In the Acts of the Apostles, both St Peter and St Paul are represented as teaching that salvation is available to those who live outside a knowledge of the traditions of divine revelation. 'Of a truth', Peter says, after meeting the centurion, Cornelius, 'I perceive that God is no respecter of persons: but in every nation he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, is accepted with him' (Acts 10:34-5; cf. Rom. 2:11). St Paul, before the Athenian philosophers, tells his hearers that God hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation; that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him, and find him, though he be not far from every one of us: for in him we live, and move, and have our being; as certain also of your own poets have said, For we are also his offspring (17:26-8).

Yet, alongside these teachings, both Apostles proclaim that salvation is only to be achieved through Jesus. 'To him', Peter says, 'give all the prophets witness, that through his name whosoever believeth in him shall receive remission of sins' (10:43). Jesus, according to Paul, is 'that man whom he [God] hath ordained' whereby 'he will judge the world in righteousness' (17:31).

The seemingly divergent tendencies expressed in these claims provide a continuing problem for Christian theology. On the one hand, the apostolic teaching supports the view that the goodness and justice of God tell against any attempt to restrict the offer of salvation to those who possess a specific knowledge of God's salvific acts in the history of Israel and the life of Jesus. God, St Paul writes, 'will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth' (I Tim. 2:4; cf.
Rev. 5:9). On the other hand, the Apostles clearly bear witness to the central Christian conviction that the divine work in the salvation of man is summed up and completed in Jesus, a person about whose life nothing can be known by most of those who need the benefits of his passion. Jesus, St Peter tells the Sanhedrin, 'is the stone which was set at naught of you builders, which is become the head of the corner. Neither is there salvation in any other: for there is none other name under heaven given among men, whereby we must be saved' (Acts 4:11-12).

How are these different doctrinal tendencies to be harmonised? The issue becomes particularly pressing whenever, as in Acts 10 and 17, non-Christian thought and practice has to be understood and appropriated in its own terms. There is, it would seem, no agreed answer to the problem nor a consensus on the salvific significance of such claims as Paul's teaching that 'God winked at' (Acts 17:30) or exercised forbearance at the religious ignorance and failings of those who lived before Jesus (Rom.3:25; Acts 14:16). The balance between the two tendencies is apt to be achieved either by stressing one or the other, but any such reconciliation is likely to involve a questionable reining in or re-interpretation of one in favour of the other.  

For those who find that they cannot ignore the continuity between the ends of salvation history and the personal and cultural histories of those whose lives are necessarily lived in ignorance of Jesus, the benefits of his passion have to be made available independently of any specific knowledge of him. The knowledge essential for salvation, in the case of these people, at least, has to be freed from a reflective grasp of its foundation in the life of Jesus and understood in a fashion which accords, in general, with those New Testament passages which teach the beneficial but unrecognised presence of Christ in the religious life of Israel and of all men and women. Those who followed Moses out of Egypt, Paul says, 'all drank of that spiritual Rock that followed them: and that Rock was Christ' (I Cor. 10:4; cf. Jn. 1:4, 9; Matt. 25:31-46).

For those, however, whose vision of the history of humanity is largely determined by the particularity of the Christian revelation and the discontinuity between the life of God and the moral and intellectual
strivings of fallen mankind, some explicit knowledge of Jesus is apt to be regarded as an essential condition of salvation. In the case of the ancient Jews, it was achieved by types and prophecies; for all others, it requires a knowledge of Jesus and his works. Thus, St Paul tells the Gentile Christians of Ephesus that before conversion they were 'dead in trespasses and sins' (Eph. 2:1), 'without Christ, being aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenants of promise, having no hope, and without God in the world' (2:12; cf. Rom.10). The divine justice and goodness in relation to those whose cognitive lot falls outside of salvation history has then, on this view, to be understood in terms of the transcendent sovereignty of God and the radical unworthiness of man. 'Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why has thou made me thus?' (Rom. 9:20).

Outside the circle of orthodox faith, the difficulties involved in trying to formulate a Christian soteriology might be thought to indicate the radically confused nature of the task. The universal reach of God's salvific will and the particularities of the way in which Christians say it is wrought cannot, it has been argued, be successfully held together. In seventeenth century England, this was the position of the Deists. 'The true Catholic Church,' Lord Herbert of Cherbury writes, in De Veritate (1625)

is not supported on the inextricable confusion of oral and written tradition to which men have given their allegiance. Still less is it that which fights beneath any one particular standard, or is comprised in one organization so as to embrace only a restricted portion of the earth, or a single period of history. The only Catholic and uniform church is the doctrine of Common Notions which comprehends all places and all men ... And it is only through this Church that salvation is possible.

Lord Herbert's Protestant contemporaries, however, could not solve the problems of orthodox soteriology in such a sweeping fashion. Their options lay either with some version or other of the openness shown by Erasmus and Zwingli or more constructively by Ficino and Pico to the positive value, in the mercy of God, of right conduct and thought wherever found or Calvin's and Luther's Augustinian dismissal of all
fallen mankind bar those whose redemption by electing grace is specifically vouchsafed in Scripture. In 'The Godly Feast', a colloquy of 1522, Erasmus has one of his characters, Eusebius, say:

whatever is devout and contributes to good morals should not be called prophane. Sacred Scripture is of course the basic authority in everything; yet I sometimes run across ancient sayings or pagan writings -- even the poets' -- so purely and reverently and admirably expressed that I can't help believing their authors' hearts were moved by some divine power. And perhaps the spirit of Christ is more widespread than we understand, and the company of saints includes many not in our calendar.

Over and against this, there is the reaction of Calvin. 'Surely,' he writes,

after the fall of the first man no knowledge of God apart from the Mediator has had power unto salvation ... Thus, all the more vile is the stupidity of those persons who open heaven to all the impious and unbelieving without the grace of him whom Scripture commonly teaches to be the only door whereby we enter into salvation (Jn. 10:9).

The choice between these two ways of understanding the Christian doctrine of salvation depends in part upon the experience of life which the theologian brings to the interpretation of the biblical texts. In mid-seventeenth century Cambridge, as earlier in the modern period, it was, for those who wished to reform the Augustinian Reformed doctrine of salvation, an experience determined not only by the opportunities of modern life but the contemporary relevance of the best moral and religious thought of pagan antiquity.

II

In early seventeenth century England, the more hopeful approach of Erasmus and Zwingli and, by then, the followers of Arminius, was strongly represented in the theology of Thomas Jackson, an influential Oxford divine of the Laudian, Arminian party. His conversion from Calvinism to Christian Platonism naturally led him to look for ways of widening the boundaries of salvation to include the 'divine Plato' and other noble spirited pagans such as Hermes Trismegistus, Plotinus, and Seneca. These authors, Jackson says, are 'worthy to be lookt into by the
most Eagle-sighted Divines of our times'. Although the gospel of redemption was not made known to these 'Heathen Theologists', the intellectual modesty and spirituality of their writings far exceeds that of the 'usual professors of School-divinity'. Yet the problem remains, how are these and other pagans to be brought within the Christian scheme of salvation? The answer, for Jackson, is to be found in Paul's teaching in Acts 17:30 of the forbearance of God towards the pre-Christian tutelage of humanity:

I shall no way wrong the Apostle in unfolding his exhortations to the Athenians thus far; but they rather offer the spirit, by which he spake, some kind of violence, that would contract his meaning shorter: 'The times of this ignorance [before Christ's death] God winked at'.

Jackson's treatment of pagan virtue and its positive place in the divine order of things is clear in its intent but politically cautious in its statement, as the times required. The exponents of the more common pessimistic view about the salvific fate of pagans tended, as Jackson complained, to be bolder in their determination of the issue. William Pemble, for example, an Oxford contemporary of Jackson's, writes of the pagan religious situation:

It is very little the Natural man hath seen, not much that he can see. ... Whatever he doth or can do in worship of God, nothing is done aright, for matter or manner ... Again, the Nature of their sinne and misery is above the reach of the Heathens knowledge; and therefore Grace and Mercy are beyond the possibility of their desire: both which yet are the first steps to true conversion. Finally, for their virtues, they are corrupted in the root, perverted in their buds, defective in their whole practice.

The great difference between the two approaches reflects not so much disagreements about what happened in classical times, though differences are present, especially in philosophy, but the way in which classical life and thought are to be theologically evaluated. For Protestant scholastics, such as Pemble, pagan life is finally to be understood in terms of Calvinistic doctrines of the total depravity of fallen man and the divinely selective distribution of sanctifying, electing grace. Within this doctrinal framework, ordinary common-sense distinctions between moral and non-moral acts, right and wrong, good and evil, tend, from time to time, to disappear or to be treated as matters
of no positive significance for a theology of salvation. 'The reasoning and discourse of natural man,' Paul Baynes writes, 'the devil hath conjured it in such a circle that it cannot turn itself to anything but what is evil, or hath an appearance of good only.' *Augustine* of old, and our Protestant writers of late,' Edward Leigh writes, 'maintain against Papists, that all the works of Heathens, yea of unbelievers, and unregenerate men, are sins.' 'What a sad thing is it,' Anthony Burgess notes, 'to be all the day and years long damning our soules? If we eat or drink, we sin; if we buy or sell, we sin. And consider, that sin is the greatest evil, and that onely which God loaths and abhorres.'

It is no easy thing, if indeed it is possible, to construct a coherent theology of the goodness of God and the responsibility of man which runs counter to intuitively based beliefs about right and wrong, good and evil, the voluntary character of moral acts, and so on. This, however, was the task to which mainstream Protestant scholastics were committed by virtue of their doctrines of original sin and predestination. The academic success of Calvinist theology in the first half of the century shows, in part, the skill and vigour with which the scholastics argued their case. Despite the difficulties of Calvinism, Protestant scholastics were confident that, in John Owen's words, it is 'what the Scripture and right reason teach us concerning these secrets of the Most High.' But no system of ideas succeeds as a philosophy of life simply on the basis of authority and speculation. If it is to gain widespread acceptance, it must be able to illuminate and to order the life-experiences of those to whom it is addressed. 'Experience', as one Puritan wrote, 'proves principles.'

Of the key ideas involved in the Calvinist scheme of salvation, none is more powerful nor more vulnerable to the leadings of experience than the doctrine of total depravity. Its emphasis upon the solidarity of the race in the guilt and punishment of Adam's sin brings into prominence the non-personal and socially pervasive influence of evil, while its stress upon the radically disordered soul draws attention to the complexity and hidden aspects of the motives which shape human acts. Yet, if this doctrine helps to illuminate some aspects of the human
situation, there are others which it obscures or distorts, particularly the central place of informed and free choice in the construction of the moral order.

The problems which arise from the tensions between the doctrines of total depravity and electing grace, on the one hand, and common and shared intuitions about the nature and conditions of moral life, on the other, regularly appear in Augustinian theologies. They can be seen, for example, in Lutheran and Calvinist attempts to develop soft-deterministic views about free will in religious choice and the disputes between supralapsarians and sublapsarians as to whether the Fall of man was a means chosen by God in order to predestine some or a state foreseen by God in choosing to elect some and not others. The experiential problem, the question of the true-to-life plausibility of such doctrines of sin and grace, appears particularly in their ambivalent attitudes towards the lives and achievements of the great spirits of antiquity.

That Calvinist divines should speak in diverse, if not conflicting ways about pagan virtue is hardly surprising. The literature of the classical world provided a central part of the early education of young theologians. The thought forms of Protestant scholasticism in which they expressed their theologies were a continuation of the medieval appropriation of Aristotelian and other pagan philosophies, especially Platonism, in the interests of a Christian metaphysic. Religious thinkers formed in this way will naturally celebrate, as occasion requires, the pagan models and traditions of their academic mastery. 'I muse not a little to see Platoniceall and Plotinicall Philosophy,' William Twisse, an 'Aristoteliean Christian', writes, against Jackson, 'so much advanced by an Oxonian: as if Aristotles learning left Logicians perplext in a point of sophistry, and only Plotinicall Philosophy would expedite them.' 'It is not to be doubted', Pemble admits, 'there were and are amongst the Heathens, many who besides the common and ordinary gifts of Nature, had extraordinary abilities and endowments by a speciall though not sanctifying grace of God ... for the finding out the most secret hidden principles and conclusions in all learned Arts and for the wisest application of them to all manner of practice.' 'The knowledge of philosophy is useful, nay, necessary,' John Davenant teaches, 'to the clear understanding and perspicuous elucidation of many passages which every
where occur in the sacred Scriptures.' Aristotle, John Arrowsmith says, is 'one of Nature's high priests in his Ethicks, [a work which is] one of the choicest pieces of morality extant.'

When, however, scholarly concern turns from pagan achievements in secular knowledge and civic virtue to matters of divinity and the morality of the heart, admiration gives way to criticism and rejection. Pagan teachings and practice are then discovered to be less impressive in ways which accord with the received doctrines of total depravity and electing grace. 'Aristotle a man of the deepest reach that Antiquity ever bred', Pemble claims, '... hath not left us any one discourse by which it might appear that he bestowed any pains in searching after the knowledge of God, except a little here and there in some poor pitiful disputes.' 'The natural knowledge of spiritual things,' Davenant teaches, 'is obscure and feeble, extending only to the existence of those things ... This knowledge may render a man inexcusable, but it cannot render him a competent teacher, unless knowledge infused by grace be added.' Aristotle and other pagans, Arrowsmith says, 'commended to their readers some habits and actions for virtues and duties [such as megalopsuchla or magnanimity], which in Scripture are represented as vices and sins.' As for outstanding examples of moral conduct, these, according to the Augustinian-Calvinist view are not properly motivated by a love of the good and the right. 'No man but a Christian,' Richard Sibbes claims, 'can be stout and courageous, except it be from a false spirit .... And therefore those that put on a Roman stoutness and courage, though they seem to have strong spirits, it is but false: either they are besotted with sensuality, or else with a spirit of pride.'

If the Augustinian way of understanding pagan virtue seems to falsely minimise, for theological purposes, the achievements of ancient life, this same theological tradition also provides resources for explaining why the pagan world had achieved so much and why aspects of its life should be freely admired. Why had not the total depravity of man brought about the destruction of the race or, at least, a state of unrelieved barbarism? The answer, according to tradition, is the kindness of God in providing a common but not regenerating grace to prevent the worst excesses of depraved nature and to enhance what remains of God's gifts to man in his creation. Conscience, for instance, according to
Thomas Goodwin, is 'a tender part, and which is such in man as God hath made in wild beasts to tame them by, as a snout in a bear and the mouth in an horse; it 'lies so open and exposed immediately unto God, and beams of light from him, that let man revolt and become never so sinful and rebellious, yet he cannot keep God nor his forces out of it.' All the best aspects of ancient life and culture are to be understood, in part, as the result of common, though not sanctifying or regenerating grace, at work in fallen man. The great achievements of pagan learning, Pemble says, are the result of human cleverness enhanced 'by a speciall though not sanctifying grace of God.' The similarity between some pagan doctrines, especially Plato's, and those which had been revealed to the early prophets could be explained by some version or other of the Ancient Theology, the providential or accidental transmission of biblical materials to a line of Greek sages and philosophers. Thus Twisse, for example, writes that

The meanest Christian by light of grace knowes more then Aristotle by light of nature concerning God. So might Plato, if by tradition he receaved something derived from the Word of God, and believed, which Aristotle eyther receaved or believed not.

Protestant school-men, like their Augustinian mentors, had little option but to seek some such accommodation between their theologies of grace and sin and the classically oriented culture of their formal education and profession. If they found this theology of pagan virtue uncertain in some of its details or counter-intuitive in certain respects, its general correctness, in their view, remained unaffected because of the truth of its foundation doctrines of sin, grace, and the value of academic learning. For those, however, who came to consider the Calvinist theory of unregenerate virtue in its own right, a different intellectual strategy in relation to difficulties was apt to suggest itself: uncertainties or implausibilities in the received doctrine could be taken to indicate, from this point of view, error in the basis upon which the theory rests. Just which aspect of the doctrinal base is questioned, in this circumstance, depends upon which feature of the Calvinist theology of culture seems problematic. Some divines among the radical Puritans argued that the common scholastic position sacrificed grace in favour of corrupted nature: a Spirit-shaped theology and ministry, in their view, did not require the benefits of academic learning. Others, however, claimed
that the fundamental error in the Calvinist theory of culture is not its valuing of the classical past but its failure to recognize the full achievements of antiquity because of mistaken doctrines of original sin and grace.

Amongst those who challenged the Calvinist theology of salvation in mid-century and after, the most strategically placed were the circle of young Cambridge divines which started to form around Benjamin Whichcote after his return to Emmanuel College as fellow (1633) and tutor (1634). There were, of course, other contemporary theologians equally opposed to the Calvinist scheme, but few had the opportunity of continuing academic influence afforded some of Whichcote's group, especially Ralph Cudworth and Henry More. In the sixteen forties and fifties, John Goodwin, a London Independent and anti-Calvinist played a forceful theological role as did the episcopallians Henry Hammond, Jeremy Taylor, and Samuel Hoard. Hoard's *God's Love to Mankind* (1633) provided such a direct and powerful challenge to received Calvinistic views that the two senior contemporary masters of that tradition, John Davenant and William Twisse, both felt obliged to write full scale replies. Others such as William Chillingworth and Lucius Cary were to exercise a posthumous influence through their books and example. Thomas Jackson, 'the Father of English Arminians', who died in 1640, had already provided his model of the Platonizing theology which is such a striking feature of the Cambridge turn against the Calvinist tradition. Within the confines of that tradition, Richard Baxter was to present steadily a theology modified and widened by the same sort of spirit which led others to reject its chief features.18

Yet, in the middle years of the century and afterwards, the Cambridge Latitudinarians, as they came to be called in the early sixties, had the great advantage of being able to maintain and consolidate their doctrinal interests in the University until, in the case of More and Cudworth, the sixteen eighties. In the course of that time some of those whom, in varying ways, they had influenced, came to positions of power and patronage in the established church (and outside of it). These churchmen, in Gilbert Burnet's sympathetic view, were the true maintainers of the church in a time of Restoration decay. They were, he says, 'generally of Cambridge, formed under some divines, the chief
of whom were Drs. Whichcot, Cudworth, Wilkins, More and Worthington. One of those eminent persons with whom Whichcot 'had great credit', John Tillotson, to be made Archbishop of Canterbury in 1691, preached the sermon at his funeral in 1683. Of Whichcot, Burnet writes: 'he set young students much on reading the ancient philosophers, chiefly Plato, Tully, and Plotin, and on considering the Christian religion as a doctrine sent from God both to elevate and sweeten human nature.' At Emmanuel, Whichcot's students included Ralph Cudworth, Peter Sterry, John Smith, John Worthington, John Sadler, Nathaniel Culverwell, John Wallis. The new but already old Italian Humanist way of studying and understanding the religious past, which he set before his students, did not always lead to a Christian Platonism, as Whichcot's own example shows, or to the rejection of the framework of Calvinist theology, as the writings of Sterry and Culverwell demonstrate. But from within this group, and elsewhere in the University, a great assault was to be mounted on the spirit and application, if not always the basic principles, of the received Calvinist theology of salvation, especially the salvation of pagans.

III

Peter Sterry and John Sadler, according to Thomas Baker, 'were the first that were observ'd to make a public Profession of Platonism in the univers. of Cambridge.' Presumably, this would have been sometime before Sterry left Cambridge in the winter of 1639-40. In view of his Calvinism, it is likely that Sterry's Platonism drew public notice because of its provocativeness in an environment where Aristotelianism provided much of the basis for metaphysics and philosophical theology. The religious significance of this profession for Sterry's later thought can be seen in Richard Baxter's description of his theology as an 'attempt to reconcile Philosophy (or Gentilism) and Christianity', an attempt which received an earlier statement in The Nature of Truth (1640) by Robert Greville, Lord Brooke, to whom Sterry became chaplain in 1640. Within the University, however, the first published signs of a new and hopeful openness to the world of pagan antiquity came from outside the immediate circle of Whichcot's students at Emmanuel, in the chapel sermons of John Sherman and the poetry of Henry More.
Sherman went up to Trinity College in 1626, the same year that Whichcote became a student at Emmanuel, and he remained there as fellow until 1644 when he was ejected by the Parliamentary Visitors as one who would not sign the Solemn League and Covenant. Sherman's *A Greek in the Temple* (1641) is a series of chapel exercises on Acts 17:28b which were probably delivered in the late sixteen thirties.

St Paul's example in Athens, Sherman claims, should guide us in relation to the value of pagan learning:

> S. Paul after conversion did not burn his books nor parchments: But it is an error to bring this into question in an University. In lieu of all arguments this may serve, that in this dispute of S. Paul, where he useth both Philosophy and Poets, a woman, Damaris, and many others, likely not of the learned nation, were converted. From hence also the Teacher of the Gentiles instructeth us Christians not to disembrace goodnesse in any, nor truth in any. Plato's rule is good ... Let us not consider so much who saith, as what is said; who doeth, as what is done.

Sherman is not over-bold in speculating about the eternal fate of those Athenians who did not follow St Paul after he addressed them. They needed the news of the Gospel yet the Apostle held their views in esteem: 'It is not amiss to see what the twilight of humane reason can see of God, and towards God, and what analogy there is betwixt some of their speeches and some of Scripture.' Their salvation and that of their authorities must be regarded by us as an open question. 'These Philosophers then and Poets', Sherman writes,

> are not acknowledged here to be of the Church visible: and whether they or any of them be members of the Church invisible, of the Church triumphant, now, God knoweth. I am not here ingaged to speak definitively of their eternall condition.

It is not known whether Sherman's cautiously open position about the fate of pagans elicited any reaction. Several years later in another work, *White Salt* (1654), he put forward similar views, but by then his university career had been long since ended, only to be given a retrospective recognition with the award of a doctorate at the King's command in 1660.
A more ominous sign of the coming great challenge to Calvinist theology is to be found in Henry More's book of poetry, *Psychodia Platonica: or a Platonical Song of the Soul*, written in 1640, but appearing in 1642. This work, written 'for all free Philosophers and well-wishers to the Christian Life' is a 'Christiano-Platonicall display of Life'. More had gone up to Christ's College in 1631 already opposed to the doctrine of predestination. This way of thinking would have been strengthened under the influence of the reigning presence in Christ's of Joseph Mede and More's anti-Calvinist tutor. By the end of the thirties, More's opposition to Calvinism had become part of an elaborate theological metaphysic shaped by the spirituality of the *Theologica Germanica* and the tradition of Plotinian Platonism. 'I bought one [a copy of Plotinus] when I was Junior Master for 16 shillings,' More wrote in 1673, 'and I think that I was the first that had either the luck or courage to buy him.'

Whether or not More was the first of his young contemporaries to buy a Plotinus, Platonism had become for him, as earlier for Ficino, the metaphysic of Christianity.

Now this Eternall life I sing of, even in the middest of Platonisme: for I cannot conceal from whence I am, viz. of Christ; but yet acknowledging, that God hath not left the Heathen, *Plato* especially, without witnesse of himself. Whose doctrine might strike our adulterate Christian Professors with shame & astonishment; their lives falling so exceeding short of the better Heathen. How far short are they then of that admirable and transcendent high mystery of true Christianisme? To which *Plato* is a very good subservient Minister.

Salvation, in accord with this view, can hardly be limited only to those who know of Jesus of Nazareth. In his poem, *The Immortality of the Soul*, More writes of the contrary view:

Beside, 'tis said, they that do not partake
Of Christian lore, for ever they must dwell
With cursed fiends, and burn in brimstone lake.
Such dreary dread designes do make my heart to quake.
The scriptural teaching that there is 'none other Name ... whereby we must be saved' (Acts 4:11) has to be understood to refer to the bearer of the Name rather than the words and concepts by means of which he is now correctly identified as Jesus.

Christ is not where ever his Name is: but as he is the Truth, so will he be truly displayed upon the face of the Whole Earth. For God doth not fill the world with his Glory by words and sounds, but by Spirit, and Life, and Reality.

Accordingly, in More's view, the Delphic Oracle was correct when it replied, in answer to Amelius's question about the fate of Plotinus, that his soul had attained heavenly bliss. Of 'Divine Plotinus, yet now more divine,' the Oracle says, in More's translation, that his soul 'now [is] got into the Land of Life, Fast plac'd in view of that Eternal Light'.

More's book of poetry is a direct challenge to common Calvinist views about the relations between God and man. If it attracted critical attention, it seems not to have been recorded, but it was, More says, approved by some, 'the bravest and best improved spirits', presumably his fellow Platonists and Latitudinarians. The year in which it was published, however, saw the beginning of the Civil War. In 1644, Parliament authorised Edward Montagu, the Earl of Manchester, to visit the University and to enforce the Solemn League and Covenant upon its senior members, a policy designed to weed out the royalists and others opposed to the political and religious path set by Parliament. 'In the end', S. R. Gardiner writes, 'twelve Heads of Houses and 181 Fellows or persons officially attached to the colleges were sent adrift to shift for themselves.'

Amongst the divines approved by the Parliament and the Westminster Assembly to replace the ejected were some who were to play a prominent part in the public disputes about nature, grace, and salvation in the early sixteen fifties. The Intruded Heads of Houses included a group of Whichcote's friends, Antony Tuckney, his old tutor (Emmanuel, 1645), John Arrowsmith (St John's, 1644), Thomas Hill (Trinity, 1645) -- all staunch Calvinists and Presbyterians -- and Ralph Cudworth, Master, in title at least, of Clare Hall (1645). Whichcote, who had left Emmanuel for a parish in 1643, unwillingly replaced the
ejected Provost of Kings in 1645. All were deemed by authority to be in agreement with the political and religious reforms set on foot by Parliament and from which, in part, they had benefited in their new appointments. The extra-university hopes involved in their appointments were not always, however, to be completely fulfilled even with those such as Tuckney who were committed to the Calvinist world-view. 'In the world of intellect', Gardiner writes, 'was a current making for liberty, and amongst the very men imposed on Cambridge as the guardians of Calvinistic verity were some who, like Whichcot and Tuckney, were to shine forth as champions of intellectual freedom.' The theological effect of that current is to be seen in More's poetry. Its influence is also to be found within the Calvinist framework of Nathaniel Culverwell's 1645-6 lectures at Emmanuel on the light of reason or 'the Candle of the Lord' (Prov. 20:27).

Culverwell's lectures, posthumously published in 1652, address at length one of the main topics of Protestant scholasticism, viz., the nature and limits of man's rational nature. Like his fellow scholastics, he is anxious to establish the divinely given character and continuing authority of reason in human life. 'The more men exercise reason,' Culverwell claims, 'the more they resemble God himself'. The Fall, he teaches, has distorted and disoriented the soul but it has not removed it: 'It did not destroy the essence, the powers and faculties, nor the operations of the soul; though it did defile them, and disorder them, and every way indispose them.' But while Culverwell is careful to acknowledge the influence of the Fall, it is the power of reason properly used to discover truth about the physical, moral and divine orders which he celebrates and defends against those who suggest that fallen mankind can achieve nothing of value.

But out of what Antiquity doth it appear that any Nation did favour Atheisme by a Law? that any Kingdome did license Blasphemy by a statute, or countenance Murder by a Law? Out of what Author can they shew us a Nation that ever did allow the breaches of solemn contracts, the dishonouring of Parents, that ever made a Law for this, that there should be no Law or Justice amongst them? Till all this can appear, let the Testimonies of Gentiles be esteem'd somewhat more than the barking of dogs. Me thinks if they were meere Cyphers, yet the Jews going before them, they might amount to somewhat. Let the prints of Nature in them be accounted sacred: a Pearle in
the head of a Heathen, some Jewels hid in the rubbish of Nations, let them be esteem'd precious. Whatsoever remains of God's image upon them, let it be lov'd and acknowledg'd. Their darkness and misery is great enough, let us not aggravate it, and make it more. To mix the light of their Candle, with that light which comes shining from the Candle of an Heathen, is no disparagement to Jew nor Christian.

The full reality of pagan moral virtue is to be acknowledged; it is not, in all cases at least, to be understood as externally proper conduct determined by immoral motives.

The ennoblement of intellectuals, the spotlesse integrity of Morals, sweetnesse of dispositions, and the candor of Nature, they are all deservedly amiable in the eye of the world. The Candle of Socrates, and the candle of Plato, the Lamp of Epictetus, they did all shine before men, and shine more then some that would fain be call'd Christians.

Yet Culverwell remains loyal to the anti-Pelagian tradition which Emmanuel had been founded to perpetuate. All men stand in need of saving grace, contrary to the views of Pelagius, 'an high Traitor against the Majesty of Heaven'. The best achievements of pagan life are due to the enhancing effect of common grace as the Augustinian tradition maintained:

that Socrates was any better then Aristophases, was not nature, but a kinde of common gift and grace of the Spirit of God, for there are the same seminall principles in all.

But enhancing grace, even when distributed selectively -- a common grace which is not common! -- is not sanctifying, electing grace. God's freedom in exercising mercy is preserved, but we are not in a position, Culverwell insists, to set limits to his freedom. For all we know, some pagans, at least, might come within the reach of God's saving activity. Christ is the way of salvation but

their censure is too harsh and rigid, who as if they were Judges of eternal life and death, damne Plato and Aristotle without any question, without any delay at all; and do as confidently pronounce that they are in hell, as if they saw them flaming there. Whereas the infinite goodness and wisdome of God might for ought we know finde out several ways of saving such by the Pleonasmes of his love in Jesus Christ; he might make a Socrates a branch of the true Vine, and might graffe Plato and Aristotle into the
fruitful Olive; for it was in his power, if he pleased, to reveal Christ unto them, and to infuse faith into them after an extraordinary manner; Though indeed the Scripture does not afford our charity any sufficient ground to believe that he did; nor doth it warrant us peremptorily to conclude the contrary. Secreta Deo, it does not much concern us to know what became of them; let us forbear our censure, and leave them to their competent Judge.

The anthropocentric turn in Culverwell's theology of reason and its powers loosens but does not remove the boundaries of his Calvinism. 'As face answers face, so does the heart of one man the heart of another, even the heart of an Athenian, the heart of an Indian.' But while his humanism naturally inclines his theology towards an uncommon agnosticism about the fate of some pagans, the range of those who might be granted an uncovenanted mercy is strictly limited in accord with the spirit of the common Augustinian tradition. The particularity of revelation and the way it is preserved and made known by the 'inclosure of the Church' suggests, according to Culverwell, that God does not choose to extend saving grace to many in the pagan and heathen world.

Surely, though the free grace of God may possibly pick and choose an Heathen sometimes, yet certainly he does there more frequently pour his goodnesse into the soul where he lets it streame out more clearely and conspicuously in external manifestations.

In comparison with More, Culverwell represents a conservative appropriation of the new theological interests which were beginning to be expressed in Cambridge. The more radical, Platonically governed version which is to be found in More's poetry appears again in Cudworth's and Smith's teaching towards the end of the decade.

In 1647, the year in which More's poetry appeared in a collected edition as Philosophical Poems, Cudworth preached a long sermon before the House of Commons on 1 John 2:3-4. The topic of the necessary connection between a saving faith and a life of good works and character was a theological commonplace. Cudworth's treatment of this matter, however, is distinguished by its use of a Christian Platonist view of God, grace and the soul to explain why and how a regenerate person naturally tends toward a divine life. It was not, however, the first published sign of Platonism in Cudworth's thought. In 1642 he had published The Union
of Christ and the Church in a Shadow in which a Platonic metaphysic is used to explain the union and this Platonism is in turn justified by a positive providential view of the Ancient Theology. But in his 1647 sermon the Christian Platonic challenge to Calvinistic ideas of religion is more apparent.31

Goodness, not power or sovereignty as such, Cudworth teaches, is the divine attribute which should determine our thoughts of God. Divine grace, by necessity of God's goodness, is universally distributed to all rational creatures.

God's Power displayed in the World, is nothing but his Goodnesse strongly reaching all things, from heighth to depth, from the highest Heaven, to the lowest Hell: and irresistibly imparting it self to every thing, according to those severall degrees in which it is capable of it.

The opposite view which makes power the key to understanding the divine nature and salvation an arbitrarily chosen exercise of divine dominion 'will make us either secretly to think, that there is no God at all in the World, if he must needs be such, or else to wish heartily, there were none.'32

Salvation, according to this Christian Platonic view, does not depend upon a doctrinally correct understanding of who Jesus is, but rather the welcomed presence of grace within the soul restoring Its created and Logos-determined nature: 'without the life of Christ dwelling in us, whatsoever opinions we entertain of him, Christ is but onely named by us, he is not known.' Indeed, this saving or real knowledge of Christ and his benefits is compatible with a very reduced knowledge of the details of Christian faith.

Christ was Vitae Magister, not Scholae: and he is the best Christian, whose heart beats with the truest pulse towards heaven; not he whose head spinneth out the finest cobwebs. He that endeavours really to mortifie his lusts, and to comply with that truth in his life, which his Conscience is convinced of; is neerer a Christian, though he never heard of Christ; then he that believes all the vulgar Articles of the Christian faith, and plainly denyeth Christ in his life.
In the context of a sermon directed principally against those who would make the reality of Christian life depend upon theoretical knowledge, the wider bearings of this theology on the salvation of pagans was not Cudworth's primary concern. The likely direction of his thought on this topic, however, could easily be discerned. The same is true of John Smith's teaching at Queen's College late in the sixteen forties. In his lectures, for example, 'On the True Way or Method of Attaining Divine Knowledge', Smith assumes that the dividing line between pagans and Christians cannot be usefully drawn in terms of the gift of saving grace. Smith, like his Platonic contemporaries, finds in the writings of Plotinus a pagan understanding of the life of Christ within the soul. For Plotinus, according to Smith, real knowledge of God 'makes us amorous of divine beauty, beautiful and lovely; and this divine love and purity reciprocally exalts divine knowledge', but, Smith continues, the life so described is what is best known as the life of the true Christian.

Though, by the Platonists' leave, such a life and knowledge as this is, peculiarly belongs to the true and sober Christian, who lives in Him who is life itself, and is enlightened by Him who is the truth itself.

The difference between Christian and pagan remains in this theology, but it is not founded on a distinction between the gift of saving grace to one and common grace to the other. Pagans differ from Christians, not in terms of access to the saving grace of Christ but by virtue of what they can know about Christ and the particular but not saving benefits which such knowledge brings. It remains true, however, that some pagans, at least, knew truths about God and man which Jews and Christians had obtained only by revelation. How is this possible? The answer, according to the Cambridge Platonists, is to be found in the providential direction of the Mosaic revelation into a tradition of Greek thought which reaches from Orpheus through Pythagoras and Plato to Plotinus and some of his followers. By means of this positive version of the Ancient Theology, which is to be found, for example, in More's poetry, The Grand Mystery of Godliness (1660) and in Cudworth's 1642 sermon and, at length, in The True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678), the pagan world of classical antiquity is brought within the boundaries of the revelation of God's will to inform and to save all mankind.
The first published signs of a reaction to the emerging challenge to the Calvinist account of salvation are probably to be found in the addresses given by Antony Tuckney in connection with the Great Commencement on 11 July 1650. Tuckney, Master of Emmanuel and Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity, had been actively involved in the doctrinal formulations of the Westminster Assembly. At the Commencement he gave one of the major academic lectures and a day earlier he preached before the University on related concerns.

The proceedings of the 1650 Commencement were overshadowed, for some at least, by recent political events. The drive towards Presbyterianism at the Westminster Assembly had been successfully carried out in the documents produced for Parliament but the political strength of Independency and the coming of the Commonwealth meant that the Presbyterian way would not become the state enforced teaching and practice of the church of England. For Tuckney and his Assembly and Cambridge colleagues, particularly Hill and Arrowsmith, the times were threatening for a properly developed Calvinist Christianity. The errors which jeopardised its future had to be clearly understood and resisted. 'A Commencement now-a-dayes', one deeply disaffected observer wrote, 'is the [Westminster] Synods Adjournall House; A Visitation of all the Empirick Divines'. The errors against which these divines set their face, according to this writer, are symbolised by John Goodwin, the prominent London Independent and anti-Calvinist chaplain to Cromwell. Using the analogy of baptism to explain the Commencement graduation, he says that 'the God-fathers', the university teachers, 'are of the same Religion with the [Westminster] Fathers ... [and] ... will answer for none, but such as deny John Goodwin and all his Works.'

In this political context, the signs of doctrinal discontent in the generally Calvinist university were probably regarded as but a small local expression of a more widespread and developed deformation of Reformed religion in England and elsewhere. The new Cambridge developments, however, were probably part of the target at which Tuckney aimed his remarks in both his lecture and sermon.
In his Commencement lecture, Tuckney addresses the methodological problem of the role of reason in relation to revelation. As a scholastic, he is at pains to defend the importance of reason in receiving, ordering, developing and applying revealed truth. But reason, he argues in traditional vein, is a servant, not a mistress in relation to revelation. It must accept, when necessary, what it cannot understand. Against old and new heretics, such as the Socinians and the Arminians, he teaches that the measures of human reason cannot be used to determine the content of revealed truth:

It is not the Divine truth which must be summoned to the judgement seat of human reason, but, on the contrary, the truth of reason which must be summoned to the judgement seat of truth in, or revealed by, God.

Much of what Tuckney says about the role of reason in theology accords with what Culverwell had taught in his 1645-6 lectures, but the spirit and balance are different. The radical difference between the worth of regenerate and unregenerate reason in religious matters is firmly maintained against contemporary efforts to ignore or to re-interpret the difference. 'We are met today', Tuckney says, 'not in Athens, but in Jerusalem, not in Zeno's Stoa, nor in Plato's Academy, but in Christ's holy temple.' Quoting Melancthon, he warns that 'We have embraced Aristotle rather than Christ. Christ's doctrine has been shaken through Plato's philosophy' and, Tuckney adds, the same 'canker afflicts our own times'. Indeed, this canker is one of the errors he attacked in his sermon on 2 Tim 1:13 the day before.

This sermon, The Form of Sound Words, defends the necessity of authoritative church teaching such as the recent Westminster Confession and the need to hold fast to such 'sound words' against the anti-Reformation errors of the times. One of these errors is the over-valuing of the worth of pagan philosophers.

There are those 'now adays', Tuckney claims, who think so highly of the lives and thought of certain 'Heathen Philosophers ... that their charity concludes for their Salvation, and for every honest moral mans in every Religion, or of what ever perswasion.' But this view, Tuckney
argues, is a grievous error, one at variance with scriptural teaching and Christian experience. If his contemporaries were to pay more attention to the scriptures and less to ancient philosophers 'and so prove either less Philosophers, or more Christians, I mean more spiritual', then, he says, 'this Heathenish morality would appear at least comparatively, a flat dull thing, were we more acquainted with Christ'. Pagan practice and teaching, particularly Plato's, are both equally deficient in saving grace. For some, however, Plato is 'no longer onely Divine, but a Deity' in whose works 'some now adayes become so learned, that although they cannot finde Christ in them, yet they think they can spell salvation out of them.' But this theology, Tuckney asserts, is not Christian teaching:

Something they [the pagan philosophers] were able to do in discovering false Religions, but not at all able to manifest the true: Abana and Pharpar, and other rivers of Damascus, Naaman may think are better then all the waters of Israel. But for all that it's Israel's Jordan that he must wash in, if he would be cleansed from his leprosie. They are these wholsom healing words that must work that cure, not a Philosophers, not a Socrates his dictates.

To try to find salvation outside of a knowledge of Christ and his sacrifice is to do wrong to God in order to 'gratify men'.

With these 1650 remarks Tuckney rebuked the new religious openness to the pagan past of some of his Cambridge contemporaries. As might be expected, the rebuke failed to achieve its effect, at least with those who were thought to stand most in need of correction. At the Commencement exercises in 1651, Whichcote, now serving as Vice-Chancellor, spoke in such a way that the circle of Calvinist dons of which he had once been a member, with Tuckney, Arrowsmith and Hill, became deeply concerned about the direction of his thought and its influence within the University. Tuckney, Whichcote's old tutor, was advised to write to him expressing their anxiety about Whichcote's views, as expressed in his Commencement exercises, which were thought to be directed against Tuckney's performances the year before. The eight letters exchanged between September and November, 1651, are a remarkable testimony to the personalities of the two men and to the profound changes which were coming over the University. The general
theme of the letters is the place of reason in religion; one of the particular topics discussed is the religious value of pagan teaching about morality and theology.\textsuperscript{42}

Tuckney points out that 'the Scripture scarce aniewhere speaks particularlie of the Philosophers and wise men of the Heathens, with approbation and honour; but generallie with dislike and contempt ... And therefore', he says, 'we shou'd followe Scripture's pattern; if wee shou'd more insist on their darkness, ignorance, their falling short of and coming cross to Christ; than on the admiring and advancing of their knowledge and virtues: which at best were but dim and dead'. The pagan philosophers, Tuckney believes, are grossly over-valued by their admirers: 'in those fewe that I have redde, I have found them scattering a great deale of what is bad, with what is good in them'. Plato and the Platonists, it is true, do contain 'manie excellent and divine expressions' but they are to be seen as 'gemmes in such dunghills' and not as a mine of truth.\textsuperscript{43}

This was not Whichcote's position. 'Sure,' he writes, 'itt will not bee a casting sham e on the Gospell; to say and shew, that what hath bin most worthie and like to divine, in severall ages of the world; hath held best and fullest conformitie with the Gospell.' What he has particularly in mind are some of the heathen authors who have written on the end of life, the tranquillity of the soul, contempt of the world, the love of truth, and zeal for righteousness and justice. 'These,' he says, 'and other noble truths they have well defended and justified: againste the base practise of the degenerating and apostatizing worlde.' Underlying this and other differences between Tuckney and Whichcote are rival Christian doctrines of human nature. Tuckney holds to the pessimistic Augustinian view of man before revelation and regeneration, Whichcote to a more optimistic view. 'I look att itt, as a dishonouring God,' he writes, to nullify and make base his workes; and to think Hee made a sorrie worthless peece, fitt for no use; when hee made man. I cannot but think of a noble able creature: when I read \textit{ad imaginem in similitudinem Dei}: or if, in \textit{statu lapso}, itt bee as nothing; then you villifie the restitution by Christ.
The history of mankind both before and after Christ is not to be understood in Augustinian or Calvinistic terms.44

There is no doubt that the exchange of these letters was painful for both men, but their difficulties only serve to indicate the personal costs involved in any such revolution of ideas. While the letters, unpublished until 1753, were being written, Culverwell's An Elegant and Learned Discourse on the Light of Nature (1652) was being readied for posthumous publication with a dedication, provided by the editor, to Tuckney and the Fellows of Emmanuel. In London and elsewhere John Goodwin's Redemption Redeemed (1651) was on sale with a dedication to Whichcote, as Vice-Chancellor of the University, and the Heads of Houses. Of these two works, Culverwell's is the one which has lived most vigorously in later memory, but at the time it was Goodwin's massive defence of the sufficiency of Christ's atonement for the sins of all mankind which drew most attention because of its elaborate challenge to the Calvinistic understanding of salvation. Goodwin, Tuckney said in 1653, is 'the great daring Champion of the contrary errors, whom the abusive wits in this University with an impudent boldness could say, none here durst adventure upon'.45

The basis of Goodwin's teaching is that the power of human reason in the well disposed to discover truth is to be trusted; divine revelation confirms or does not deny what reason declares, after careful investigation, about God and man. In particular, principles of justice and goodness, which can be known by all, provide a clear indication as to the way in which God always acts in his dealings with his rational creatures. The use of such principles in theology makes clear that if God provides a remedy for human sin then that remedy must be universally applicable and not arbitrarily limited to some and refused to others. A God who restricted the opportunity of salvation would be an unjust God. Such a deity, however, is not the God of revelation, for what the scriptures teach about the divine nature and acts fully accords with the deliverances of reason. Because of Christ's atoning death, none are condemned for original sin but only because of the personal sin of unbelief in God and his Christ. But how, it might be asked, does this excuse the pagans from condemnation since they could neither believe nor disbelieve in Christ?46
Goodwin's answer to the problem posed by pagan ignorance is to change the measure of the belief by which pagans are to be judged. No one, he points out, can be justly blamed for falling to believe religious truths which do not come within their cognitive reach. 'Inability for performance,' Goodwin writes, 'the best excuse.' Yet men and women are condemned for unbelief. It must be the case, therefore, that pagans can believe in God and Christ even though they may not know that there is a Christ. How can this be? The problem is solved, Goodwin claims, once it is realised that a sufficient belief in Christ can be achieved, according to Hebrews 11:6, by assenting to this truth about the divine nature, viz., that God is 'a Rewarder of those that seek him.' That all men can have this knowledge, Goodwin writes, 'is the sense of learned men generally, especially of such, who have acquainted themselves with the Writings of Philosophers, and other studious and learned men amongst the Heathen.' And he concludes:

the Heathen generally had, and have, power, means, and opportunities sufficient to come to the knowledge of the gracious Property in God, that He is a Rewarder of those who seek him; and consequently of coming to Him with acceptance.

In Redemption Redeemed Goodwin's treatment of the plight of pagans is not a major concern. The central task in his rescue of redemption from the Calvinists is taken up with such topics as the reliability of reason in fallen man, the way in which the attributes of God are to be understood, and the teaching of Scripture on redemption. In the controversy which flared up around Redemption Redeemed, however, Goodwin's treatment of the salvation of pagans became a matter of dispute.

One scholar who disagreed with Goodwin was Thomas Barlow, an Oxford theologian, who wrote to him challenging the tenet that all men are bound to believe in Christ if they are to be saved. This thesis, Barlow claimed, is not correct: what we know is that God's dealings with the salvific need of pagans will be just, but that is all. Barlow's criticism led Goodwin to restate his position in a work entitled The Pagans Debt and Dowry which also appeared in 1651. In this latter work, Goodwin presents his case at some length. Like his Calvinist
critics, he is not prepared to let go the teaching that a knowledge of Christ is essential for salvation, and he repeats his claim that such a knowledge is possible to those who have not been 'Gospelized', but who are able to know of Christ only that God is merciful to those who seek him. Those who know more of the mercy of God as revealed in the life and teachings of Jesus, viz., those who have been gospelized, have greater opportunities for amendment of life than those without such specific knowledge, but all men everywhere can know, if only in the most general terms, of the divine reality fully revealed in the person of Jesus. 'Jesus Christ', Goodwin writes, 'is so far, and upon such terms, preached, or made known unto all Men without exception, that no man lieth under an impossibility of believing in him; I mean, of believing in him upon such terms, which will be available to his Salvation.'

The plight of pagans, in Goodwin's theology, is identical with the plight of all people and the benefits of salvation in Christ are equally available to those pagans who wish them irrespective of their ability to know the details of salvation history. It is no wonder that the 'abusive wits' within the new Cambridge movement were taken with Goodwin's speculations which, like their own, were based upon a confidence in the power of reason in fallen man, an openness to the value of the pagan past, and a firm conviction that in Jesus, God's saving word was fully manifest. It was said, according to George Kendall, a Calvinist critic, that Whichcote was of the view that The Pagans Debt and Dowry 'was as good a Book as any was written since the Apostles dayes.' Kendall was not of the same opinion, as he made clear in two works of criticism of Redemption Redeemed which he dedicated to Whichcote and the Heads of Houses at Cambridge. In one of these works he expresses, with a pun, the hope

That some of those great wits which now forget Paul, they are so much enamoured on Plato, will in good time discover the sorrie shallownesse of their profound speculation; and as much as they have wandred after this Metaphysicall leader, know at last to what shepherd, and to which Cote to return.
Kendall, however, was something of an outsider to the Cambridge scene: an Oxford trained Calvinist who felt obliged to correct the Cambridge tendencies which 'either opposed or betrayed the Doctrine of the Church. 49

Within the University, the Calvinist reaction to these developments is to be seen in Arrowsmith's chapel lecture at St John's and in Tuckney's sermon, None but Christ, on Acts 4:12, at the July Commencement in 1652. The two works differ in style according to the circumstances of their delivery, but not in doctrine. Arrowsmith's lecture on 'The Insufficiency of other Religions for bringing men to the enjoyment of God' affirms the traditional view that a knowledge of the means of salvation cannot be found outside of divine revelation.

The heavens indeed, and so the earth, with all the creatures in them both, declare the glory of God in himself; but the glory of God in the face of Christ as Mediatour is not declared by any of them.

Philosophy, in particular, provides no alternative to the revealed knowledge of Christ. The gentile converts of Ephesus, Arrowsmith points out, were without Christ, according to Paul, 'although Ephesus then was full of Philosophers and eminent scholars'. 50

Tuckney's None but Christ is the main statement of the reactionary position. It is a vigorous, scholarly and unflinching statement of the established Calvinist position. The forlorn condition of pagans and others who know not Christ, according to this frightening doctrine, is not glossed over: with 'humble awfulness,' he writes, 'let us adore and tremble at the most dreadful, and yet most just Judgement of God upon the Heathen, the farre greater part of the world then, whom he yet over-looked'. The distinction between a natural knowledge of God and a saving revealed knowledge of the deity is drawn with some sharpness against Goodwin's account of the significance of Hebrews 11:6:

it is not a Philosophical, but a Theological, not a natural but a supernatural knowledge that he there speaketh of. A belief that God is, but a God in Christ, and that he is a rewarder, but in an evangelical way.
The attempts to find a knowledge of Christ in pagan learning cannot, he argues, be plausibly maintained. It is true, he allows, that Christ was manifested to the ancient Israelites, according to I Corinthians 10:4, but there is no evidence that any such manifestation has been made to the pagan world. The doctrine of the Ancient Theology is without scholarly foundation. The biblical truth is that ignorance of Jesus leads, by divine decree, to damnation and there is no way in which the full weight of the divine judgement upon pagan sin and ignorance can be avoided. We must not presume to speculate in any way about the fate of Plato and Aristotle, as Culverwell had done in his recently published lectures. Above all there must be no attempt to deny or qualify the apostolic teaching.

They that have not heard of a Saviour, do not, cannot believe in him; They that believe not in him, cannot call upon God; they that call not upon God, cannot be saved; and therefore **a primo ad ultimum**, they that have not heard of a Saviour cannot be saved.51

The argumentative vigour of Tuckney's response and the scholarly care he takes in stating his case -- the sermon was printed with a 90 page appendix -- shows that he recognised the new developments to be a most serious threat to the long and carefully maintained tradition of Cambridge Calvinism. The 'verie ill consequence to the Universitie' which he had feared in Whichcote's teaching was coming true. A year later, at the funeral of Thomas Hill, in December, 1653, Tuckney praised his old friend for his faithfulness to that Cambridge tradition.

As a Divine he was sound in the Faith, Orthodox in his Judgement, firmly adhering to the good old doctrine of the Church of England; that which in our University our famous Whitaker, Perkins, Davenant, Ward and others maintained in their time.

Death prevented Hill from completing his reply to Goodwin's errors, but his generation of Calvinists had lived to see the progress of the scholarly decline of Reformed Augustinianism within the University.52

During the sixteen fifties some of the foundation works of the new way of understanding Christian dogma and its relation to the history of mankind began to be published. Culverwell's *An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature* (1652); More's *An Antidote Against...*
Atheism (1653), Enthusiasmus Triumphantus (1656), The Immortality of the Soul (1659), An Explanation of the Grand Mystery of Godliness (1660); Smith's Select Discourses (1660), edited by Worthington. Some of the enduring works of the movement such as Cudworth's The True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678), Whichcote's Works (1751) and the correspondence between Tuckney and Whichcote (1753) were to appear much later, to serve as guides to posterity and witnesses to the changes of mid-century.

Tuckney and his colleagues continued to publish their views, some of which reflect the ambivalence which characterises the common Protestant scholastic view of the worth of pagan virtue, but the climate of opinion was ceasing to favour the distinctive ideas of this way of thought. Such ideas, however, would not disappear because the moral fatalism or determinism which is central to such a philosophy, both in its theological and secular forms, draws some support from experience of the moral order. But in the sixteen thirties and forties an equally important aspect of that order captured the vision of some of the most promising younger divines in the University. At the centre of that vision is the freedom of man in the just providence of God. A theological programme based around such a vision might make for 'sublimated Deists', as Tuckney observed, but such a warning was to little avail. When Whichcote replied to Tuckney that he could not accept his correction and 'returne to that frame of spirit, in the judging and discerning the things of God' of which he had experience 'in the former parte of my life', he spoke as a leader of a generation which had already started to remake Christian theology around a renewed understanding of God and man. It was a programme which not only called upon the theological resources of pagan antiquity, but, more importantly, held out hope, with varying degrees of certainty, for the salvation of pagans.53

Notes


caution, note Twisse's remark: 'But as yet you dissemble your Tenet, and
play least In sight, and discover your meaning onely by Insinuation.'
(Twisse, Discovery, p.633). W. Pemble, Vindiciæ Gratiae, Works (Oxford
1659), p.55; (work separately paginated). Pemble's discussion of the
problem (pp.40-57) is a well organised presentation of a Calvinist
viewpoint. See also J. Preston, Life Eternall (London 1631), pt 1, pp.87-90
on pagan idolatry.

7. Protestant scholasticism: see bibliography in R. A. Muller, Dictionary
of Latin and Greek Theological Terms (Grand Rapids, Mich. 1985),
ch.7 and J. Morgan, Godly Learning (Cambridge 1986), ch.3. Anthologies:
1978) and H. Schmid, ed., Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran
Church (Eng. trans. 1875, Minneapolis 1961). Paul Baynes, An Entire
Commentary Upon the Whole Epistle of St. Paul to the Ephesians (1643;
Edinburgh 1866), p.274; E. Leigh, A Systeme or Body of Divinity (London
1662), p.388 (margin); A. Burgess, Vindiciæ Legis (2nd ed., London 1647),
p.93. Burgess subsequently wrote a large study, The Doctrine of Original
Sin (1658).

affect, such a course in these dales, namely to temper Gods word
according to the light of natural reason; whereas in the simplicity of the
institution wherein I have been brought up, I have been taught that the
light of natural reason ought rather to be regulated by the Word of God."
(The Riches of Gods Love, bk. 1, p.191; cf. bk. 1, pp.159ff). See also
John Davenant, An Exposition of the Epistle of St. Paul to the Colossians
(1627; trans. London 1831-2), 1, pp.389-407 and Animadversions ... Upon ...


10. The distinction between hard and soft determinism comes from William
James's 'The Dilemma of Determinism'. See J. Davenant, Animadversions,
pp.55, 115, 140; W. Twisse, The Riches, bk. 1, pp.28-9, 95-7; bk 2,
the order of the decrees note Davenant's comment that the sublapsarian
view 'is the most convenient for helping our understanding in this deep
mystery.' (op. cit., p.22; cf. p.48). Twisse took the supralapsarian view
but he was also prepared to call into question the identity or likeness
between divine and created features; see op. cit., bk. 1, pp.124-7.

11. See W. T. Costello, The Scholastic Curriculum at Early Seventeenth

12. W. Twisse, A Discovery, pp.179-180, 62; W. Pemble, op. cit., p.44; J.
Davenant, Colossians, 1, p.395; John Arrowsmith, Armilla Catechetica
(Cambridge 1659), p.82.

13. W. Pemble, op. cit., p.44; J. Davenant, op. cit., 1, p.393; J.
Arrowsmith, op. cit., p.82; R. Sibbes, Second Corinthians Ch. 1 (1655),
Davenant, Colossians, 1, pp.253-4. Sibbes, Pemble and Davenant echo
Augustine; see Against Julian ed., M. A. Schumacher (Washington 1957),


Mede's moderation and reserve in doctrinal disputes and his opposition to Calvinist doctrines of predestination see his Works, ed., J. Worthington (London 1677), pp.xvi-xx. In regard to predestination he is reported as "being herein much of Dr. Jackson's mind" (p.xix).


25. Philosophical Poems, p.182 (Cant. 4, 31); sig. B7v. In the 1642 edition More has a gloss on this passage: 'This opinion, though it have its moments of reason, yet every man's judgement is left free, and will ever be, where there is no demonstration to bind it to assent.' (1642, sig. A5r). 'The Oracle', Philosophical Poems, pp.296, 298. This translation is also in the 1642 edition. Cf. Porphyry's Life of Plotinus in S. Mackenna's translation of Plotinus The Enneads (London 1662), pp.16-17.


27. For the details of the appointments see Mullinger, op. cit. On Tuckney, Arrowsmith, and Hill, see besides the Dictionary of National Biography, James Reid, Memoirs of the Westminster Divines (1811; Edinburgh 1982). Hill's The Right Separation Encouraged (London 1645) contains a strong plea to keep the universities Ideologically pure: 'If those Nurgeries bee not well pruned, you may receive such chaplains thence, as may study to corrupt you and yours, flattering you into everlasting misery.' (p.33). S. R. Gardiner, loc. cit.


29. ibid., pp.161, 163, 165-6.

30. ibid., pp.73, 166.


33. ibid., pp.18, 14.

34. John Smith, Select Discourses (1660), ed., H. G. Williams (Cambridge 1859), p.21. Smith goes on to say: 'This life is nothing else but God's own breath within him, and an infant-Christ (if I may use the expression) formed in his soul' (p.21). Cf. R. Cudworth, op. cit., pp.33-4. Smith was appointed to Queens College after the ejections of 1644.


38. John Beardmore in his account of Tillotson says 'the most prevailing men were generally contra-remonstrants' (Tillotson, Works, 1, p.cclxv).

39. The quotations are from Dr J. M. Lee's translation of Tuckney's Latin lecture entitled 'Articuli Fidei ad normam humanae rationis non sunt exigendi' in Tuckney's Praelectiones Theologicae (Amsterdam 1679). Fol. 10, sect. 3(1).

40. Ibid., fol. 1,2.

41. 'The Form of Sound Words' in A. Tuckney, A Good Day Well Improved (London 1656), pp.311-12, 314, 308, 264, 313.


43. Letters, pp.92, 92-3, 93, 38.

44. Letters, pp.128, 128-9, 112-3.


47. Ibid., pp.503, 507, 507-8.


50. J. Arrowsmith, Armilla Catechetica, Exercitation 2, pp.72, 80. The work may be earlier but it seems fair to date it in the early fifties.

