deeds are recounted in contrast to the meanness of Achilles who will not use his strength to succour his own people. Nestor wishes that he still had his youthful powers as
when the Elians and Pylians came to fight a battle (11, 671 νείκος ἔτυχθη): this is the initial statement. That battle was caused by a cattle raid in which Nestor killed the leading champion. This cattle raid and what follows, including two explanatory expansions, is then told in full up to the point that the Elians, in their turn, come to attack the Pylians. After an elaborate introduction (707ff) the two hostile armies join battle (737 Πυλιῶν καὶ Ἐπειῶν ἐπλετο νείκος) - here we return to the initial statement - and young Nestor performs an even greater deed of valour. Here, as in the Maori story of the woman caught by the tail of the monster and in the migration story, the most important later event is told at once so that the future is known; and what precedes it can be told in looking back to the beginning.

To sum up, earlier in working on the appositional style I have tried to make sense of this often confusing phenomenon by stressing the intense mutual involvement of the oral performer and his listeners on the one hand, and on the other the freedom from any compulsion to pursue a clear chronology, because the time-notion of both speaker and listener was qualitative. While this is true, it does not seem sufficient to me now.

In this paper I have sought to give a more definite answer to the same question. It has, I believe, become possible by the comparative work which I have described. The crucial new insight for me has been the demonstration by Stanford and by Metge and Mead that the ancient Greeks and the early Maori, both being members and creators of an oral culture, lived facing not the future, as we do today, but the past stretching out in front of them to the beginnings, with the future behind them. If both storyteller and listener were in the habit of facing towards the past and of seeking explanations and directives from there for themselves, the appositional style is nothing if not an expression of that same fundamental attitude. For in an appositional expansion, as we have seen, the storyteller 'faces the past' by relating each new piece of description back to the initial object of his description, or by giving the 'pre-history' or perhaps better 'pre-story' of an event or a person or an object by starting from that event, moving to its source-event in the far past, and returning to the starting-point. It is then the close psychological tie to the past which characterises both qualitative time and the appositional style. An oral culture seems to be - perhaps inevitably - a traditional culture.
NOTES

4. M I Finley, 'Myth, Memory and History', *History and Theory* 4 (1965), 293.
22. Mead refers to Williams' dictionary, 214.


