The Procession of the Spirit
Towards a Transcendence of the Filioque Controversy

E. J. Stormon S.J.

To make this paper intelligible to a wider audience than those familiar with Trinitarian theology and the controversies that have broken out during the long history of its development, I think I should begin with a comparison of the Greek and Latin texts of the common creed of Christendom, the Niceno-Constantinopolitan (NC), or more precisely the third article where belief is expressed in the existence, origin, and activity of the third member of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit. The Greek text, which was ratified by the Fourth Ecumenical Council, at Chalcedon 451, together with a prohibition of alteration to its content (and, if we take the strictest interpretation, to its verbal formulation), is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church to this day. It runs:

(We believe) also in the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the giver of life, who proceeds from the Father (τό ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον), who together with the Father and Son is adored and glorified, who has spoken by the prophets.¹

The early Latin version in use in Rome until the early 11th century was substantially the same. However, by a strange ‘creeping process’ which seems to have begun in Spain in the 6th century, and rapidly spread to England, Gaul, Germany and northern Italy, an interpolation was made after ‘who proceeds from the Father’, so that the resultant text, which has been for long universal in the West (in both the Roman Catholic and the Reformation Churches), reads:

And we believe also in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and giver of life, who proceeds from the Father and the Son (qui ex Patre Filioque procedit), who together with the Father and Son is adored and glorified, who has spoken by the prophets.²

The interpolated clause ‘and the Son’ (Filioque) seems to express, in very shorthand fashion, the teaching in St. Augustine’s great work, the De Trinitate (written between 399 and 419), though the origins of the phrase may go back somewhat further. It is this addition (the προσθήκη, as the Greeks call it) which, after the theology on which it drew had become common property in the West, and even appeared in professions of faith exchanged fraternally with the East, suddenly became a matter of polemics in

² Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion Symbolorum, No. 86.
late Merovingian and Carolingian times (7th to 9th centuries), and eventually emerged as the chief theological factor in the rupture between Western and Eastern Christianity when this at length took place.¹ (It is usual to date the Schism from the mutual excommunications fulminated against one another by the Papal Legate Cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida and his companions, on the one hand, and Patriarch Michael Cerullarios and his Synod, on the other, at Constantinople in 1054. Many historians, however, looking beyond these local canonical acts which directly affected only a handful of people, would see the break as looming well before this, but effectively present in the minds of both Churches only as late as the time of the Crusades — certainly by the time of the Fourth Crusade in 1204, when a Latin Emperor and Patriarch were installed in Constantinople, with Byzantine counterparts and rivals in the newly formed Greek Empire of Nicaea.)⁴

Obviously there were many non-theological factors involved in the estrangement between what could be then looked upon as the two halves of Christendom, conventionally called the Latin West and the Greek East, although the terms ‘Latin’ and ‘Greek’ should not be taken in the purely linguistic or even cultural sense, for the West included the Gaelic-Celtic, the English, Germanic (in the wide sense, including Dutch and Scandinavian), some Slav and other races, as well as the Latins; and the East included besides Greek-speaking Byzantines, great Slav populations, Georgia, and the mixed peoples of what remained of the Patriarchates of Antioch, Jerusalem, and Alexandria. There were also theological factors other than the Filioque which contributed to the Schism. Indeed one of them, concerning structures of the Church, including the Roman primacy, has by now eclipsed the Filioque in the general consciousness of the Eastern Orthodox. But the Filioque problem remains, and it affects the Reformation as well as the Roman Churches, since, as we have seen, all use the same Creed, and with varying degrees of fervour profess the faith expressed (somewhat crudely, as we shall see) in the addition.

It is true that there are exceptions: the Old Catholics of Holland, Switzerland, etc. have after long negotiations sided with the Orthodox, and a recent joint Anglican-Orthodox commission reached agreement not merely about the dropping of the Filioque clause from the Creed, but about the

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¹ For an excellent brief history of the Filioque insertion, see Kelly, op. cit., pp.358-367. Cf. the same author’s The Athanasian Creed, (London 1964), pp.86-90. Among the longer works, H.B. Swete’s pioneering History of the Doctrine of the Procession of the Holy Spirit... (Cambridge 1876) is still worth reading; M. Jugie, De Processione Spiritus Sancti ex fontibus Revelationis et secundum Orientales Dissidentes, (Rome 1936) though hardly impartial, is indispensable.

negative value of important traditional support for the doctrine. On the other hand the massive fact remains that one of the most vigorous and uncompromising assertions of the *Filioque* theology and the place of the clause in the Creed was made by Karl Barth, speaking as a theologian of the Reformed Church, and rallying support by those of his own tradition and others round the world. Further, even though the mutual excommunications between Rome and Constantinople were lifted and symbolically banished ‘from the midst and the memory of the Church’ by a splendid gesture of peace and friendship in 1965, it was recognized that ecclesial communion was not thereby restored; theological problems have still to be resolved, and one of the major ones is still the *Filioque*.

At the present time the Orthodox Churches of the East are engaged in a whole ‘cat’s cradle’ of dialogues with the various Churches of the West, including the first real theological one with Rome since the Council of Florence in the 15th century. All these are taking place under irenic conditions, and the one with Rome in particular is proceeding from vast areas of agreement and common experience to prepare for the examination of such stubborn differences as the theology of the *Filioque* and its Eastern antithesis, with a desire to reach either an agreement or a *modus vivendi* by recognition of a legitimate dogmatic pluralism in which two theological traditions with different emphases can live side by side. It is in the belief that such a position can be reached that I am conducting a few explorations in this paper.

Let us put aside for the moment the long and tangled debates about the legitimacy of the one-sided Western insertion of the *Filioque* clause in the NC creed. On that subject it is sufficient to say that most historians who have examined the means by which the addition came into currency in the West (it was resisted by Rome until some time in the first half of the 11th century, when imperial pressure seems to have prevailed), would be prepared to recommend its withdrawal. Thus it looks as if what André de Halleux, writing in the *Revue d’Histoire Ecclésiastique* some five years ago, called the ‘appel pathétique’ of Mark of Ephesus at Ferrara 1438, asking that the West give back the Creed in the form in which First Council of Constantinople bequeathed it, might be met. (It is noteworthy that the pre-

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sent Pope John Paul II, when celebrating the Eucharistic Liturgy with eastern Catholic bishops, omitted the Filioque). Again, to anticipate, I think that many Western theologians who know at first hand the Augustinian theology which the clause is evidently meant to express, are so unhappy about its failure to represent that theology properly (it leaves out the primordial role of the Father, principaliter a Patre, and the fact that a single principle of 'spiritation', common to both Father and Son, is involved), that they would be content to see it go on this ground alone. They would want, however, to see the original formula of NC, 'the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father', left in an open-ended sense (i.e. as making a positive statement of the divinity of the Holy Spirit without touching on the role of the Son, either to affirm or deny), which was probably what the Council, anxious not to give a handle to its Eunomian or 'Macedonian' opponents by saying more than was strictly necessary, really intended. (The exclusive interpretation, 'from the Father only', common in the East from the time of the Patriarch Photius onwards, at least seems to pre-empt the whole Filioque discussion, and, as we shall see, gives a hardened, absolute sense to the Scriptural phrase on which it is based (Jn. 15, 26) which modern exegesis does not support).

I must now move rapidly into matter which is more directly cognate to the central concerns of this Conference. Let me remind you, however, that I have in the nature of things to restrict myself to a theological approach. There is of course such a thing as Christian experience of the Spirit; indeed without that, much of the New Testament data on which I must now draw would not be available. But I should like at this point to proceed exegetically, expediting what could be a long drawn-out enquiry by taking account inter alia of the conclusions reached by E. Schweizer in his magisterial article on Pneuma in Kittel's Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, and also some very useful considerations recently offered by M. A. Chevallier of the Protestant Faculty of Theology of Strasbourg on 'L'Évangile de S. Jean et le Filioque' in the Revue des Sciences Religieuses.

**NEW TESTAMENT DATA**

First of all, it is clear that there is not a single, homogeneous, theology of the Spirit in the New Testament (if indeed one can speak of theology rather

8. A further instance is the Papal commendation of the Lutheran, Orthodox, and Catholic Bishops of Finland, who in inaugurating a place of common prayer for Finns in Rome, expressed their 'common roots' by reciting the NC Creed 'in its original form' (Osservatore Romano, 21 Jan. 1985, English ed. p.10).


than materials for a theology). In Matthew and Mark the Spirit is represented mainly in the Old Testament sense of the divine power (δύναμις) working in the world, and working in particular on the man Jesus. The Spirit is active creatively at his conception; it witnesses to him at his baptism, it drives him into the desert, and in the power of this Spirit he drives out devils. With Luke there is a movement from the earlier part of the Gospel where the Spirit is spoken of in close parallelism with the power of God ('The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee', 1, 35) to a more characteristic idea of Jesus as a man filled with and possessing the Spirit, and as the exalted Kyrios able to send the Spirit on his followers, as he does at Pentecost. The Spirit is promised to the early Church as a power coming from on high, and its descent, as described by Peter in Luke's Acts of the Apostles, is a pouring forth by the risen and exalted Christ, now at the right hand of the Father, from whom he receives this same Spirit.

But it is the more theologically developed Gospel of St. John on which both sides in the later Filioque controversy will draw more abundantly. In Chapters 14 and 16 (a section of the discourse of Jesus after the Last Supper, on the eve of his death), there are a number of passages in which the Spirit, now spoken of in personal terms as the Παράκλητος (Comforter, Consoler, or Advocate), is promised by Jesus as one who will be with his followers, not leaving them orphans when the visible presence of Jesus is withdrawn, but being with them for ever, leading them into all truth, even to things which they are not yet prepared to receive, and who will witness to the world about Jesus, and will glorify and announce him because it has received from him. In these texts the neuter noun Πνεύμα brings in its train a masculine pronoun ἐκεῖνος, which seems to be only partly accounted for as a grammatical carry-over from the personal masculine noun Παράκλητος. The Spirit is to be sent by Jesus 'from the Father' or 'from the Father's side' (παρὰ τοῦ Πατρός), and this statement is followed by the exegetical clause: 'The Spirit of truth who proceeds from the Father' (ὁ παρὰ τού Πατρός ἐκπορεύεται, 15, 26). It is from this clause, rendered participially, and with a change of preposition from παρὰ to ἐκ, that the words of the NC Creed, 'who proceeds (literally, 'proceeding') from the Father', derive. To complete this part of our dossier we should add the scene of what is sometimes called the Johannine Pentecost, where the Risen Christ breathes on his disciples, saying, 'Receive (the) Holy Spirit' (λάβετε Πνεύμα "Αγιόν, 20, 22).

These are seminal passages, and call for a few observations before we return to look at the earlier evidence provided in the letters of St. Paul. M. Chevallier has well pointed out that the interest and intention of the Scriptural writers is directed to activities, roles, functions, rather than to ques-
tions of being, nature, substance. Their concern is with the dramatic rather than the ontological. Thus, in common with most modern exegetes and specialists in hermeneutics, he finds the Johannine texts just referred to at a very distant remove from the *Filioque* debates that arose only when the Scriptural record had to be made intelligible within the Hellenistic culture with its own special categories and preoccupations. He points out, for instance, that the recurring παρά τοῦ Πατρός says nothing about derivation of being; it designates the point of departure almost in a spatial sense (‘d’auprès du Père’, ‘from by the Father’), and the emphasis is on a divine guarantee concerning the *mission* of the Spirit. The last of the major exegetes who was prepared to see the words παρά τοῦ Πατρός as expressing, in the intention of the writer, what Henry Swete once called ‘the eternal law of the Spirit’s being’, was apparently Père J.-M. Lagrange, whose commentary on St. John dates back to 1925. One remembers how C. K. Barrett, for instance, moved away in the second edition of his fine book on St. John (1978, 1982) from his position in the first edition (1955), where he was prepared to see the Paraclete passages as opening up perspectives on Trinitarian theology within which the later dogmatic debates find their place.

In drawing attention to the exegetical situation, I do not of course want to sever the connection between the New Testament witness and the Patristic developments with which we shall be soon concerned, for this would be to render impossible the reflections out of which those very developments took their rise, and to which renewed recourse must always be made for maintenance and regulation of a dogmatic Triadology. I wish simply to say that the New Testament texts cannot be used directly and literally as ‘proofs’ or ‘refutations’ in a debate which arose in a later and different thought-world, and one moreover which contained its own variations. There has first to be a transposition of the Scriptural evidence from the functional to the ontological plane, from the temporal, ‘economic’ level to the innermost life of God — a daring and hazardous enterprise which however I believe was justified and indeed inevitable within the Providential design of Christian history. Thus I believe that the only way in which we can lay the ground-work for a Trinitarian theology is to ‘read back’ into the immanent life of God, with appropriate safeguards and discriminations, certain significant statements and gestures of Christ as we have them in the New Testament record, knowing as we do so that we are moving from one level or context to another, from the temporal to the eternal, from the human (and ‘theandric’) to the divine. But if we follow this course — and, except perhaps at certain privileged moments, we have really no other

11. Chevallier, p.98.
option — we must know what we are doing and observe a becoming circum­pection.

I have interposed these remarks immediately after recalling the capital Paraclete and ‘insufflation’ passages in St. John, and before passing on to any account of the data to be gathered from St. Paul, partly because the Johannine matter may seem to lend itself too decisively, and by too facile a process, to the *Filioque* debate of later times, and partly because with St. Paul we may be already moving into a more Hellenic milieu in which, if Eduard Schweizer is right, the writer is already coming to terms with Spirit or Pneuma as substance.12

First there are a number — perhaps no more than four — of so-called ‘Triadic passages’ in the Pauline corpus. A typical example would be the well known conclusion of 2 Corinthians: ‘The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the fellowship of the Holy Spirit be with you all’. (Together with these we could recall the baptismal formula, ‘In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit’, at the end of St. Matthew’s Gospel). In certain places Paul rings the changes on the meaning of πνεῦμα: sometimes it is the divine Spirit, fairly clearly personalized, sometimes it is the same Spirit to be understood as personal only by reference to other passages; sometimes it is the human spirit as touched by the divine, sometimes it is a vaguer word having to do with some gift of the Spirit, or some disposition of the human personality. What is immediately relevant to our purpose is that the Spirit is sometimes called the Spirit of God and the Spirit of Christ alternately (which may remind us of the double sending of the Paraclete in St. John, 14, 26; 15, 26). A typical entanglement of these meanings is apparent in a famous passage of Romans:

You are on the spiritual level (ἐν πνεύματι), if only Christ’s Spirit dwells within you; if a man does not possess the Spirit of Christ, he is no Christian. But if Christ is dwelling within you, then although the body is a dead thing because you have sinned, yet the spirit is life itself because you have been justified. Moreover, if the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells within you, then the God who raised Christ Jesus from the dead will also give life to your mortal bodies through his indwelling Spirit (8, 9–12, N.E.B. version).

And a little further on:

In the same way the Spirit comes to the aid of our weakness. . . . Through our inarticulate groans the Spirit himself is pleading for us, and God who searches our inmost being knows what the Spirit means (*ibid.* 26–28).

Then, in a typical passage on our sharing in the sonship of God through Christ the Son (our being, as Augustine will later put it, filii in Filio):

To prove that you are sons, God has sent into our hearts the Spirit of his Son, crying ‘Abba! Father!’ (Gal. 5, 6-7).

There is a further reference to the Spirit of Christ in Phillippians, 1, 19, and a rather puzzling saying in 2 Cor. 3, 17 that ‘the Lord . . . is the Spirit’.

EASTERN PATRISTIC TRADITION

What we may have gathered from all this is that the Spirit is at one and the same time the Spirit of God (the Father) and of Christ (the Son), and that in some sense he comes from and is sent by both. It was only after the historically inevitable movement from the functional and ‘economic’ to the ontological and ‘immanent’ planes had taken place in Christological and Trinitarian thought — after a theology of persons and nature, of hypostases and ousia had been worked out in Patristic times — that we begin to see the development of different emphases regarding the mysterious intra-Trinitarian derivation of the Spirit.

We need first to look at the relevant theological traditions in the Greek-speaking East. Here we can distinguish in a general way (which does not exclude various kinds of interaction) the Alexandrian, Antiochene, and Cappadocian currents. The Antiochenes, like Theodoret of Cyr and Theodore of Mopsuestia before him, cultivate a type of Christology (seen at its extreme in Nestorius) which would make any derivation of the Spirit from the Son completely out of the question, and the first-named said so roundly.

Our concern is rather with the Alexandrian writers, beginning with Origen and proceeding through St. Athanasius to Didymus the Blind and St. Cyril of Alexandria, and then with the famous Cappadocian trio, Saints Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa (all of whom were influenced in different degrees by Origen and Athanasius, but form quite a distinct school). Of course the story does not end there: in a completer account we should have to go on to the Pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus the Confessor, and the encyclopaedic writer, John of Damascus, who tried to draw the various strands of Eastern theology into a synthesis, as late as the 8th century. But it is with the Alexandrians and Cappadocians, on the whole, that I should like to deal, partly because between them they sufficiently represent the more

12a. Readers of G. W. H. Lampe’s Bampton lectures, God as Spirit, (Oxford 1977), may well ask whether I am still content to take the New Testament record as lending itself to the categories of Trinitarian theology. My reply must be that, given my faith in the Lord of History and the unbroken tradition of the Church, ‘I can no other’.

13. Ep. 151, P.G. 83, c.1417 D. De Halleux, however, in ‘Cyrille, Théodoret, et le “Filioque”’, Rev. d’Hist. Eccl. 74 (1979) contests this common opinion, and argues that Theodoret is simply concerned to defend the divinity of the Holy Spirit by ruling out a creaturely derivation from or through the Son (pp.617ff).
One fundamental feature which meets us in Origen of Alexandria, continues in the Cappadocians, and remains fairly generally characteristic of Eastern theology as a whole, is the strong emphasis on God the Father as God in the primordial sense. He is God in his own right (αὐτόθεος), unbegotten (ἀγέννητος), and source of godhead (πηγὴ τῆς θεότητος).\(^{14}\) And this of course corresponds to the fact that in the New Testament ὁ θεός normally means God the Father. But there is another element that is only faintly reflected in the Cappadocians, but is fairly persistent in the Alexandrian tradition, and links up with, or presents analogies with, the emergent Latin teaching about the procession of the Spirit. This element has been called, not altogether suitably, the teaching of the Double Procession, by which is meant a procession of the Spirit from both the Father and the Son, not merely within the temporal order, but first and foremost in eternity — within the inner mystery of God.\(^{15}\) In Origen this is connected, at least in certain parts of his *De Principiis*, with a subordinationist theology, in which God the Son is less than God the Father, and is the direct source of the Holy Spirit, although the ultimate source remains the Father. In Athanasius’ *Letters to Serapion* this kind of thought is modified to meet the demands of Nicaean orthodoxy, but the language used, while it safeguards the primacy of the Father as the fount of deity, has a kind of Filioquist ring about it, although few would press it into an outright *Filioque* doctrine, such as we shall see later worked out against a different background by St. Augustine in the West.\(^{16}\) This strain continues in Didymus the Blind, who besides being the author of a book *De Spiritu Sancto* (extant only in a Latin translation by St. Jerome), wrote a work *De Trinitate*, and probably the fifth book (less probably, the sketchier fourth one) attached to the three genuine books of St. Basil’s *Contra Eunomium*.\(^{17}\) The theme is more emphatic in St. Cyril of

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17. Already in his preface to the Maurist edition (Paris 1730 and 1838), which was later taken up into Migne, *P.G.*, J. Garnier argued on grounds of style and vocabulary against the authenticity of Books 4 and 5. A view gained ground this century that they were by Didymus (with whose known works they have certain points in common), but certain traces of Plotinus persuaded some scholars (followed by Pan. K. Chrestos, ’Ὁ Μέγας Βασίλειος, [Thessalonike 1978], p.152) that they were preliminary drafts by Basil himself. Didymus still seems the more likely candidate.
Alexandria in whom a fairly constant formula for the procession of the Spirit is ‘out of the Father through the Son’, and who in one famous passage of his *De Adoratione* actually used the expression ‘poured out substantially from both’. (‘From both’, παρ’ ἀμφότερον, already occurs in the *Ancoratus* of Epiphanius of Cyprus, one of whose works is later used, though not, in this connection, by St. Augustine).  

Yet when all is said and done, it is the Cappadocian Fathers who are more regulative for the Eastern Church in Trinitarian doctrine. Attempts to find a *Filioque* doctrine in St. Basil are probably futile, since his thought is mainly concentrated on the modes of derivation of the Son and the Spirit from God (the Father), and on the defence of the Spirit as transcendent of the created order. (A famous passage in the third book *Contra Eunomium* in which it is asserted that the Spirit derives his existence from the Son has long been repudiated by the Orthodox as an interpolation, and it looks as if studies in the manuscript tradition have now confirmed this view. It is a great pity that in the reunionist Council of Florence in 1439 the chief Latin orator, John of Montenero, wasted several sessions in trying to prove the authenticity of those words by methods that could never resolve a literary question.) The most one can say is that there is a reflection in Basil’s later work *De Spiritu Sancto* of the Athanasian theme that in some sense the Spirit is an image of the Son, as the Son is an image of the Father, and that he bears the same relation to the Son as the Son to the Father. This, however, has to be understood against the background of his constant insistence that it is the Father who is the αἰτία or cause of the Spirit, and that it is from him that the Spirit proceeds (cf. particularly Letter 38). There is indeed an affirmation in Letter 42 of a τάξις or ‘order’ in the procession of the hypostases, but there is no evidence that he meant this to imply a sequence of causes. It would be inconsistent with his thought as we know it, and as it was conditioned by the controversies of his time, in the early post-Nicene period, to seek the derivation of the hypostasis of the Spirit in any other source but God (i.e. the Father). I do not think that the question of

18. Cyril’s famous expression τὸ οὐσιωδῶς ἥν έγουν ἐκ Πατρός δι’ Υίου προχεόμενον Πνεύμα, *P.G.* 68, c. 148A, is only one of the many which seem to put him clearly with the Filioquists. See Jugie, *Theologia Dogmatica Christianorum Orientalium*, (Paris 1926), Vol. 1, p.155 for others. The recent study by de Halleux referred to above will bring the whole matter under fresh scrutiny. Is the reference to the ‘economic’ or ‘immanent’ planes, or both? Epiphanius, on the other hand, seems to be so firmly with the Latins that it is usually suggested that he came under their influence.

19. For the present state of a question, which has been agitated for centuries see, besides the MSS *stemma* in T.I. of the ed. by B. Sesboüé, *Contre Eunome*, Sources Chrétiennes, (Paris 1982), the notes to T.II (Books 2 and 3), (Paris 1983) together with critical apparatus, pp.146-47.

mediation by the Son played any serious part in his theology at the point to which he had taken it when he died still a comparatively young man, a few years before the first Council of Constantinople.

Even less, I think, should we look for any theology of mediation by the Son in St. Basil’s friend and fellow-thinker, St. Gregory of Nazianzus. There is indeed one passage in his third *Theological Oration* delivered on the eve of the Council of Constantinople, about the ‘monad’ (The Father) moving into a ‘dyad’ (the duality of Father and Son), with the process ending in a ‘triad’ (explicitly identified with Father, Son, and Holy Spirit). However, to press the middle position of the Son into some assertion of causation would be to run counter to the immediately following statement that the Father is both γεννήτωρ (generator) of the Son and προβολεύς (‘producer’, or more literally ‘projector’) of the Holy Spirit. Indeed, precisely in the fifth of the *Theological Orations*, devoted specifically to the Holy Spirit, one can read the text right through several times without being forced to think of any causal contribution by the Son to the personal existence of the Holy Spirit. What we do find in a couple of places in these standard-setting orations is the concept of ‘relation’ (σχέσις) as that which differentiates one Person from another, and this distinction seems clearly equivalent to the famous ‘modes of existence’ (τρόποι της ύπαρξεως) which already occur in St. Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto*, and will become a standard term in later Byzantine thought.

With Gregory of Nyssa, however, the most speculative and forward-faring of the Cappadocian trio, the τάξις of the Persons does seem to assume, not indeed any difference in their nature — which all the Cappadocians are strenuously concerned to deny against their Eunomian adversaries — but some kind of causal continuity, which, while it certainly postulates the Father as the first and ultimate cause, the αιτία, of the other two Persons, indicates some part played by the Son in the special mode of procession of the Holy Spirit. The texts are slightly obscure but cumulative in their force. The Spirit, it is generally agreed, is ‘out of God and is of Christ’, although distinguished from both by his special characteristics (ιδιώματα); he can be compared to the third in a series of torches, where the fire is passed from the first to the second, and then to the third; he proceeds out of the Father and receives out of the Son; the Father is not thought of without the Son, nor the Son understood without the Holy Spirit. At the end of the first book *Contra Eunomium* there is a tantalizing passage in which a com-

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parison is instituted between the way in which the Son is attached to the Father and receives his being from him (without any temporal interval) and that in which the Holy Spirit is attached to the Only-Begotten (του μονογενούς ἔχεται τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον). Here the Son is looked upon as preceding the hypostasis of the Spirit conceptually (ἐπινοΐα) according to the order (or in respect) of causation (κατὰ τὸν τῆς αἰτίας λόγον). If this last phrase is read as directly expressive of the relation between the Son and the Holy Spirit, there is clearly no option but to take the statement as meaning that the Spirit depends causally on the Son as the Son does on the Father. But this would be very surprising, and would almost seem to say too much. Given the fact that αἰτία normally refers to the First Cause or Father in Gregory of Nyssa as well as in the other Cappadocians, I think it would be safer to say that the principle of causation is to be referred back to the Father, but that the causal influence reaches the Spirit in the third place, and that some mediation by the Son, not really defined, is in view.

We come finally to a well known passage in Gregory's Ad Ablabium (Quod Non Sunt Tres Dei). Here the argument runs that there is the Cause (τὸ αἰτίου) and 'that which is caused' (in the line of personal processions in the Trinity), or 'that which is out of the Cause' (ἐκ τοῦ αἰτίου), and that insistence on the unchangeableness of the nature (φύσις) does not abolish this distinction. But there is a further difference within that which is 'out of the Cause' (τοῦ εξ αἰτίας). There is that which is directly (προσεχώς) out of the First, and then that which is through (διὰ) that which is directly out of the First (i.e. Son and Spirit respectively). Whence we conclude that the title 'Only-Begotten' remains without doubt always with the Son, and the fact that the Spirit is from the Father is also beyond doubt, since the mediation of the Son guarantees his position as Only-Begotten and does not exclude the Spirit's natural relation (φυσικής σχέσεως) to the Father. Western writers have seen here a clear expression of the Greek version of the Filioque. Thus Prestige: 'It is here transparent that Gregory conceived the being of the Holy Spirit to be so grounded in the being of the Son, as that in turn is grounded in the being of the Father'. I find this judgement to be somewhat excessive, both as an interpretation of Gregory of Nyssa and of the genuine meaning of the Filioque. To the latter we shall come back later. For the moment I simply record the impression that Gregory's words are nuanced and elusive. All I would want to take from them is that he believes that in some sense the Holy Spirit is 'out of' and 'through' the Son, without his natural dependence, as Person or hypostasis, on the Father being thereby affected.

25. Opera Min. Dogm., ut supra, p.56
26. Prestige, op. cit., p.253
In fact, I think we have come at this point, in the writings of the most penetrating of the Greek Fathers, to a rich expression of the theology of 'δυναμού', the Procession 'through the Son'. The formula, which does not make its first appearance here, will become fairly common later on, particularly in Cyril of Alexandria, and will be finally judged as Orthodox and normal by John Damascene at the close of the Greek Patristic period. But the task of examining the range of its meaning in different writers has, I think, still to be performed. The polemicists and apologists of a later period who reduced it en bloc to a simple assertion of the consubstantiality of Son and Holy Spirit (e.g. Gregory Palamas in one of his earlier works, and Nilos Cabasilas), on the one hand; and those who like John Bekkos and Bessarion, on the other hand, systematically equate it with the Filioque of the Latins, made too short work of the task. Fortunately the Decree of Union proclaimed at the Council of Florence in 1439, ill-fated as it was, said no more than that the teaching of the procession of the Holy Spirit 'through the Son' tended towards the meaning of the Latin teaching (ad hanc intelligentiam tendit). (From another point of view, however, the wording of this decree, in the Greek version drawn up mainly by the Italian humanist Traversari, contained expressions that could hardly be squared with the settled forms of Orthodox usage: thus the word αίτια was extended to the Son, and ἐκπορεύεσθαι, which had long been reserved, supposedly by scriptural warrant, to the ultimate procession of the Spirit from the Father, was used also of the derived procession 'through the Son').

LATIN TRADITION

It is now time to turn back to the development of the Latin tradition. The equivalent of what became, as we have seen, a standard Greek expression was used by Tertullian in the form per Filium in his work against the

27. The 13th C. pro-unionist John Bekkos collected various extracts from the Greek Fathers intended to show that they meant the same as the Latin, Epigraphae, P.G., 141, cc. 613-727. This was attacked in the 14th c. by Gregory Palamas, in his Antepigraphae reprinted with Bessarion's defence of Bekkos (P.G. 161, cc. 224-287), and more carefully edited by P. Evangelou in the recently completed publication of the opera omnia of Palamas: Γρ. τοῦ Παλαμᾶ Συγγράμματα, Vol. 1, 157ff, (Thessalonike 1962). The same collection contains two early tracts by Palamas, not regarded by Prof. Meyendorff as among his best works, 'That the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, not also from the Son', ed. Bobrinkoy. Nilos Cabasilas' long work De Processione Sancti Spiritus has only been edited in part (where he argues against Thomas Aquinas), E. Candal, Studi e Testi, 116 (Vatican City 1945). It provided one of the main sources for the anti-unionist orator, Mark of Ephesus, at the Council of Florence. Bessarion at the same council produced an Oratio Dogmatica de Unione, based on Bekkos, which has been carefully edited and annotated by Candal, (Rome 1958).

modalist’ Praxeas (c. 213), and occurs abundantly in Hilary of Poitier’s splendidly if not always lucidly written *De Trinitate* (c. 356–361), where the word *auctores* also occurs, though only once, with regard to Father and Son in their relation to the Holy Spirit. There is some debate about an explicit *Filioque* doctrine in St. Ambrose’s *De Spiritu Sancto* (written later in the same century), which draws liberally, as St. Jerome gleefully pointed out, on Origen, Basil, and Didymus the Blind. There seems to be little doubt that his thought leads up to that of his neophyte, St. Augustine, though the passages usually cited refer more explicitly to the temporal mission of the Spirit (which, however, in the Latin perspective is usually seen in continuity with the eternal procession). Finally, it is clear that a procession from both Father and Son is envisaged in Marius Victorinus, a convert from neo-Platonism whose translations of Plotinus into Latin played an important part in the intellectual and spiritual formation of Augustine, as every reader of the *Confessions* will remember.

It is a delicate task to pin-point Augustine’s position in relation to Greek Patristic thought. First of all, the Greek language did not come easily to him (strongly speculative minds often find it difficult to gain real mastery of languages other than their own); on the other hand it is likely that he rather plays down the life-long progress which he made with a tongue which was so important to him. He obviously learnt to handle the Greek of the New Testament and the Septuagint version of the Old with comparative ease, but it is a long step from there to reading the Cappadocians, and at one stage he speaks as if he knew these and other Greek writers mainly through Latin translations made of some of their works. Writings on the Spirit by Origen, Basil, and Didymus the Blind could have come to him in part through Ambrose (who drew heavily upon them), and he could have read Didymus *De Spiritu Sancto* completely in Jerome’s translation. Again, for a man who was in correspondence with Jerome as Augustine was, it is hard to believe that some knowledge of the Cappadocians did not filter through. (Jerome studied at Athens with Gregory of Nazianzus and appears to have known his and Basil’s works at first hand). Indeed, it seems fairly obvious that the concept of ‘relation’ which plays such a fundamental role in Augustine’s Trinitarian thought was borrowed, not directly from

Aristotle’s categories, but from the σχέσεις and the ‘modes of existence’ employed, with a different nuance, in Cappadocian thought.  

There need be no wrangling over what Augustine really taught. Not merely in what is commonly looked upon as his theological master-piece, the *De Trinitate* (in fifteen books composed over a period of twenty years), but in the more popular expository sermons on St. John’s Gospel (*Tractatus in Ioannem*), and the two rather inquisitorial books against the Arian Maximinus, he consistently holds that on the evidence of Scripture there is a procession of the Spirit from both Father and Son, though from the Son only in so far as this power is communicated to him by the Father, who has it principaliter, i.e. in its ultimate principle or source. In both Books 5 and 15, it is stressed that Father and Son do not form two principles of the procession of the Spirit, but one only, which is derived from the Father and shared with the Son, who owes not only this but his whole being to the Father. ‘From whom the Son has it that he is God — for he is God from God — from him he has it that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from him; and for this reason the Holy Spirit has it from the Father himself that he proceeds from the Son as he proceeds from the Father’ (15, 48). ‘It must be confessed that the Father and Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit — not two principles, but as the Father and Son are one God. . . . so in relation to the Holy Spirit they are one principle: to the created world however Father Son and Holy Spirit are one principle, as they are one creator and one Lord’ (5, 15). (The question whether the common possession by Father and Son of the power from which the Holy Spirit proceeds implies that the first two Persons have something which the third Person lacks will be met by the doctrine of relations. This power itself is relational (and so not an absolute of the common divine essence), even as the reality of procession — looking back to the common source, as well as outwards from it — is relational. But successors of Augustine in later centuries will have further refinements to add at this point).

The procession of the Spirit takes place by way of love, in distinction from that of the Son, for which Scriptural expressions (Only-Begotten, and ‘Word’) suggest generation by way of intellect. The mutual love of Father and Son finds personal expression in the Holy Spirit, who is conceived as the bond (*vinculum*) between the first two Persons, and as a gift (*donum*), immanent in the Trinitarian life, but oriented, as it were, to the created world, so that what is called the temporal procession, i.e. in the hearts of men and women, is a kind of prolongation into the economic order of what  

33. B. Pruche, in his edition of Basil, *De Sp. S.*., shows the ways in which Cappadocian thought reached Augustine, and thinks it even likely that the latter had direct contact with Basil’s *Contra Eunomium* and *De Sp. S.* (cf. pp.221-23).
is for ever true in the eternal and immanent one.  

How does Augustine arrive at this conclusion? First we should understand that he begins at a different point of doctrinal development from that of the Cappadocian Fathers. The Councils of Nicaea and Constantinople were well behind, and the West, moreover, in the main had been spared the proliferation of Trinitarian heresies that plagued the East in the decades following Nicaea, as we see from the moving appeals for help that Basil makes to the Western bishops in some of his letters. Moreover, Augustine was a convert to Christianity from the neo-Platonism of Plotinus (mediated, as noted above, by Marius Victorinus), and for him becoming a man of the Gospel did not mean a repudiation of his neo-Platonist outlook, although it certainly modified it in very profound ways, and introduced beliefs from which the neo-Platonists remained aloof. Michael Schmaus, in a later edition of his early book on Augustinian Triadology, points out that in effect Augustine saw the Persons of the Son and Holy Spirit as elevated to the One (τὸ ἕν) of Plotinus, so that for him Father, Son, and Holy Spirit were fused in their nature into the most perfect unity, a single incommutabilis substantia. God for him was now the whole Trinity, Deus Trinitas, or Deus Trinitatis. The problem for him was not, as it had been for the Cappadocians (particularly Basil) to show how and in what sense three distinct hypostases could subsist in a single, not merely generic, nature, but to show how within the perfect unity of the infinite God there could be room for personal distinctions. The Cappadocians had usually begun (an exception could be made for the mystical works of Gregory of Nyssa), with the idea of three Persons or hypostases, and had to explain that these three could possess a common ousia or essence in three distinct modes of being, and by three distinct titles. (Given their position within the historic development of doctrine, and the necessity of providing answers to their opponents, Arian, Semi-Arian, and Eunomian, this was the setting in which their theology had to be shaped.)

Augustine had no difficulty to face concerning the unity of God — anything else was inconceivable to him (and probably to most of his readers) on philosophical as well as religious grounds. But how, as a deep student of the Gospels and St. Paul, was he to find distinctions according to which he could say that there was God the Father, God the Son, and the

34. J. N. D. Kelly (Early Christian Doctrines, p.277) rather plays down the importance of the theme of love in Augustine's Trinitarian theology. For J. Chevalier, Saint Augustin et la pensée grecque, (Fribourg, Switzerland 1940), however, it is of capital importance — a judgement apparently endorsed by the Orthodox S. Boulgakov (see the special number of Istina (Orient et Occident, La Procession du Saint Esprit), (Paris 1972), No.3–4. p.461). Historically the idea was epoch-making.

God the Holy Spirit, *alius, alius alius* (i.e. other as Persons), but not *aliiud* (not another *thing*)? There was only one category which he could introduce to explain personal distinctions without destroying unity of nature or substance. Absolute predicates could be applied only to the single godhead, and then only in the sense that God is not just good, wise, etc., but *is* goodness, *is* wisdom, and so on (this had been said before by some of the Greeks, but with Augustine it is a kind of passionate insight to which he comes back with tireless fascination). There remained only one category by which to describe personal distinctions, and this was that of ‘relation’ (an Aristotelian concept that had been developed by Plotinus, and, as we have seen, put to use implicitly and explicitly, though not in a generalized or systematic way, by the Cappadocians, themselves no strangers to Plotinus).

We are familiar with relationships of origin, e.g. of father and mother with son or daughter, but these, while quite real and not simply fabricated by our thought, supervene on personalities and do not constitute them. Augustine makes a bolder and more profound use of the concept, by seeing the relation under one aspect identified with the divine nature or substance, and under another (in so far as a relation means precisely ‘in respect to’, ‘standing over against’, πρός τι), as a principle of distinction. Critics whose book it would suit to see Augustine as a ‘semi-modalist’, i.e. as failing to do justice to the real distinction between the divine Persons, make light of this relational distinction, as if it were little more than a play of thought, or at most a tenuous superficial distinction imposed on the simplicity of the divine nature. But for the reader who comes to grips with the real Augustine it is quite clear that when he says that Father, Son and Holy Spirit are relational in God he is speaking in each case about the whole Person, including the divine nature as possessed by that Person. The fact that it is one and the same divine nature which is possessed by each of the three Persons, while it obviously takes us into the region of religious mystery, does not reduce the personal distinctions to minor variations of the essence, as has been alleged. Certainly a fully developed ontological account of the ‘subsistent relations’ in the Trinity and the synthesis of Person and nature, will have to wait for the high Middle Ages, but in this case we can say (as we cannot always) that St. Thomas Aquinas develops Augustine’s ideas in strict and logical continuity with the basic insights.

It is sometimes alleged against Augustine that, since his point of departure is the divine unity, given by the one unchanging nature, he is an ‘essentialist’, i.e. one whose vision is of a radically impersonal divine substance

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36. The theory of relations is worked out especially in *De Trin.* Bks. 5ff., and in a more popular way in many other writings of Augustine (e.g. *Tract. in Ioan.* 39). There is a distinct shift in emphasis from the relations (*scheseis*) which *distinguish* Persons (Cappadocian scheme) to *relational Persons* (Augustine).
which comes to expression or unfolds, only by a kind of secondary development, into a triple personality. The ultimate reality, then, would be impersonal, or at best pre-personal, and the three divine Persons would be, as it were, derivations from this — ‘accidents’ that paradoxically acquire ‘substantial’ status. Vladimir Lossky forty years ago pushed this ‘essentialist’ interpretation of Augustine to the point of denying that it was genuinely religious. It failed to make contact with the living God, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and could if pressed give us simply the God of the Deists, at the worst the God of Voltaire. But this of course is playing the Devil’s advocate, almost in defiance of the obvious. (It is known that Lossky, great and good man as he was, sometimes recanted or seriously modified later in life extreme views to which he was led for a while by some lieblingsidee which left out of view all sorts of counter-balancing facts). When one reads Augustine sensitively one is aware in fact of a kind of to-and-fro movement between the One and the Three, and the movement is not just between philosophy and faith, for the unity of God is for him just as much a religious datum as a philosophic one — hence the constant repetition of the text: ‘Hear Israel, the Lord thy God is one Lord’. And it is rather strange that the man who pioneered the idea of love as a key to the personal relationships in the Triune God, in profound pursuance of the Johannine idea, Deus est caritas, should be the philosopher of the impersonal, deficient in religious vision! His genuine heir of course is not Voltaire but Pascal — the Pascal of the Pensées and the Secret.

**MEDIEVAL DEVELOPMENT**

But this being said, it must be admitted that subsequent Western thought, in its constant endeavour to reach some understanding of the content of faith, has slipped at times towards rationalism: Abelard, at some points in his career, though not at the end, would be an example. But prior to Abelard we have the strange case of Anselm, who, because of the spiritual quality of his writing, has appealed across the centuries to Catholics and Protestants alike (it is from him that Karl Barth draws the deductive part of his Trinitarian theology), and who yet comes close to a basic ‘essentialism’ in our present context. And this in contrast to some of the Scholastics whose technical thinned-out language makes only a

37. See V. Lossky, *In the Image and Likeness of God*, (London and Oxford 1974) (tr. from French original of 1967), p.88, Chapter 4 on the procession of the Holy Spirit, and Chapter 3 of the same authors’s *Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church*, (London 1957) (Fr. original, Paris 1944), contain the best-informed and most powerful attack on the Filioque of this century. In Istina (ut supra p.310), it is reported that he modified his ideas on this subject towards the end of his life. For the supposed ecclesiological consequences of the doctrine, the differences of structures in Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches should be sufficient answer.
restricted appeal today, but whose thought is genuinely 'personalist'. (I am thinking here chiefly of St. Thomas Aquinas, but I have the impression that St. Bonaventure and Duns Scotus could be included).\textsuperscript{37a}

But again it is possible to be unjust to Anselm by not seeing the limitations which he imposed on himself and acknowledges to the reader in some of his works, though not explicitly in the \textit{De Processione Spiritus Sancti}. The chief criticism of the latter work should be, I think, that it shows little knowledge of the genuine Greek Patristic tradition, and that it gives an account of the Augustinian theology of the \textit{Filioque} which, while it faithfully develops the idea of the procession from Father and Son as one principle, lends itself to misconceptions and objections. For instance, to say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from Father and Son not in so far as they are two Persons distinguished by the opposite relations of Fatherhood and Sonship, but in so far as they are one God, suggests that the procession is purely from the common nature or essence, which in fact is equally possessed by the Holy Spirit, who might then be held to be his own co-originator.\textsuperscript{38} Anselm of course sees the difficulty, and meets it with the simple \textit{riposte} that nothing can be the originator of itself. But he does little to elucidate the combination of personal and natural factors in this Procession, and in fact leaves the impression that it is purely 'essential', an idea which not merely offends the Eastern religious sensibility, for which all Processions in God are 'hypostatic' or personal, but allows controversialists to make play with the argument that whatever proceeds from the divine essence as such must be different from it, as effect is different from cause, and so not divine.

At this point it would be tempting to follow the development of Latin theology through the admirably balanced and as yet un-'Scholastic' Trinitarian writings of St. Bernard of Clairvaux and his friend William of St. Thierry (which at least one Orthodox, P. Evdokimov of Paris, found attractively cognate with the Eastern tradition), thence to Richard of St. Victor (who uses love as the key-idea of the whole of his Triadology, not merely the Procession of the Holy Spirit), and so to St. Thomas Aquinas,


\textsuperscript{38} \textit{De Processione S. Spiritus}, 2, 9 (in S. Anselmi Opera Omnia, ed. F.S. Schmitt, (Rome 1940), II, pp.185ff., 201ff.) In the \textit{Monologion} Anselm explains that owing to the demands made by associates, he tried to seek (here and elsewhere) 'rationes necessitatis', rather than work with the positive data of revelation. He begins with God as 'summus spiritus': from that point of departure the Persons must indeed appear as 'fructifications of the essence', or as he calls them in the \textit{Monologion}, 'tres nescio quid', c.79. As Congar says: 'We admire him, but think that he should be left behind. He would have certainly agreed' (\textit{op. cit.}, p.142).
prince of the Scholastics in the 13th century. But apart from the fact that
my personal knowledge of the texts and reflection would not sustain me for
the whole of this enterprise, we have already long passed the point in history
at which the Filioque became a theological crux between East and West, as
distinct from the matter of the credal addition.

I content myself therefore with the observation that with Aquinas, if we
carefully follow his thought from the early Commentary on the Sentences
through the Contra Gentiles and the first part of the Summa Theologica to
the De Potentia (we can discount the early Contra Errores Graecorum as be­
ing based on faulty materials), we arrive at a most penetrating treatment of
the problems of Person and Nature, including the procession of the Holy
Spirit. And this moreover in the difficult cataphatic mode (i.e. by taking
systematic positive propositions as far as they can go when dealing with a
revealed religious mystery). Unfortunately, although many elements from
Greek theology are included, the highly technical language and conceptual
apparatus, and the limited though genuine appeal to the average reader’s
fund of religious feeling failed to make it widely attractive in the Byzantine
East when it was translated into Greek by the brothers Cydones in the 14th
century. This theology was used to win arguments at the Council of
Florence in 1439, but only in rare instances did it bring deep conviction
among the Orthodox contingent. Today the situation, reluctant dico, is
even worse, since there is little prospect, with general passing out of currency
of a once commonly understood terminology and system of ideas, that the
brilliant and profound writings of Aquinas will be laid directly under con­
tribution in the struggle for rapprochement of Western and Eastern
thought.

THE PHOTIAN CRISIS

But now we must retrace our steps through history to the time when the
first serious confrontation over the Filioque theology began. It could hardly
have taken place under worse circumstances. Not merely the ‘addition’, but
the thought which it expressed, or seemed to express, came under hostile
scrutiny by the greatest Greek scholar and churchman of the 9th century,
the Patriarch Photius, in the context of tensions between the Old and the
New Rome (Constantinople) over ecclesiastical primacy and jurisdiction.
(This was linked with a rivalry for spheres of influence among the Slavic
peoples, particularly the Bulgarians of Illyricum, between the new

39. For these translations, see M. Rackl, ‘Die griechische Übersetzung der Summa Theologica
Notizie di Procoro e Demetrio Cidone... (Studi e Testi 56), (Vatican City 1931); and
Stylianos Papadopoulos, Greek Translations of Thomistic Works: Philo-Thomists and
Anti-Thomists in Byzantium (in Greek), (Athens 1967).
Frankish-German Empire founded by Charlemagne and the old East Roman or Byzantine Empire). For a long time a rather cynical view was taken of Photius's ecclesiastical activities and indeed his character by Western, particularly Roman Catholic historians, from Baronius in the 16th century to Hergenröther in the 19th, while in the Orthodox world the tradition prevailed that he was a saint. The great Byzantinist, Father Francis Dvornik, cleared up much of the tangled history, and vindicated the character of Photius the man in his massive study The Photian Schism, History and Legend (Cambridge 1948), but here and in other works he has singularly little to say about Photius as a theologian. Yet it was the Greek Patriarch's attacks on the Latin Filioque teaching (a letter to the 'Oriental Thrones', 867; another to the Bishop of Aquileia, 883-884; and the much longer and systematic Mystagogia Sancti Spiritus 895-96) which, while they did not of themselves declare or provoke any schism there and then, provided the chief theological raison d'être of the great breakdown of communion when this gradually became apparent as a reality. The Mystagogia in particular, written in the period of Photius's retirement and evidently expressing his settled mind on the subject, mounts against the Latin doctrine a whole battery of arguments — varying in their impressiveness — that became classical in the Orthodox East. The more fundamental ones, where accepted as valid, constitute for many Orthodox thinkers (particularly of the older generation) a theological crux which would make communion with the major Churches of the West a serious difficulty of conscience to this day.40

I have often thought that it was one of the great tragedies of history that Photius, great bibliophile as he was in Greek literature, pagan and Christian, did not care to acquire Latin, and so was precluded from direct acquaintance with St. Augustine's De Trinitate, a Christian classic in the same order of greatness as the best in the longer works of St. Basil or St. Gregory of Nyssa. He might still have had difficulties with the idea of the Holy Spirit proceeding from Father and Son as from one principle, but he would have perceived the religious reasons for the doctrine, and would have been sensitive to the spiritual quality of the book as a whole. As it was, he knew the Filioque doctrine only by report at first, and even when he came to

40 All the above works were edited by Cardinal J. Hergenröther, and included with notes in Migne P.G. 102. The cardinal not only accompanies the text of the Mystagogia with a running commentary, but adds 143 columns of Animadversiones Historicae et Theologicae to the 120 columns of the Greek text. Hergenröther also wrote a monumental study, Photius, Patriarch von Konstantinopel (3 Vols.), (Regensburg 1867-69), which Dvornik, who disagrees with much of the history in it, considers still worth reading. On a smaller scale we now have Richard Haugh, Photius and the Carolingians, the Trinitarian Controversy, (Belmont, Massachusetts 1975). Out of all this the most interesting theological items are the text of the Mystagogia (cc. 279ff.) and Hergenröther's Animadversiones.
write the Mystagogia he seems to have had no further documentation from the
Latin side than a Greek précis, or a translation of selected parts, of the
Contra Graecorum Opposita of Ratramnus of Corbie, who in his turn had
evidently no knowledge of Photius’s real difficulties with the Filioque.41 The
dogmatic debate then began as a dialogue of the deaf, if it can be called a
dialogue at all. (The De Trinitate of St. Augustine was not translated into
Greek until the 13th century, and the version then produced by Maximus
Planudes was evidently not widely read. The Mystagogia of Photius was only
partly put into Latin by Hugo Etherianus in the 12th century, but not edited
and translated in full until modern times, in spite of its popularity and
prestige in the East).42

The Scriptural argumentation in Photius is not particularly impressive
(nor is that of his early opponents), and in the Mystagogia, where the
discussion of Patristic authorities could normally be expected to occupy
considerable space, the reader is fobbed off with the remark that Photius is
writing from a place where he has no access to his books. The arguments
based on theological reasoning, however, are important, and, although
there is overlapping and virtual repetition, the main ones call for careful ex­
amination. Four principles deal with the consubstantiality and equality of
the three divine Persons, with the position of the Father as first cause and
principle from which the other two Persons are in different ways derived,
with the communication of the divine essence and the incommunicability of
personal ‘properties’, and with the idea of ‘monarchy’ in the Trinity. These
are enunciated in terms with which all theologians, Eastern and Western,
would agree. Added to them, however, are a number of statements or
arguments which are meant to show the radical inadmissability of the Filio­
que approach. These are quite overwhelming if the Augustinian-type
theology is understood as Photius sees it — though he tries to exculpate
Augustine personally, given the great Western doctor’s position as one of
the recognized Fathers of the undivided Church. The Filioque teaching in­
volves two first principles, i.e. two sources of divinity within the Godhead,
which means that there are ultimately two Gods. It also involves a duality in
the Holy Spirit, since his origin is from two principles. It destroys the
Monarchy in the Trinity, taking away from the Father, source of all

41. Cf. Hergenröther, P.G. 102, cc. 102, 104.
42. The version of Hugo Etherianus (an Italian theologian who lived for long years in Con­
stantinople and knew Greek well) is quoted liberally by Hergenröther in his notes. The text
is reproduced in Migne P.L. 202. The whole 15 books of Augustine’s De Trinitate were
translated by Planudes at a time when the imperial policy in Byzantium was pro-unionist.
Cf. M. Rackl. ‘Die Griechischen Augustinusübersetzungen’, Studi e Testi 37, pp. 1-38. A
little over a hundred years later, the fact that Augustine taught the Filioque explicitly and
at length seems to have been news to the main body of the Greeks at the Council of
Florence.
Godhead, what is constitutive of his Person and cannot be alienated. A procession from two Persons implies that the procession from the Father is imperfect, and needs to be supplemented. And if the double procession were possible in view of the common nature of Father and Son, then the Holy Spirit, who also possesses this same nature, could be seen as the source of his own procession; or alternatively there is no reason why he should not be a conjoint principle with the Father in the generation of the Son. And so the arguments continue.43

In view of the account given above of the *De Trinitate* it is clear enough that a number of these charges miss the mark. Augustine acknowledges that there can be only one principle of the procession of the Holy Spirit, and he sees this as deriving from the Father. However, in view of the Scriptural evidence as he understands it, he feels compelled to conclude that the Father communicates this power to the Son, so that Father and Son in this respect form a common principle of the procession, and that this has to do with love given and returned as between the first two Persons. Of course the Holy Spirit loves, too, but this love is logically consequent upon his constitution as a Person by the love of Father and Son, and is not itself constitutive of a further Person. (Similarly the Son, although possessing the divine intellect in virtue of the procession by generation from the Father, is seen as the term of the intellectual process in the Father, so that, while he exercises the same divine intellect in his relationship as Son-Word, he does not generate another Word as Person).

When all the points at which Photius is at cross-purposes with his opponents, real or imagined, have been dealt with, are there any genuine difficulties left? I think we must admit that there are two, and they lie close to the core of the whole East-West debate from the time of Photius on. They may not be intractable, though within exchanges conducted in a polemical spirit, and from within established positions, they have seemed to be.

**RESIDUAL DIFFICULTIES**

The first is this. Photius is certainly right in saying that in the Trinity, while the divine nature or essence (οὐσία) can be and is communicated, personal properties (Ιδιότητες), i.e. those realities which are constitutive of the Persons as such, cannot be. Thus the Father, while he can communicate the divine nature to the Son, cannot communicate his own Fatherhood (πατρότης, paternitas), with which he is in fact identified and by which he is distinct from the Son. Nor can the Son communicate that by which he is 43. The theological reasons elaborated (and sometimes repeated) were later reduced by controversialists to seven axioms. These appear, with answers drawn from Hergenröther, in M. Jugie, *Theol. Dogm. ChrI. Orient.* 1, pp.193-205.
Son, i.e. his relation of Sonship. And so for the third Person (where the terminology for the property becomes difficult). Now in one Greek position strongly represented e.g. by the Pseudo-Dionysius, which Photius helped to make standard, the Father, as the Fount of Deity, is characterized and (it would appear) constituted by two positive personal or ‘hypostatic’ properties: he is both Father to the Son and Producer or ‘Projector’ (προβολεύς) of the Holy Spirit, so that the eternal acts of generating the Son (γέννησις) and causing the Spirit to proceed (προβολή, or ἐκπόρευσις in an active sense) are both proper to him and incommunicable. The ἐκπόρευσις or procession from the Father is understood by reference to the famous text, John 15, 26, ‘The Spirit. . . . who (which) proceeds from the Father’, taken as it then was as referring literally and directly to the eternal procession, with the rather vague word παρά (‘from’, as a messenger might be sent ‘from’ a person in authority) being understood in the metaphysical sense of ἐκ (‘out of’, ‘deriving from the very being of’, viz. the Father). By the time of Photius, too, the verb ἐκπορεύομαι and the corresponding noun ἐκπόρευσις had long acquired a more sharply defined and expressive meaning than in Scriptural usage.44

Against this background it would have been difficult for Photius to accept Augustine’s position of a procession of the Holy Spirit from both Father and Son acting as a common principle, even if he had come directly under the sway of Augustine’s thought and language. How could the Father extend to the Son a property (ιδιότης) which belonged exclusively to himself as Fount of Divinity and was in part constitutive of his very personality? Even Western theologians would agree that hypostatic properties are incommunicable. And the very word ἐκπορεύεται, isolated as it had become by this time from the Scriptural context, where it runs parallel to ‘whom I shall send you from the Father’, would seem to indicate a process peculiar to the Father, an emission of the Spirit from him and him alone. The difficulty still stands for all Orthodox in the Photian tradition, as most have been until now. And it must be respected, even though it may not be the last word in Orthodox theology. (In Western theology, where the Father, while still being recognized as Source of Deity [principium totius divinitatis, scilicet Pater. . . .Deum ingenitum qui est totius divinae processionis principium, Aquinas, De Pot. q. 9, a.9], is held to be constituted as a Person

44. The Orthodox scholar V. Rodzianko holds that Photius went back even beyond the technical meaning that the ἐκπόρευσις had acquired by the time of John Damascene and Tarasius (2nd Council of Nicaea, 787) to an earlier Patristic meaning which he associates particularly with Athanasius, and which would make it impossible for Photius to say ἐκπορευόμενον δι’ υἱόν. Certainly Photius does not use this expression (which would not suit his book at all), but it seems to be doubtful whether he went back to the Athanasian idea, which would have suited him even less. See Studia Patristica, Vol.II, Part 11 (1957), ‘“Filioque” in Patristic Thought’, pp.295-307.
THE PROCESSION OF THE SPIRIT

uniquely by his Fatherhood, and where the relational though fully subsistent reality of the Persons is kept more directly in view, the difficulty does not appear so serious, and for many it is sufficient to keep on repeating Augustine's *de Patre principaliter*). Nevertheless, it is probably here, in the representation of God the Father in somewhat different intellectual schemes, that the nub of the whole difficulty — indeed the key to the historic problem of the *Filioque* — is to be found.45

The other problem that would still have seriously troubled Photius even if he had read St. Augustine and foreseen some of the more technical precisions that were obviously called for, has been already touched on in connection with St. Anselm. In the Eastern tradition generally the processions, i.e. modes of communicating or possessing the common divine nature, are held to be 'hypostatic', from Person to Person, and in the last analysis Western theologians would agree. Writers in both traditions have occasionally spoken (particularly in taking up the language of pagan or heretical adversaries) of *substance* (= nature or essence) being derived from *substance* (*oūσία* from *oūσία*), but when they are using their own more typical terminology they speak, e.g. of the divine nature being communicated by the *Father* to the *Son* (by generation). It worries and offends the Orthodox that Westerners not seldom speak about the procession of the Holy Spirit as if it were at least reductively 'essential' rather than hypostatic, i.e. as deriving from the essence or nature and not a Person. When for instance writers say that the Father and Son are the cause or principle of the Holy Spirit, not in so far as they are Father and Son (and therefore distinct by 'opposite' relations) but in so far as they are one God having everything in common except

45. It we think of God the Father in an absolute rather than a relational sense, and then see him as the 'Fount of Deity' (*πηγὴ θεότητος*), it follows that he cannot communicate his 'fontal' property to the Son without denying his own identity. This in general is the Orthodox position. For the Cappadocians the idea of 'fount' tends to be absorbed into that of *ailia* or *ailion* (first and primordial cause of divinity). Even so, if we abstract from the relational scheme towards which they are moving through a resolution of their 'modes of existence', the *ailion* could never share its being first cause with the *ailiaton* (caused divinity) without an evident self-contradiction. On the other hand, in the explicitly relational scheme of Aquinas the Father is *principium* (which has a wider and more general meaning than *ailia*), and it is possible to speak about a *principium de principio*, or a *principium principiatum*. Moreover, the Father is primordial qua *Father*. (Aquinas reverses Peter the Lombard's dictum 'Pater est quia generat' [He is Father because he generates] to 'Generat quia Pater' [He generates because he is Father].) Precisely because he is *principium* and primordial as *Father*, he can communicate to the Son everything except his very Fatherhood, by which his own identity is constituted. In this relational vision, the Son is the perfect image of the Father, receiving all that does not involve a contradiction either in the Father or himself.

The *Filioque*, then, as an historico-theological problem, arose from the confrontation, under adverse circumstances, of these two diverse intellectual schemes, each with its own coherence, and each with something to learn from the other.
the constitutive personal properties of Fatherhood and Sonship, they are in fact saying that it is the nature or essence of Father and Son (by which alone they are one God) that is the source of the procession of the Spirit.

Apologists in the Scholastic tradition get off a little cheaply at times by simply introducing a distinction drawn from our own experience between the subject which (or who) acts (principium quod) and the nature or power through or by means of which the subject acts (principium quo). Thus it is the man who sees, and his visual sense by which he sees. In a bold step, but probably necessary for the coherence of our own thought, they transfer this distinction analogously from finite beings to the infinite Being, and say that in the Trinitarian life it is, e.g. the Father (a Person) who acts in generating the Son, but that he does this through the divine nature.

Aquinas is somewhat more subtle here, insisting that it is through the divine nature as possessed by the Person and as affected by what belongs to that Person, which in the case of the procession of the Son would be the generative property of the Father. We can thus speak of the nature being so profoundly influenced by the Person acting through it that it is itself in a certain manner ‘personalized’. For his application of this idea to the procession of the Holy Spirit, see In I Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 3, where two Persons, Father and Son, exercise a single ‘spirative power’, ultimately deriving from the Father, which so affects the nature that they — not the common nature as such — can be said to be the single principle of this action, while remaining distinct as Persons. Indeed, as the thought of Aquinas on the unity of the spirative principle and of the ‘active spiration’ (the technical name for the ‘breathing forth’ through love by the Father and Son of the Holy Spirit) grew more sharply defined, he found it necessary to revise the earlier language of his Commentary on the Sentences. If we look to the duality of the Persons, the Father and Son may in fact be called ‘two who are breathing forth’ (duo spirantes), but in the spirative act itself they are so united, in view of the single principle of spiration (the commonly possessed via spirativa), that we should not at this point speak of two ‘Breathers-Forth’ (duo Spiratores), but one only (anus Spirator). (Cf. S. Th. 1, q.36, a.4, ad 7 with Comm. in Sent. d. 11, q.1, a.4). The paradox has its roots in the mystery of love between Persons, the communication between Father and Son, and the unity of the divine nature.46

46. It should be added, however, that he also found it possible, in developing the theme of the Father as primordial and ultimate principle of divinity, to use the Greek and early Latin formula, a Patre per Filium (S. Th. ibid, a 3), and, with Richard of St. Victor and possibly Gregory of Nyssa, to say that the Holy Spirit proceeds ‘immediately’ from the Father and ‘mediately’ from the Son (ibid).
But in introducing this approfondissement of Aquinas — and perhaps rather too briefly for full intelligibility — I have interrupted the sequence of my own observations. I think it is a little facile to say simply that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son not in so far as they are two distinct Persons but in so far as they are together one God, and then to refute the charge of ‘essentialism’, i.e. of holding that the procession is from the essence or nature, by the simple distinction of princípium quod and princípium quo mentioned above. Once you talk about ‘one God’ you bring directly into view the common nature of the three Persons, and by making that the basis, as it were, of the procession, you are in a difficult position to maintain a ‘personalist’ emphasis, especially since there are two Persons, irreducibly distinct, to be seen as the final subjects of attribution (principia quae) of the divine act here involved. It is interesting that Aquinas, while giving an affirmative reply to the question ‘Whether Father and Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit’ (S. Th.I, q. 26, a. 4), had already returned a negative verdict to the proposition that ‘the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son in so far as they are one in nature’ (In I Sent., as above).

It is no wonder, then, that the somewhat simplified, ‘essentialistic’ account of the procession of the Holy Spirit which one often finds in popular manuals, and which one can certainly read into Anselm, to say the least, has caused endless difficulties to the Orthodox. One can see that Photius, from the bits and pieces he had picked up about the Western theology behind the Filioque, had already thought his way to many of these objections (they are scattered throughout the Mystagogia). Strangely enough Thomas Aquinas draws attention on his own initiative to one of these, which had been lightly dismissed by Anselm: namely, the conclusion, mentioned above, that if the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son in so far as they are one in nature, then he must also proceed from himself, since he possesses this nature equally with the Father and Son. But whereas Anselm, as noted above, merely rules this out as something that does not happen because it is impossible, Aquinas uses the conclusion as a reductio ad absurdum of this way of viewing the procession (loc. laud., and Anselm, De Proc. S.S. 2, ad fin.).

At the Council of Florence the chief Orthodox speaker, Mark of Ephesus, hammered away at his Latin counterpart, the Dominican Provin-
cial of Lombardy, John of Montenero, trying to reduce his statements to a simple assertion of a procession from the divine essence, so that he could then bring into play the traditional Photian arguments, as they had been further developed in later centuries by Gregory Palamas and Nilos Cabasilas. He was particularly anxious to strike an equivalence between the Latin doctrine of the procession of the Spirit and the commonly held teaching that the whole Trinity acted as one principle, in virtue of the common divine nature, in the work of creation, so that he would then be able to deduce that, on this view, the Westerners were guilty of the heresy of saying, at least implicitly, that the Holy Spirit, too, as a product of the divine essence was a creature, and so not a Person of the Trinity. Montenero was too masterful a theologian in the metaphysical mode to have any truck with what was an old debating ploy, and after reading his opponent a lesson on terminology from Aristotle, moved on to Patristic authorities (where his literary sensitivity, however, was not of a high order).

The point I am making is that it is traditional for Orthodox in the Photian line to see Western theologians as *Pneumatomachoi* ('enemies of the Spirit') because of their (alleged) insistence on nature or essence rather than hypostasis, and that the suspicion goes right back to the Photian attack in the late 9th century. (It is rather paradoxical, however, that Augustine should be blamed for this, as it was he precisely who pioneered the idea of the Holy Spirit as the ontologically personal expression of love between two Persons!)

**PROSPECTS FOR RAPPROCHEMENT**

I have so far preferred to deal with the *Filioque* controversy within its historical perspective, and I have kept my account in general fairly close to the beginnings and early stages. The main lessons of the later centuries have been that a mere prolongation of hardened historic positions brings little hope of rapprochement. But this is of course far from being the final word. In the ecumenical climate of today, while loyalty to ancient insights and emphases represented in both sides of this debate will and should remain, a greater flexibility is becoming manifest. 'Tout comprendre c’est tout pardonner' is not always 'the Devil’s philosophy', as Bernard Shaw once described it. The history of the *Filioque* is not, in spite of apologists on either side, one of heroes and villains, or wise men and fools. With the advance of Patristic and Byzantine studies in particular, it is possible to enter with sympathy into the position and outlook of very different figures and schools of thought. De Régnon, at the very end of the last century, set a good example, even though much of his work on the Eastern Fathers was at

second-hand, through Petavius.49 But now it is probably safe to say that St. Basil and St. Gregory of Nyssa have at least as many devotees in the West as in the East. The major and most sympathetic study of Photius, even, in this century was by the Czech Catholic, Francis Dvornik, who wrote in English, French, and Latin. Orthodox theological students often work for their doctorates in Western Faculties, Catholic or Protestant, and while usually returning confirmed in their Orthodoxy, have an understanding of Western positions that was not always possible before.

It seems to me that there are two ways of getting beyond the theological impasse of the Filioque. The first would be a fairly gradual process, in which a mutual comprehension could be encouraged, with an aim to dissolve misconceptions where they exist (and there are still quite a number of these), and to emphasize both common and complementary points of view. ‘The great problems do not go away’, we are told, but on the other hand some of them, particularly where they are intertwined with history — both the history of events and ideas — can be, as it were ‘distanced’, or located in special contexts of the past in which they emerged and became pressing. Within the Western world there would be few believing Christians, or even — perhaps more particularly — theologians, who would want to fight the various battles of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation in the same terms over again. The present pacific pluralism, with a lot of give-and-take between the confessions, seems preferable. Within the Roman Catholic Church, Dominicans and Jesuits, split in theory for centuries over the tremendous issues of human liberty and God’s sovereign control of his creation, have realized the frailty and the hidden anthropomorphism of the most brilliant intellectual constructions, and have quietly and smilingly resigned their differences to the mystery of the infinite God. A great deal of the gravamen of the Filioque debate would disappear with a general agreement, which as noted before seems to be gathering force in the Western world, Catholic and Protestant, to drop the one-sided addition to the NC Creed. It would be surprising, if after some decades of peaceful and indeed friendly coexistence, with the visible and audible sign of dissension removed from the liturgy, Eastern and Western Churches did not see their Trinitarian traditions as pluralistic rather than profoundly divisive.

But there is another and bolder course which might be pursued concur-

49. Op. Cit. supra, 4 vols. De Régnon is readable and vivacious and he has a generous open-mindedness. However, his generalizations about Western and Eastern approaches through Nature and Person respectively are far too sweeping and lent themselves to Lossky’s and Boulgakov’s equally sweeping attack on Latin ‘essentialism’. Augustine’s famous psychological analogies impart strongly personal categories into his theology. And in our own time the most ‘personalistic’ account of the Trinity is provided by Heribert Mühlen, who uses the inter-subjective language of Martin Buber, ‘I-Thou’, ‘We’, of the Trinitarian relations. See his Der Heilige Geist als Person (Paderborn 1963).
rently, and which might achieve important practical results within a shorter term, without precluding the further cultivation and refinement of the ancient theological traditions by those who feel that they stand in the respective lines of succession. It is time, surely, that theologians who are genuinely concerned with Trinitarian themes, whatever their position in the confessional spectrum, tried to sort out what is essential in their belief from the theological elaborations — some of them very imposing and beautiful — that have been developed as faith has sought understanding of itself over the course of the centuries and against different backgrounds. The ‘that’ of the Trinitarian mystery, most of us would say, is in the New Testament and the early Councils of the undivided Church. The ‘how’ has been worked out somewhat differently, and within different limits — but on the whole with huge areas of agreement in Eastern and Western tradition. This state of affairs led the Russian theologian B. Bolotov at the end of the last century to publish his influential *Theses on the Filioque*. Here he distinguished between dogma, *theologoumena*, and theological opinions, and in spite of his strong anti-Augustinian bias, reached the conclusion (Thesis 27) that the *Filioque* ‘as a private theological opinion cannot be considered as an *impedimentum dirimens* to the re-establishment of communion between the Orthodox and the Old Catholic Churches’. Events have so overtaken this pronouncement as to make it now irrelevant. But the procedure used (we need not follow exactly his definition of *theologoumena* and theological opinions) and the content of his theses are still suggestive today.

Without covering the same ground as Bolotov, I think we might consider, in our present situation, some of the following possibilities.

1. A fresh examination could be made of the Scriptural basis for the doctrine of the procession of the Spirit. We have, for instance, a series of great studies and commentaries on St. John’s Gospel by English, American, French, and German scholars, against which the exegesis of the Pneuma and Paraclete passages should be first rigorously tested. Even leaving aside Bultmann (as perhaps in this context we should), this could be a sobering and salutary discipline. And so with other relevant parts of the New Testament.

2. A study might be undertaken of the hermeneutics involved in the transposition of Scriptural evidence to the plane of dogmatic theology. Is there an ‘axiomatic unity of the “Economic” and “Immanent” Trinity’ (Rahner)? Or are there grounds for saying that the texts which bring the Son into relation with the Father in the ‘sending’, etc. of the Spirit apply only to the temporal mission, and cannot be read back into the inner life of God?

(Photius, and now, it would seem, the joint Orthodox-Anglican Commission at Moscow 1976). Or are both these views extreme?

3. Let us cheerfully admit, not necessarily in Bolotov's terms, that there is a distinction between basic dogma and theological structures. The greatest 'cataphatic' thinkers of the West were fully aware of the frailty of their conceptual systems when held over against the infinite and transcendent reality of God. It may be remembered that shortly before he died Aquinas judged all he had written to be like straw ('sicut paleae mihi videntur'), which does not mean that he thought he was wrong. And even the comparatively 'apophatic' Cappadocian Fathers who steadfastly refused to 'physiologize the divine' (Gregory of Nazianzus), were pushed by their Eunomian and other adversaries into occasional mind-teasing subtleties, special emphases, and notable reticences about what could be exploited in a wrong sense; and they drew, though perhaps not very deeply, on the philosophic systems of their day, Platonic and neo-Platonic, Stoic, and even Aristotelian. At some point or other in both Western and Eastern theologies the maxim quoted by Bolotov comes into play: in necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas.

4. Could we get back beyond the systems to some common starting-point in the thought of both West and East? Might not this be found in the idea that there is a τάξις or order between the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit. As noted above, St. Basil admits in his Epistola ad Canonicas (Ep. 52) that there is such an order (not of course temporal), although he was chary, about saying this outright in his early work Contra Eunomium (Book 3), because of the use to which the idea could be put. But surely there is a sense in which one can say that, if the Spirit proceeds from the Father, it is from the Father who begets the Son (an eternal act which is logically antecedent). There is (contra Photius but not Gregory of Nyssa) some sense in which the generation of the Word-Son is a condition of the procession of the Spirit. Just what does this imply? In the World Council of Churches' very valuable symposium, Spirit of God, Spirit of Christ, Garigue, (Catholic), Staniloae (Orthodox) and Moltmann (Reformed), all seem to work from this point in different ways.

For Père Garrigues the conceptually prior begetting of the only Son leads to two views, negative and positive, of the 'how' of the procession of the Spirit. For Cappadocian-Byzantine theology it rules out the possibility that the Spirit is 'born' of the Father, and so in a way conditions as a radically different process the ἐκπόρευσις of the Spirit. This gives rise to a διά τοῦ

51. This important and useful work could serve at many points as the basis for future discussion. In a directly practical sense, the proposals for agreement put forward by Père Congar in the third volume of his great work Je Crois en l'Esprit Saint (Le Fleuve de Vie coule en Orient et en Occident) III, pp.260-66, call for close consideration.
\( \Upsilon\iota\omicron\omicron\) (‘through the Son’) theology with a very weak sense assigned to \( \delta\iota\iota\) (‘through’) — too weak, if I may venture an opinion here, to correspond to some of the texts. For the Alexandrian and Latin theologians, the generation of the Son would be a positive condition or cause (but not primary principle) of the ‘consubstantial procession of the Spirit in the communion of Father and Son. This would find expression in the Greek formula, \( \varepsilon\kappa\tau\omicron\omicron\omicron\ \Pi\alpha\tau\omicron\omicron\varsigma\ \kappa\iota\ \Upsilon\iota\omicron\omicron\pi\rho\omicron\omicron\omicron\) (‘going forth out of the Father and the Son’) and the Latin \( \textit{qui ex Paire Filioque procedit}.\) These, however, would be two theologies which express and develop in different ways the same core of meaning, and need not divide the Church. (Père Garrigues does indeed proceed to a further formulation in which both traditions might be brought into synthesis, but this would call for a more detailed exposition and examination than is possible here).

The Rumanian Orthodox Professor Staniloae (a venerated name to all interested in the teaching of Gregory Palamas), while insisting in traditional Orthodox terms on the procession of the Spirit from the Father alone, couples the generation of the Son with what he calls, in an expression derived from Gregory of Cyprus, the ‘shining forth’ (\( \varepsilon\kappa\lambda\alpha\mu\mu\iota\varsigma\)) of the Spirit: ‘the manifest shining out’ of the Spirit (through or from the Son), demonstrates that there is an ‘inner dynamic presence of the Spirit in the Son’. (‘Shining forth’, ‘manifestation’, ‘appearance’, ‘sending out’ etc. are fairly common Greek Patristic metaphors, presumably drawn from the economic order, but certainly used to describe the inner Trinitarian life of the Spirit. They cannot be reduced simply to the ‘consubstantiality’ of Son and Spirit). Again, behind the different theologies, emphases, and terms, are we not approaching the same core of primary belief?\(^{51a}\)

Professor Moltmann’s thought moves in a similar direction. Following Bolotov, he insists that the Spirit proceeds from ‘the Father of the Son’ (not some universal Father like Zeus, Vishnu, or Wotan), and that it is from this

\(^{51a}\) A subject which is too large and involved to be explored here, but must not be passed over in silence, is the \textit{rapprochement}, within the revived ‘Palamite’ tradition of modern Orthodoxy, of an order or manifestation and emission of the divine, uncreated ‘energies’ (which enter the field of human experience) with the Western \textit{Filioque} view of the Trinitarian processions. Professor J. Meyendorff indicated the opening for dialogue here in his \textit{Study of Gregory Palamas}, (London 1964), with special references to Gregory of Cyprus and the later writings of Palamas himself. Boris Bobrinskoy, in the \textit{W.C.C.} collection mentioned above, draws attention to contemporaries like Paul Evdokimov, Nikos Nissiotis, Dumitru Staniloae, and Olivier Clément, in this context p.138.) Congar, too, sees some significance here (\textit{op. cit.} III, p.277). But the Palamite theory of uncreated ‘energies’ really distinct from the divine essence is still highly debatable, and it is not always interpreted in a strictly objective sense. (The literature is enormous, but on the point just referred to see Endre von Ivanka, ‘Palamismus and Vatertradition’ in \textit{L’Eglise et les Églises}, (Chevetogne, Belgium), 1955, II, pp.32ff., and the same author’s \textit{Plato Christianus}, (Einsiedeln 1964), p.418.
Father that he receives existence, or perhaps better subsistence (ὑπαρξία). He is an hypostasis from the Father, but receives his relational form (Gestalt or εἴδος) as ‘Spirit of the Son’ within the immanent, interpersonal life of God. There is some transition here from ontological to almost aesthetic categories. Yet fundamentally what seems to be at stake is the distinction according to which, within the inner life of God, the Spirit derives his being from the Father as ultimate source, but in such a way as to be influenced by the fact that ‘Father’ here refers to the begetting of the unique Son, so that the Spirit is not merely ‘not stranger to the Son’, to use an Eastern phrase, but in his relation to Father and Son is Person (wears ‘a face’), and is not just a subsistent being.52

None of these efforts to get behind, or beyond, the hardened positions of the past is immune to criticism, particularly in the simplified form in which I have presented them. I cite them chiefly as significant attempts to reach back to truths which both the opposed systems of the past were concerned to safeguard.

What seems increasingly clear is that the period in which the Filioque doctrine and its direct antithesis were regarded as fixed positions, each in turn the object of polemics and apologetics, is on the wane. We do not want, if I may use T.S. Eliot’s more general words, ‘to ring the bell backward/ . . . Or follow an antique drum’. Besides the further ‘historicizing’ of the past, there will be many gropings towards new presentations of aspects of the Trinitarian mystery, and for the first time in centuries they can be done in common. This paper, in spite of any imbalances or oscillations that may derive from its author’s being an incurable Occidental who has long been a lover of the Eastern Fathers and a friend to Eastern Orthodoxy, is meant to be a move in its own small way towards an ecumenical and thereby more fully Christian future.53

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52. Of course Professor Moltmann is using metaphorical language. He knows well that in Christian art the Spirit is represented by the biblical images of breath, fire, water, dove, etc., and that it is only in allegory, as in Rublev’s famous icon of the Trinity, that he is given a human form.

53. For most confessional groupings there are such things as conciliar decrees, synodal and other pronouncements, that have to be taken into account. A sane hermeneutic of such statements will have to be undertaken, and encouragement for this has not been lacking in official quarters.