1. INITIAL PUZZLE

The first puzzle is that Clement uses masses of material, especially exegetical comment, from Philo, but does not normally name his source. On four occasions he acknowledges Philo, whom he identifies as a Pythagorean. For the rest, he simply takes over and modifies what Philo has said. There are complications which add to the difficulties. It is not always clear from which place Clement has derived his Philonic material. Mondésert notes that Protrepticus 11.111 could come from Opif.157, Leg.2.72 or Agr.97. Similarly Prot.10.109 could derive from Mutat.237, Poster.85, Somn.2.180, or Poenit.2. Clement does not quote exactly: 'Il y a néanmoins chez Clément des passages qui sont certainement des emprunts à Philo. Mais il est rare que ces emprunts soient des citations pure et simples: souvent Clément choisit dans le texte, résume, ajoute ou change quelques mots.' ('Nevertheless, there are some passages in Clement which are certainly borrowed from Philo. But it is rarely that these borrowed passages are citations pure and simple: within the text Clement often chooses, summarises, adds or changes some words.') Philo's division of 'the holy books' into two parts—historical and legislative, becomes in Clement a division of the 'philosophy according to Moses' (the O.T.) into four parts—history, legislation, contemplation of nature, theology (or epopteia or metaphysics).

When the physical extent of the debt has been acknowledged, Clement's debt as an exegete stands in need of precision and evaluation. There are exegeses of numbers, names, decalogue, temple and high-priestly vestments; encore ne sont-elles pas les plus intéressantes ni pour lui, ni pour nous, (still they are not the most interesting passages, either for him or for us). There are sensible comments on precepts, and masses of allegorical interpretation; much of this is fantastic speculation which has no relation to scripture. Some of it may be justified by the symbolism of its subject and touches on the fundamental problems of mysticism, sans jamais les approfondir beaucoup. (Without ever reaching much depth). All of which indicates an assessment of Clement's debt to Philo as au fond, il lui doit assez peu, (fundamentally, he owes him rather little). How may we solve the puzzle of Clement's massive, inexact, inconsequential and unacknowledged use of Philo?

(a) Tradition

The first explanation is that the material used by Clement belongs to a tradition which is wider than Philo. Clement may use it without owing it to Philo. While Bousset's identification of sources in Philo and Clement is over-confident, there is no doubt that Philo and Clement use units of material which have had an earlier and independent
existence. In many cases they derive from units of teaching. 'In den literarischen Arbeiten Philos und Klemens' von Alexandria haben wir es mit verwandten Erscheinungen zu tun. . . . Vor allem aber, beide sind Männer der Schule, welche die im Verborgenen ausgespeicherten Schätze der Schularbeit zum ersten Mal in grossen Literaturwerken an die Öffentlichkeit treten lassen'.(8) 'We are confronted, in the literary work of Philo and Clement, by similar phenomena. . . . Above all, however, both are schoolmen who publicly release for the first time in major literary works the treasures of school tradition which have been stored in secret'. Clement acknowledges that the Stromateis are meant to record what he was privileged to hear (Strom.1.11). Philo is less explicit; but he did not have, in Bousset's judgement, the creative mind to bring together so much in his synthesis of Judaism and Hellenism, and he makes frequent references to anonymous predecessors.(9) He speaks of physikoi andres from whom he has learnt what he writes (Abr.99; Mos.2.103; Opif.132). At several points it seems that he is working over existing material.(10) Philo lives on in Clement who continues the synthesis which Philo concocted, a synthesis which is one of the most important developments of human thought.(11)

(b) Escape from literalism

Clement uses Philo because the non-literal interpretation of the O.T. was essential to Christian theology. Where Philo claims that Moses had presented the whole and perfect truth, the followers of Marcion claimed that nothing in Moses could be true; Moses did not know the most high God. Clement followed others like Paul, the writer to Barnabas, and Justin, in insisting that the highest God, the Father of the Lord Jesus Christ, was creator of all things and the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob; but what was declared concerning him by Moses and other Hebrew writers should be taken in a non-literal sense. Not all Jews would allow such an interpretation; Justin and others replied to them that the anthropomorphic language about God sitting and standing, having hands and fingers, would be absurd if it were taken literally.(12) There is little doubt that Clement, like Origen, saw Marcionism as the chief heresy.(13) Marcion was nearly right with his discovery of the newness of the gospel and the strange God: there was no simple continuity between the Law of Moses and the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ. Clement therefore used with gratitude the great store of allegorical interpretation which he found in Philo. After all, a non-literal interpretation of Moses opened the door to the Gentiles and should have weakened any claims to exclusiveness by Jews.

Here also, is the second reason why Clement could not acknowledge his source. Incipient Marcionites would be wary of Jews bearing gifts. It had been convenient for Justin to ignore Philo in his controversy with Jews and to regard all
Jews as literalists; after all, only a literalist could deny, without qualification, that Jesus was Messiah. On the Christian side there was nothing for Clement to gain by naming his source; there was much to lose among those who were attracted by Marcion.

(c) Eclecticism
Clement believed with Justin that whatever had been well said belonged to Christians. The logos spermatikos had fallen like rain on every race and time (Justin, 2 Apol.13; Clement, Strom.1.37). The body of divine truth had been torn apart by sects (Strom.1.57). Eclecticism was an obligation. The seeds of logos must be harvested. The limbs of the divine logos must be reunited. Therefore, by taking great lumps of Philo and inserting them in a Christian writing, Clement was simply placing them where they belonged. It would be inappropriate to attribute them to the false context from which they had been taken.

(d) Philonic shortfall
Clement uses Philo because he wants to say more than Philo has said. For example, the unknown God who transcends all thought and speech is not easy to recognise in the practical and even bloody-minded God of Moses and the Deuteronomic historians. Non-literal interpretation can take the roughness off the account of the God of Israel; but it leaves a void which cannot be filled from its own resources. Philo did not see this problem and persisted in a narrow nationalistic view of God, side by side with his mystical tendency. Clement says with Paul on the Areopagus: 'Whom you ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you.'(14) So Philo had enough but not too much to be of use within a new and Christian synthesis. Clement was prepared to use any partial view provided he could go beyond its inadequacy to the fullness which he claimed for Christ.

(e) New problems
Clement was confronted by problems which Philo did not know and which made Philo redundant. Clement's problems were dissimilar and his outlook sharply opposed to that of Philo. They were both Alexandrine, steeped in scripture, opposed to idolatry, believers in one God; but for Philo all was summed up in Moses and the vision of peace was found in Jerusalem. For Clement all was summed up, and God was seen, in Christ; those who came before him were thieves and robbers. Philosophy, for Philo, is a latecomer after Moses. Philosophy, for Clement, was a preparation for Christ, serving the Greeks as the Law had served the Hebrews. What the Law was to the Jew, philosophy was to the Greek—a schoolmaster to lead to Christ.

2. THESIS
We shall examine the thesis 'In any event, though minor borrowings are frequent, Clement is not simply producing a
hellenized Christianity precisely parallel to Philo's
ehellenized Judaism; his main problems (notably faith and
logic, free will and determinism, and the correct evaluation
of the natural order) are different from Philo's and are
approached from quite another angle'.(15) As a preliminary
objection we must consider those for whom the common
material is a proof of common ideas and dependence. What
can be done to show that the same words mean something
different in a different context? The move has to be
aggressive because belief in constancy of meaning between
parallel expressions can only be avoided by imagination, a
faculty which an inscrutable creator has bestowed unequally
upon his creatures. Belief in constant meaning is found in
the person who cannot see a joke, since most humour depends
on the tension between alternative meanings given to the
same words. Parallelomania is at the root of the
humourless disposition. A picture from Punch of a slave
galley, portrays the slave-driver, on the stern, with his
whip in hand. He declines a large goblet of wine, 'No,
thank you, I have to drive'. The tension between the two
meanings is similar to the tension between creation in Paul
and creation in Joseph and Asenath (a well-known
parallel).(16) Plato in the Phaedrus speaks of the
irretrievable meaning which an utterance has at its moment
of origin. Cadamer speaks of the Wirkungsgeschichte of a
tradition and insists that 'we miss the whole truth of the
phenomenon when we take its immediate appearance as the
whole truth.'(17) Our thesis speaks of 'minor borrowings'
in distinction to 'main problems'. There are plenty of
minor borrowings but they are not relevant to main problems.
How may we assess what is major and what is minor? We may
note that Clement speaks of the Stromateis as containing
much earth and little gold, and as concealing the seeds of
wisdom.(18) It is easily shown that Philonic transplants
generally provide the boring parts of Clement, the earth as
distinct from the gold. But boredom is a subjective test.
There is no way of deciding what is major and minor for
Clement and Philo but by an analysis of their ideas.
Difficult as this is, for two diffuse writers, it is the
only way to justify a claim, either that Clement stands with
Philo on the main problems of their thought, or that the
common ground is extensive but peripheral.

(a) For Philo and Clement, God is the first principle of
being, goodness and truth. This claim expresses both
the philosophy of Plato and the theology of the O.T.(19)
For Philo, God is a unity reached by abstracting from
objects their physical qualities and plurality (Leg.2.1; cf.
Confus.33). Men are like snails curved in on themselves
(Sacrif.95; cf. also Deus 56). Moses at the burning bush met
the God who is (Sacrif.28-30; Deus 11-14). Despair of self
leads to knowledge of God (Legat.1), and love of self is the
first of evils (Congr.28). Death is due to him who denies
that God is sole cause (Leg.3.35). The fullness of the
world is a free gift from God (Leg.3.78).

Clement uses greater precision, and draws from the Middle Platonism of his day. God is indivisible and simple. His names are means of support for the human mind not descriptions in logical categories (Strom.5.81f.). God is reached by abstraction which ends in knowing what he is not rather than what he is (Strom.5.71). In both cases Clement sees the via negativa as preparatory rather than final. The Unknown God is declared by the Logos who comes from him. Beyond abstract unity we cast ourselves into the megethos of Christ (Strom.5.71).

For Philo and Clement there is at least one other being beyond finite existence and close to God. For Philo the Logos is the most generic thing(20) (Leg.3.59-61). There is a hierarchy of divine powers but God has filled the Logos entirely(21) with powers (Somn.1.11). Yet God himself can still be called the 'place' of the ideas (Cherub.14), and God uses the Logos as a rudder to steer all things, and as an instrument or servant by whom he made all things (Mig.1; Deus 12). The Logos is also described as himself steering the universe (Cher.11).

For Clement the Logos is one thing as all things, all the powers of the Spirit rolled into one (Strom.4.156). He is the Jesus who was born, lived and died, and who continues as Lord and Saviour of all. The hierarchy is swallowed up. For Clement the central part of his account of being is the magnitude of the Christ, which Philo does not mention.

(b) Philo's ethics are based on the Mosaic Law as unique and authoritative. Other laws could be natural, positive or ideal. The law of Moses sums up and goes beyond these kinds of laws. It expresses the natural law because it is universal, rational and according to nature. It also expresses the ideals which the philosophers seek and the motif of likeness to God. Similarly, Clement identifies the law of Moses with the natural law and insists that the Mosaic Law is the basis of all ethics. The Greeks derived their ethics from Moses (Strom.2.78f.)(22) However, Clement goes beyond Philo to set ethics in a more explicit logic. He draws on philosopher, prophet and apostle, but sees all ethical endeavour as assimilation to God (Strom.2.131-6). This theme he takes from Plato, but finds it also in the scriptures. Plato speaks of a twofold end, the good and participation in the good; Paul talks of a twofold hope--the object of hope and the act of hope.(23)

(c) For Philo, God is the source of all truth, gained by mystic penetration beyond the veil of the words and events of the Pentateuch. 'But of some things we may be sure. First, there is revealed in Philo an elaborate transformation of Judaism into a mystic philosophy, one that ultimately drew for its sources largely upon Orpheus, Isis and Iran, as these were interpreted by the mystic philosophers of Greek background. This mystic philosophy
with an almost monotonous reiteration brings all the incidents of the Pentateuch into an account of the Mystic Royal Road to God through the Powers or through Sophia.'(24) Philo claims 'I was myself initiated under Moses, beloved of God, into his greater mysteries' (Cherub.48). There is little place for argument. The soul is fed by the word of God which like coriander seed grows even when divided (Leg. 3.169). Scripture as the product of the divine mind offers immediate access to the intellectual world. Reasoning is inappropriate. While there is some place for apologetic in defending the tradition and attacking polytheism, the chief apology is that Moses offers access to divine mysteries and is above argument. The translation of biblical ideas into a Greek idiom was a massive task, but it was not argument. The teaching of Moses was auf griechischen Boden verpflanzt, umgestaltete, neu verjüngte (transplanted into Greek soil, reshaped, given a new life), and acclaimed as the source of Greek philosophy.(25) Philo was not conscious of the philosophical problems which threatened his system of belief.

Philo is able to receive Greek philosophy into Judaism because he regards it as a corpus of intellectual revelation. Mais en même temps elle l'altère profondément, et dans son essence même. Cette altération est au premier abord assez délicate à apercevoir. (But at the same time, the concept of revelation alters Greek philosophy profoundly and changes its very essence.) Philo wrote what appears to be philosophy in his de incorruptibilitate mundi and de providentia and he inserted without modification fragments of philosophy in his exegetical works. Il est indubitable cependant que le talent comme le besoin dialectiques lui manquent, (However, there is no question that he lacks both a talent and a sense of need for dialectic). He either approves or rejects. The discussions in his works are borrowed from others and sometimes broken off because he cannot see the point of them. The absence of argued criticism is, in Bréhier's view, due less to Philo's generally accepted lack of originality than to a radically different point of view from that of the philosophers. Il n'a nullement cette attitude combative que prendront plus tard les apologistes chrétiens,(26) (He shows no trace of the combative attitude which the Christian apologists were to adopt later).

In Clement there is a place for argument which is directed against heretics for their inadequacies of logic and pagans for the folly of their idolatry. Direct appropriation of the divine truth of God is possible through faith; but such direct appropriation is justified by argument in two ways. First, the need for faith is established by a series of proofs. (Strom.8.6f; Strom.2.13; Strom.2.15; Strom.2.121; Strom.2.48; Strom.2.54; Strom.5.5). Secondly, reason must build, upon the foundation of faith, a structure of knowledge (Strom.6.2). The propositions of faith are few and may not be increased or diminished; but
the world of knowledge is never still. Logical knowledge joins truth to truth while spiritual knowledge sees God face to face in constant prayer. No-one can dispense with argument, for, to show that argument is unnecessary, it is necessary to argue. Yet the use of scripture is governed by symbol and allegory for which argument is given, and by a preference for the non-literal meaning. For Clement the central question of truth and logic is the need for faith; no arguments for faith are found in Philo, any more than arguments for higher knowledge are found in Gnostic writings. The achievement of Philo and his predecessors was to invent a new language—the language of biblical helenism. Clement was fortunate to have this language, for he was troubled by problems of truth which had not existed for Philo. The credibility of his philosophy was considered highly vulnerable by his contemporaries. He was able to use the new language; but his chief mission was to argue that faith was reasonable, that man was free and responsible, that the creator and his world were good.

(d) Taking an account of first principles which Philo and Clement share, which expresses at once the philosophy of Plato and the essence of the O.T., there are major differences. On the arche (origin) of being, the relation between the Logos and the Father reflects a central dissimilarity. Philo puts the Logos in second place but still wants him to be divine. As arche the Logos is still to genikotaton (that which is most true to type). Some of the same ambiguity is found in Clement and there is ground for it in Plato; one may conceive of the Good as being and truth but will be right in considering it other and fairer, beyond being and truth (Republic 508). However, in Clement, there is the Johannine christology of divine unity to which attention has recently been drawn. To this may be added the humiliation-exaltation theme as evidenced in Johannine subordination and unity. By his humiliation the Son is exalted and by his subordination the Son is united with the Father.

As arche of ethics, God has given his commands and from these even the Greeks drew their ethics. On this point Philo and Clement are agreed. But Clement develops the theme of assimilation to God, widespread in later Platonism, along distinctively Christian lines. As arche of truth, God speaks, for Philo, through the mystery of scripture. For Clement, allegory is not enough, because there is disagreement concerning truth among those who depend on scripture. Above all, Clement answers the attack on faith by argument which gives reasons for faith, and then builds further. He is able to use, with modifications, much of Philo's exegesis; this he can do the more freely, because allegory is inconsistent with Philo's literalist allegiance to Judaism. To sum up, on each of the central themes, there is a fundamental difference. The divine unity is taken in two incompatible ways. Goodness, for Clement, is found in
likeness to and participation in God, a concept raised to dominance by those who saw themselves as disciples of God's express image in Christ. Truth for Clement is accessible to faith, a logically defensible means which is of little consequence to Philo.

The chief reason for the difference is the dissimilar problems which Philo and Clement faced. On God, Philo had to blend language about the god of the philosophers with language on the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Clement had to show that this God was more than a mystic blank whom philosophers like Numenius could readily accept: 'What is Plato but Moses speaking Attic Greek?'(28) He also had to show that the God of creation was not separable from the God of redemption, that the goodness of creation was guaranteed by an omnipotent, redemptive and providential love. Similarly in ethics, the identification of the law of Moses with natural law gave Philo another gain for his hellenistic Judaism; but it reduced the particularity of the scripture to an ambiguous core of diverse possibilities. Clement spoke of assimilation to God as following Christ; his account of assimilation was governed by the reflection which he saw in history of the divine likeness. Further, Clement faced the threat of a determinism which denied human freedom and the reality of moral choice. Such a threat was not real to Philo who defended a doctrine that God's people were born not made. Philo's epistemology defended a higher knowledge open to an ethnic elite. Clement opposed such a view, unless knowledge were based on a faith accessible to all. The integrity of this faith had to be defended against hostile criticism.

The thesis with which we began has been amply justified. On major issues there are deep differences between Philo and Clement; these differences are due to the different problems which Philo and Clement faced. Some obscurity remains.

3. THEOSOPHY

The most important distinction in the history of ideas at the beginning of the Christian era is that between philosophy and theosophy. The first argues; the second does not. 'The theosophist is one who gives you a theory of God, or of the love of God, which has not reason, but an inspiration of its own for its basis.'(29) Clement and Philo, Clement and the Gnostics, exemplify the dichotomy. Philo and the Gnostics live on the side of the mystagogue. This conclusion was established 150 years ago and certain consequences were derived from it. In his work, Philo und die jüdisch-alexandrinische Theosophie,(30) Gfrörer concluded, after an extended examination, that Philo's thought was marked by many pairs of contradictory principles. Each part of his thought was incompatible with at least one other part.(31)

1 (a) Philo follows a canon of holy books.
(b) He uses these books, not in their original form but
in a Greek translation, submitting Hebrew names to Greek etymology.(32)

2 (a) Philo stresses the inspiration of holy scripture.
    (b) Philo subverts its meaning by arbitrary interpretations.

3 (a) God is not only invisible but inconceivable, beyond all contact with the finite realm.
    (b) God's most secret plans are known to Philo.

4 (a) The invisible God is inconceivable even to Moses.
    (b) This God has chosen the Jews as his own, performed mighty acts in their early history and will perform in the future acts mightier yet.

5 (a) There is a second God, the son of the most high God.
    (b) This son is the Platonic soul of the world and idea of ideas.

6 (a) All things were made by God and apart from him nothing was made.
    (b) Matter exists externally and is a subsisting principle contrary to God.

7 (a) The material world is marked by corruption and decay.
    (b) The material world is but sleeping spirit, a cosmos marked by divine beauty and harmony.

8 (a) God is self-sufficient, unrelated to any creature.
    (b) God is an oriental king of angels.

9 (a) The souls of men fell from heaven to earth.
    (b) The first man was formed in part by angels and the divine spirit was breathed into him.

10 (a) Man's body is evil and man is chained to its evil ways.
    (b) All comes from above, from the Father of light, and man is free.

11 (a) By virtue alone can man please God.
    (b) God arbitrarily chose the Jews out of all the nations.

12 (a) For Philo, the chief virtues are those of resignation and detachment from the body.
    (b) His goal is an all-embracing kingdom of earthly bliss.(33)

Four comments on these antitheses are relevant:
Philo is unhappily hoist with his own encyclopedic petard. It is not possible to make a judgement about him which cannot be contradicted from another part of his work. This is Philo's great weakness, not his strength.

Gfröer's conclusion, that the contradictions show that Philo is the uncritical repository of his contemporary accumulations, must be allowed, with the qualification that the opinions are held together by rich imagination and considerable literary skill. Gfröer proceeds to show how Philo's chief ideas may be traced through the two hundred years before he wrote. He identifies as Philo's chief instrument the arbitrary use of allegory, and as Philo's chief contradiction God's pure transcendence and God's partiality for one nation.

Second-century Christianity was subjected to very severe intellectual criticism from philosophers, heretics and Jews. Clement therefore had to argue more and to draw on a wide tradition of argument. He was aware of the contradictions listed above and succeeded in avoiding or solving them. He was further guided by the heretical appropriation of parts of Philo's antitheses, which caused him to disown them and to give reasons. Paul had already disposed of Philo's great contradiction: one God cannot be the god of Jews alone (Rom. 3:29f.).

In Philo, the world of forms becomes a world of intermediaries between man and God. This transformation of Greek thought belongs to the milieu of Alexandria. 'Philon n'a pas pris comme point de départ la philosophie grecque, mais cette théologie alexandrine qui devait produire les systèmes gnostiques et la littérature hermétique.'(34) (Philo takes as his starting-point, not the philosophy of the Greeks, but that Alexandrian theology which was set to produce the Gnostic systems and the hermetic literature.) The origin of this view is obscure but it owed some impetus to the Stoic world-soul which it sought to re-unite.

The comparison of Clement and Philo must take notice of the strong conclusion which Gfröer draws: that Philo is an accumulation of ideas from two hundred years of hellenistic Judaism and his synthesis of these ideas is inadequate. This has important consequences for historical philology. Parallels are of little scientific use unless they have a clear meaning in their prior setting. For the meaning of a new use is illuminated by its tension with a past use. The Areopagus speech in Acts does not mean, by the Aratos quotation, what those words meant in their original context. It hopes to baptise them into another meaning; but that new meaning should be illuminated by a reference to a former
meaning with which there is tension and disagreement, discontinuity and continuity. If Philo is a loose accumu-
lation from the past, he can provide little illumination for later usage.

4. EXEGESIS

In a sound and extensive study of Philo and the writer to the Hebrews, it has been argued that the language and thought of these two writers have little in common. A consideration of the vocabulary of the two writers finds no dependence, for, where verbal similarities occur, the meaning of the words is too disparate to be illuminating. Philo employs 'the language of scripture in a system that is totally foreign to the Bible', (35) while the writer to the Hebrews makes plausible sense of the biblical material. Still more striking is the difference between Philo and Hebrews on such subjects as time, history, eschatology and the physical world. They are 'poles apart'. (36)

A more positive approach to Philo regards him first and last as an exegete, (37) who writes in subjection to a biblical text which contains contradictions. If we read a modern commentary in isolation from the text, we gain the same negative impression which many have gained from Philo. The difficulty which faces this defence is that Philo is not really subject to the text; his allegorical method is too arbitrary to be governed by its subject matter. All we may claim is that the most arbitrary methods of exegesis, when they are practised widely in scripture, can still bring illumination, because the interpreter is imaginatively formed by the biblical world in which he lives.

The same writer insists that Philo will be understood through exegetical themes rather than through philosophical themes. Of these, the most important is that of spiritual migration from a material to a spiritual world, from the slavery of Egypt to the freedom of Canaan, the land of virtue to the city of God. (38) Here we find, perhaps, a link between Clement and Philo; they employ philosophical language in two ways. First, they use the original sense to present something preparatory or opposed to Judaism or Christianity. Secondly, they use the same words with a new meaning, which they find in Judaism or Christianity. This move requires careful analysis of each writer. Philo and Clement are both intellectual emigrants. The weakness of this metaphor is that neither Philo nor Clement gives evidence of a former state in which he was remote from hellenism.

CONCLUSIONS

The relation between Philo and Clement is hard to define because Philo lacks precision and is outside the scientific limit for such comparison. His ideas are not sufficiently clear for areas of continuity and discontinuity to be established. Clement also includes a great deal of secondary material and in a chosen obscurity surrounds his
gold with much earth.

Clement is more a philosopher than a theosophist and has historical importance because of his philosophical contribution. A philosopher is less important for the theses which he propounds than for the way he supports them; his arguments indicate the meaning of his conclusions. The theosophist does not argue and his meaning is therefore to be found in a quite different way, by some form of aesthetic awareness. It is hard for philosophers to take theosophists seriously; it is hard for theosophists not to feel superior. This is the first difference between the two and it is today important for an age where Gnosticism has been treated as theology or philosophy instead of being recognised as an attractive form of theosophy.

A second difference is in problems faced and ways of solving them. For Philo, Moses and the Law are to be the sum of all excellence. For Clement, Jesus is God, the Son in the Father as the Father is in the Son; all is fulfilled in him. This is explained with the help of John, Paul and Matthew, all of whom were unknown to Philo. Moses remains a figure of the past for Philo. Matthew is deeply conscious of a 'holy past' (39), but for Paul and John, Jesus owns the present and the future; for all three the cross is the centre of the universe, a recent and earthy fact; John 17 indicates a way towards unity with God for which parallels may be found in Philo. John is closer to Plato than to Philo because of his concern for argument and word; but the major difference is the relation of faith to Jesus within the stark reality of the cross: (40) 'through faith in Christ we may enter into a personal community of life with the eternal God, which has the character of agape (Christian love), which is essentially supernatural and not of this world, and yet plants its feet firmly in this world, not only because real agape cannot but express itself in practical conduct, but also because the crucial act of agape was actually performed in history, on an April day about A.D. 30, at a supper table in Jerusalem, in a garden across the Kidron valley, in the headquarters of Pontius Pilate, and on a Roman cross at Golgotha.'

A third difference is the dissimilar historical setting of each writer. Philo provided the language of biblical hellenism and brought two cultures together. With the help of his many predecessors he continued the translation of a Greek bible into hellenistic ideas. This involved imagination and thought but did not require awareness of problems of truth. For example, when the presence of evil in the world is attributed to the incompetence of God's auxiliaries (Opif. 72-75), a Greek idea which is consistent with polytheism, but not with monotheism, is left unchanged. The work of Philo is, at times, more a transposition from one key to another, an operation which lacks the subtleties of translation; but that does not destroy his achievement. Perhaps he could not achieve more because he saw his Jewish version as the original and Greek philosophy as derivative.
from Moses. The new language could not be proclaimed as a language event because nothing new had happened.

Clement had the language of biblical hellenism handed to him on a plate by Philo and his predecessors. He was able to do something with it because of the peculiar weakness and strength of his position as a second-century Christian. The weakness of his position was that Christianity, lacking the prestige and dignity of an ancient ethnic religion, was widely attacked as logically and morally inadequate. The force of these threats demanded from Clement a firmer response than Philo was able to provide. The credibility of Christianity was not accepted and the Christian position was insecure. On the other hand there was added strength. The event of the incarnation produced a new language which could move from Jerusalem to Athens and into all the world. 'Das von Jesus her ergehende Wort zeichnet sich endlich dadurch aus, dass es verändernd wirkt. Es schafft eine grundlegend neue Situation, die durch die Nähe Gottes und die Verheissung seines Vollendens bestimmt ist. Darin einzustimmen vollzieht sich als ein Umdenken, woraus Früchte erwachsen, die dem wahren Leben dienen und so die Welt zugute kommen.'(41) (The word which proceeds from Jesus is in the end distinguished by the fact that it effects transformation. It creates a fundamentally new situation, which is marked by the nearness of God and the promise of his fulfilment. Acceptance of this reality produces a new way of thinking, out of which grow fruits which serve the true life and so benefit the world.)
NOTES TO PHILO AND CLEMENT

(1) Clement draws especially on Leg., Somm., Virt., and Mos.; and uses Philo most in Strom. 1, 2, 5 and 6. Stählin lists roughly 350 instances.

(2) Philo is mentioned by name in Strom. at 1.72; 2.100; 1.23 and 1.31. At the first two references he is described as a Pythagorean.


(4) Ibid., 167.

(5) Ibid., Mos.46f., and Strom.1.176.


(8) Ibid., 1.

(9) Ibid., 2, 8.

(10) Ibid., 152-4. On Clement see especially 155f., 263-71.

(11) Ibid., 319.

(12) Justin, Dialogue with Trypho, 114.

(13) A. von Harneck, Marcion, Das Evangelium vom fremden Gott, (Leipzig, 1921), TU 45, 245f.

(14) Acts 17:23; Clement, Strom. 5.82.


(16) Rom. 4:17; Joseph and Asenath 8.9.


(18) Strom. 1.20f., and Strom. 4.4.


(20) Philo also says, 'God is the most generic thing and the logos of God is second.' Leg.2.21.

(21) δι' ςτοιχείαν

(22) W. Völker, Der wahre Gnostiker nach Clemens von Alexandrien.
NOTES TO PHILO AND CLEMENT

(Berlin and Leipzig, 1952), 622f., sums up the differences between Clement and Philo as follows: both connect eikon with nous, see the good man as a copy of the copy which is the Logos, attribute sin to weakness (astheneia) and ignorance (agnoia), and advocate the right use of the world. But in Clement the remoteness of God is mitigated by the account of symbolism, the divine love for man is proved by the death of the Son, and agape dominates the whole plan of salvation. For Clement, the Logos is found in incarnation, passion, church, and sacraments, while Philo’s Logos is more mysterious. Clement speaks in a distinctive way of sin and repentance, the search for forgiveness and the growth from faith to knowledge in stages. Faith is imparted by Christ and with it, a note of victory (sieghafte Stimmung). Ατρεητος μένει means the peace and love of God and έζομοίωσις πρός τόν θέον is a close and personal relationship. Philo penetrates the whole of Clement but Bei aller Abhängigkeit hat Cleaiens seinen Vorgänger doch kritisch gelesen und von einem festen Standpunkte aus gewürdigt.

(23) Clement takes this explicitly from Paul. See Rom. 8:17, 6:22, 5:4f.; Heb. 2:11. Hope is also a central virtue for Philo (Deter.38; Poster.8; Mutat.30; Abr.2), but there is no development of an account parallel to Plato.

(24) E.R. Goodenough, By Light, Light! (New Haven, 1935), 263. Against Goodenough see V. Nikoprowetsky, Le commentaire de l'écriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie, (Leiden, 1977), 240: ‘En l'absence de critère de caractère objectif, c'est-à-dire philologique, rien ne nous paraît plus dangereux et plus illusoire que tout psychologisme de ce genre. Particulièrement lorsqu'il s'agit d'un auteur aussi déconcertant--au regard des normes littéraires ordinaires--que l'est Philon.' Also against Goodenough, who I consider to be justified in his central contention, see Völker 38f., where it is noted, however, that Goodenough and Cerfaux insisted that the mystery terminology should not be taken too literally. Völker’s purpose is stated: 'Es wird sich hoffentlich zeigen lassen, dass der starke Eindruck von Philos Uneinheitlichkeit und vom unaufhörlichen Schwanken seiner Begründungen und seiner Terminologie doch nur für die Aussenbezirke richtig ist, dass aber hinter allem eine einheitliche Grundhaltung achtbar wird, die einer tieferen Schicht angehört als die Begriffe.' W. Völker, Fortschritt und Vollendung bei Philo von Alexandrien, (Leipzig, 1938), 46f.


(28) Numenius fr.B. Cited by Clement, Strom.1.150.

NOTES TO PHILO AND CLEMENT

(30) Philo und die jüdisch-alexandrinische Theosophie, (Halle, 1831 and Stuttgart, 1835).

(31) Gfrörer was answered by A.F. Daehne, Geschichtliche Darstellung der jüdisch-alexandrinische Religions-philosophie, 1, (Halle, 1834), who systematized Philo within the categories of nineteenth-century Idealism. Gfrörer disposes of Daehne’s objections in the preface to the second edition of his work (Stuttgart, 1835).

(32) This is, as Gfrörer insists, absurd; for Philo the logos was active universally and covered a multitude.

(33) Gfrörer (1835), Part 2, 1-3.

(34) E. Bréhier, Philon d’Alexandrie, 317.

(35) Ibid., 576.

(36) Ibid., 577.


(38) Ibid., 239.


(40) C.H. Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, (Cambridge, 1953), 199f. Sandmel defines the distinctiveness of Christianity as an ‘intertwining of events in, and of theology about, the career of Jesus, whether we can recover that career or not, and the histories of his direct disciples and of later apostles, and what they believed and thought’, S. Sandmel, Parallelomania, JBL, 81, (1962), 4.

(41) Gerhard Ebeling, Dogmatik des christlichen Glaubens, 2, (Tübingen, 1979), 515.