THE CASE FOR NEO-STOICISM TODAY

R.G. Tanner

When Zeno the young Phoenician merchant from Cyprus came to Athens to study philosophy in 313 B.C. he learned from Crates the Cynic, Polemon the Academic and Stilpo the Megaric. When Zeno the young Phoenician merchant from Cyprus came to Athens to study philosophy in 313 B.C. he learned from Crates the Cynic, Polemon the Academic and Stilpo the Megaric. The Cynic position shared Plato's view that the dog was a philosophical animal who lived according to nature—hence the school's name. Cynics followed Antisthenes in rejecting possessions and denying that convention should moderate natural behaviour.

Stilpo was affirming Eleatic views of equational predication by admitting no statement except tautologies. For if we say (x) 'Plato is white', (y) 'Plato is walking', (z) 'Plato is musical', an equational doctrine of predication will force us either to say 'white = walking = musical' or else to divide the subject by the number of predications. Then we affirm either 1/3p = x, 1/3p = y, 1/3p = z, or else p = x + y + z. As there are any number of possible predicates, we get an infinite series, and Plato is then infinitely divisible and thus will become an unreality instead of an entity. Again, if we say 'Plato(p) is (a) man(m)' and 'Socrates(s) is (a) man(m)', so that p = m and s = m, then unless p = s, m becomes a meaningless term. This did not exhaust Stilpo's linguistic difficulties, though we must remember they were compounded by the lack of an indefinite article which made 'Socrates is white' and 'Socrates is (a) man' look to a Greek speaker like statements of the same order. But in addition, as you will gather from the first page of North & Hillard's Greek Prose Composition, the definite article was used both to generalise and to specify; so any sentence's subject may be either a specific instance or a general concept. Of course the doubt disappears in context, but it is real with an isolated sentence, and this made what we call ambiguity and the Greeks called amphibole a valid issue. Further, this problem can extend to the meaning of a whole sentence, not merely affecting the reference of the subject. As a sentence is a flow of sound limited by silences and marked by an intonation pattern, the sequence 'I am unfit for it' can either be an admission in the confessional or an angry denial, simply according to the intonation, which thus determines the meaning and gives a

3. Diog. Laert. VI, 10 (Antisthenes) and 104 (Menedemus).
4. Plutarch, adversus Coloten, 23.
form to the sounds of the sentence. The verse ‘Whereon live purple bleeds’ has live for an adjective and purple for a noun. But, only pronounce your ‘live’ as a verb, and you create a plural noun subject ‘bleeds’, presumably as in the compound ‘nose-bleeds’!

All the other schools were forced to accept the Stilponic challenge. Now that a Platonist can no longer say ‘Socrates is musical’ or ‘Socrates is (a) man’, the Academy under Xenocrates proposed to say instead, ‘Socrates is activated by a musical daemon’ or ‘Socrates is vitalised by a humanising daemon’.\(^8\) Thus successive or concomitant rational forces intervene to recreate the subject qua subject, just as Zeus made Hector a coward for a few minutes in the Iliad. So much for Polemon’s teaching. At the Lyceum Dicaearchus very drastically modified Aristotle’s view that substance is matter actualised by form, asserting that ‘forms’ or ‘second substances’ are mere properties of matter. Cicero notes, ‘Dicaearchus states that the entire force by which we feel or do anything is consistently spread within all living bodies and is not separable, in that it is non-existent, and there is nothing but one simple body, so formed that by the symmetrical blend of its nature it lives and feels.’\(^9\) This view denies the existence of mind or soul as a thing apart, and makes it a function of matter: it is a position seeing form very much as a Stilponic intonation pattern which cannot exist apart from the sounds it modulates, though it may be separately notated. Dicaearchus would restate predication in this light, taking ‘the philosopher IS (a) man’ as meaning ‘the matter qualified by the property of philosophising HAS STATED OF IT the property of manhood’. Similarly, he would interpret ‘Alcibiades IS (a) general’ as meaning ‘the matter individually qualified by the property of being called Alcibiades HAS STATED OF IT the property of generalship’.

The three new Hellenistic schools also had to react to Stilpo. Pyrrhonian Scepticism avoids confusion of general and particular, real and apparent. Unable to concede that ‘The Real Honey actually IS sweet’, Sceptics admit that ‘The apparent honey SEEMS TO BE sweet’.\(^10\) Pyrrho thus introduces an apparent situation like Parmenides’ Way of Belief over against the presumed real situation of the Way of Truth\(^11\) to enable men to operate by their senses without granting reality to any of the sense-data, concerning which they may suspend judgment.\(^12\) Again, Epicurean atomism met Stilpo

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7. Even prepositions can be amphibolic. So without = both ‘outside’ and ‘lacking’.
11. Parmenides, Prooimion, (Stein), 18-52.
by postulating a particularised substratum of countless Leucippan atoms. Each is a tiny plenum and an everlasting entity—falling forever through infinite void. From the clusterings of these atoms arose the merely temporary particulars of which only predicates limited by space and time could be stated. Thus Epicurus satisfied Stilpo's requirement that subjects be divisible. Further, his predicates were non-entities; mere consequences of the shape, weight and motion of the atoms making up their subjects. Zeno himself is influenced in his Stoic response to Stilpo by Crates and his other teacher Polemon, and, though this is not avowed, I believe also by Dicaearchus, to whom I should assign the influence Rist and his followers wish to give to the Lyceum as affecting the Stoa's formation. For a follower of Crates, life must be according to Nature and able to 'tune in' to Nature. For a follower of Polemon, vital daemonic forces must create subjects and predicates. For a Stilponic thinker, it is possible for two substances to occupy the one space simultaneously just as two 'meanings' can occupy the one amphibolic sentence. Aided by Dicaearchus' view of an inseparable force spread through matter as a property, he uses his teachers' views to postulate two substances—i.e., inert matter and tense warm rational pneuma—simultaneously occupying a finite spherical geocentric universe. To satisfy Polemo and Dicaearchus the resultant Universe is at once both alive and mechanistic. Pneumatic matter is separable from inert matter in that the latter is generated from the former when the Universe begins and subsumed back into it at the end of a cycle, but Dicaearchus and Stilpo are met by the doctrine of total mixture—that two bodies may occupy the same space simultaneously. Therefore by this cyclic theory he met Xenophanes’ need. On this viewpoint, the doctrines of Ecpyrosis and Palingenesia, which state that the material universe returned to pneumatic rational fire after a 36,000 year cycle and was then recreated by the transformation of rational fiery pneuma so that part again became inert matter, justified cosmic unity whilst providing for duality in the world of phenomena.

I. ZENO’S SYSTEM OF THE COSMOS

Stoic theory saw the universe as a finite plenum and held that body alone was existent. However, they did not disallow certain subsistent non-bodily realities. Place is the position a body occupies inside the spherical geocen-
metric cosmos, *time* is the succession of positions occupied by heavenly bodies within the universe, and *space* is the further succession of positions occupied by the whole universe in the void, whilst *void* itself is a fourth subsistent. Finally, there is a subsistent called *lekton*, the idea occupied by an utterance—in the case of an amphibolic *lexis*, the two simultaneously occupied ideas or *lekta*. Thus we find that two bodies can occupy one space simultaneously and that two spaces may contain the one body simultaneously. Thus self motion is impossible, yet consciousness can cause the phonetic body of a *lexis* to *be* moved between two alternate *lekta*, a point taken further by Stilpo’s rival Diodorus Cronus.

Bodily entities are tensional fields of inert matter mixed with elastic pulsating *pneuma*. The more rare the substance of the body so created the more tightly is it stretched by pneumatic tension (*tonos*). The mass of air in a room is less than the mass of water in a tank the same size, and far less than that of earth in a container of equal volume. Thus air is far more tightly stretched than water, and water is under greater tension than earth. This tension permits air to transmit far more sight and sound vibrations than water, and far more again than earth. Four kinds of pneumatic fields can be found in entities. First, *hexis* imparts to a body its shape, texture and definition. To some bodies *physis* imparts capacity for growth, reproduction and decay. To some of these *psychē* adds the gifts of desire and movement. Finally, the cosmos, gods and men experience the fourth pneumatic field, *logos*, the power of reason, judgment and communication.

It should be emphasised that Stoic bodily entities are not substances in Aristotle’s sense. The Cosmos is a continuum in which all tensional fields are more or less temporary events. A mountain is a very long-lasting event, a man is a much more temporary event, a sunset very temporary.

Predication is thus the linking of events in a conjuncture. Statements like ‘Socrates is white’ indicate a fairly permanent association of the two events, *Socrates* and *whiteness*. On the other hand, the sentence ‘Socrates is running’ implies a brief association between the two events, *Socrates* and the *running motion*. To cope with this the Stoics devised a new system of categories rather like our traditional schoolboy’s analysis table in English grammar, four in number: subject (*ὑποκείμενον*), of some kind (*ποιόν*), somehow disposed (*πώς έχου*), somehow disposed in relation to something (*πρός τι πώς έχον*). The subject is the inert matter and the other three categories are the pneumatic events in which it participates in descending
order of permanence.23 So, if we say ‘The philosopher teaches in the Academy’, we analyse it thus:

The (inert matter)—(tensionally qualified as) philosopher—is (tensionally disposed) teaching—(in relation to) in the Academy.

Let us next consider ‘Cleon captured the Spartans’, where Greek would write ὁ Κλέων ‘The Cleon’. We may analyse the sentence as follows:

The (inert matter)—(individually tensionally qualified as) Cleon—is (tensionally disposed) having captured—(in relation to) the Spartans.

Because the Cosmos is a plenum whose parts are all in contact and admits no void and is wholly penetrated by rational pneuma it follows that there is sympathy between all parts of the whole. The Cosmic purpose or Providence, the Gods, and all totally wise men, will have their rational pneuma pulsating in perfect harmony. Thus a wise man will be spontaneously inerrant and impeccable, and his wishes will automatically be in harmony with Providence. Thus Natural Law could be regarded as a physiological fact and be synonymous with right reason.24 Again, because the rational pneuma in all creatures that are rational is the same substance and aware of its presence in others, all good rational men will have a primary drive to benevolence towards other rational beings and to the whole cosmic good. However, as we cannot exercise good will and good works unless our own tensional fields remain in being, a second primary impulse to self-regard and preservation is prior in time to the first, though secondary in worth.25

However, in order to appreciate Stoic ethics, we need to grasp the theory of apatheia and of the eight-part soul.26 The Stoics envisaged a centre of rational pneuma in the breast called ἡγεμονικόν in Greek or commune sensorium in Latin. From this, pneumatic tentacles held in tension by the resistance of the inert bodily matter stretch out to the eyes, ears, nose, palate and hands and skin surface to convey the input sensory impulses of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. Two more output tentacles extend to the tongue and sex organs to express speech and sexuality as responses from the common sensorium to the input impulses. Of course in non-rational animals the common sensorium is purely psychic and appetitive; but in man the common sense will guide and censor our responses to input of information in the light of reason and judgment. Nevertheless, the common sense of most men is erratic because of irregular pneumatic pulsation in the pneuma,

23. This is an idiosyncratic interpretation. See R.G. Tanner, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 54, No. 3 (1976), pp.255-264, for a fuller explanation of this position in the course of a review article on A.A. Long’s Hellenistic Philosophy.
a flutter, or fibrolation, called *ptoia* in Greek.\(^{27}\) This leads both to incorrect perceptual interpretation of sense data and to choices in conflict with our natural primary impulses mentioned above. Zeno taught that perception in a wise man was inerrant. It involved reacting to the presence of a sensory stimulus or presentation by *recognising* or *assenting* to it, then firmly grasping or *comprehending* it; while the repetition of this process gave accurate *knowledge* of the phenomenon through perception.\(^ {28}\) With a man who was not wise the *ptoia* in his pneumatic pulsation might lead to error through either an obstruction to the perceptive process or the engendering of a false preconception which could lead the *hēgemonikon* to refuse assent to the presentation. The stock instance was the disbelief of Admetus at the real sight of the dead Alcestis after Heracles restored her to life.\(^ {29}\) Moreover, the problem extends from perception and knowledge to moral choice. The same *ptoia* in the man’s *pneuma* leads him to err by concentrating on the self-regarding moral impulse to the exclusion of the more important other-regarding impulse. The result is *pathos*, an unhealthy selfish emotion.\(^ {30}\) Of course *apatheia* means ‘absence of unhealthy emotions’, not, as earlier scholars following Roman sources wrongly deduced, a cold impassive absence of all feeling such as is suggested by modern abuse of the term ‘stoic’ or ‘stoical’. A healthy unselfish emotion full of regard for one’s fellow creatures was called a *eupatheia*.\(^ {31}\)

Though not given to the seemingly irrational impulses of ecstasy, rages or fury, a Stoic wise man could be full of gentle warmth, good humour and kindness. Thus *pleasure*, or in Greek *ήόονή*, is regarded as a *pathos* because it is self-absorbed, yet this does not mean that Stoics shunned enjoyment, for *joy* (*χαρά*) is classified as the corresponding *eupathy* felt by a wise man when a fool feels pleasure.\(^ {32}\) Because wisdom means having one’s pneuma ‘in tune’ with the Cosmos, the transition from folly to wisdom is instantaneous like an instrument’s transition from being ‘out of tune’ to being ‘in tune’. But a *proficient*, or man progressing to wisdom from folly, may be very good and wise and close to perfection like a piano needing only a final adjustment of the last string. The sudden change simply carries him from virtual to total inerrancy and makes his goodness entirely spontaneous without the least need of reflexion.\(^ {33}\)

32. και τὴν μὲν χαρὰν ἐναντίον φασίν ἐστὶ τῇ ἥόονῃ, οὕσον εὐλογοῦ ἐπαροὶ.
The notion of universal natural law made Stoics prefer the notion of a world state governed by a constitution which imitated and shared the wisdom of the divine pneumatic Providence which presides over our Cosmos. Early followers of Zeno felt that a simple natural style of life might bring large numbers of men into harmony with the cosmos and make possible a perfect egalitarian democracy based on equal property and responsibility. But as the later thinkers realised how hard cosmic attunement was likely to be, the Stoa tended to favour philosopher Kings or small oligarchies of the wise. But if it faltered in the hope of a reformed human race sharing enlightenment among all, it never retreated from the ideal of men at peace living in a free world state like tame cattle sharing one universal pasture.

Finally, the contributions of the Stoa to systematic logic included Antipater of Tarsus' doctrine of monolemmatic syllogism. Aristotle's most regular syllogism has a major and minor premiss: (1) All Welshmen are thieves. (2) Taffy is a Welshman: (3) Therefore Taffy is a thief. In these cases (2) is included in (1). But statements like 'If water is raised to 212 degrees F (1), it boils (2)'; or, 'If a triangle is isosceles (1), the angles at the base are equal (2)'; examples which are equally valid stated with one premiss; because the observed regularity of nature is an unstated major premiss. This form of deduction, so useful to modern science, is the monolemma.

II. RELEVANCE OF THE STOIC SYSTEM

As we have seen, the neo-Stoicism of the renaissance relied heavily on Cicero and the sources of the first and second centuries A.D. Modern work since Sambursky's Physics of the Stoics and the recent publications of Gould, Kidd, Long and Rist have made the fragmentary sources of the earlier Stoa yield up the system described already, whilst assisting us better to estimate the influence of Zeno's immediate predecessors. Have we then a system or programme still of value in viewing the world, or is our only legacy the better understanding of an antiquated system in its ancient context?

34. See the very interesting chapter 'Stoics and Politics' in F.H. Sandbach The Stoics, Chatto & Windus, 1975, pp.140-148.
35. Plutarch, de Alexandri virtute i, 329A.
(A) *Physics and the Physical Sciences*\(^{38}\)

The Stoic doctrine of *ecpyrosis* and *palingenesia* has significance for modern cosmogony. Since 1927 Lemaître’s doctrine of the expanding universe deriving from the explosion of a ‘cosmic egg’ (a very ancient concept) has been popular. To explain the Belgian’s view the British astronomer Bonnor took the view that the Cosmos began as an extremely thin gas, gradually contracting under the influence of gravity until it became an ultra-dense mass which exploded into a cycle of expansion. We live in the brief period of the ‘fulness’ of the universe before expansion advances too far. This is the doctrine of the ‘oscillating universe’ for which Sandage in 1956 postulated an era of 82,000 million years for a single oscillation. So this Stoic concept is not out of date, even if it is not, and may never become, a scientific orthodoxy.

The position of Bondi, Gold and Hoyle in the theory of a ‘steady state’ universe is inimical to ecpyrosis theory, but is nonetheless able to offer an explanation for the continuing creation of new matter which fits the Stoic view of transformation of pneuma into inert matter at the cyclic *palingenesia*. If new matter is to be created, what becomes of the law of mass-energy? Hoyle holds that energy required to create new masses of matter may be drawn from some of the expansive energy, and that matter can be formed at the expense of energy otherwise put into expansion. From a Stoic view one would like to suggest that Hoyle’s universe must thus slow down, cease expanding, and finally contract in Bonnor’s sense.

When my Stoics insist that pneuma and inert matter are both ‘body’ they may mean nothing more than an enlightened guess at the law of mass-energy. If we insist on taking them literally, the modifications of the value of \(m\) in the Lorenz equation proposed by Bilaniuk and Sudarshan would allow us the posited *tardyon* or normal material particles whose mass tends to become infinitely large at the speed of light, the *luxon* particles like neutrinos, antineutrinos and photons which have a mass of zero at the speed of light, and theoretical *tachyon* particles which have a negative proper mass at the speed of light and whose speed increases as their energy diminishes, rising towards infinity. Are the theoretical *tachyon* particles a description of pneuma unmixed with inert matter?

Finally, the biology of Teilhard de Chardin is strongly neo-Stoic. His ‘point Omega’\(^{39}\) has strong affinities with the consummating doctrine of

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ecpyrosis where all turns to cosmic fire as it is caught up in the final ecstasy of existence. His notion of no-osphere like atmosphere or hydrosphere suggests the role of rational pneuma in the geocentric Stoic cosmos being played out within this planet’s life by an emergence of a divine and rational power.\(^{40}\) The development of rationality viewed as hominisation and its culmination in ultra-hominisation suggests the Stoic notion of profectus leading the insipiens to sapientia,\(^{41}\) whilst the complexification or growing interrelation of the world gives a physical basis for the drive to scientific ecology.\(^{42}\)

(B) Language and Logic

Stoicism teaches a material continuum. The same hectic, physical, psychic and rational pneuma interpenetrate the striker and the man he strikes. This prevented Stoic linguistic theory from concentrating on subjects to the exclusion of objects, as Aristotle tended to do. Because men and things are defined as tensional fields—prolonged events—and since acts are brief events a Stoic calls the former qualities of the subject and the latter dispositions attaching to this subject tensional field. The fourth factor is the objects and circumstances or effects of that actual disposition—disposition in relation to something. These Stoic categories are very like a traditional analysis scheme:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Quality</th>
<th>Disposition</th>
<th>Relation of Disposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The philosopher</td>
<td>teaches</td>
<td>youths/in the garden</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The old man</td>
<td>(is) (a) philosopher</td>
<td>the general/with the philosopher</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The youth</td>
<td>meets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We note that the noun philosopher may function equally well as quality, disposition, or relative disposition. However, a more stable or permanent longer-lasting event will tend to be described by sentences such as:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Quality</th>
<th>Disposition</th>
<th>Relation of Disposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The admiral</td>
<td>works</td>
<td>in the Peiraeus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now A.C. Lloyd has established that Zeno and Cleanthes recognised only four parts of speech—the article, the name, the verb, and the conjunction.\(^{43}\)

41. ibid., pp.166-170.
Those parts of speech we now see as the category markers for a 'normal' statement sentence which describes a fairly stable tensional situation. Further, Lloyd mentions that Chrysippus introduces *individualised quality* for proper names like *Socrates*, which are unique qualifiers.\(^{44}\) Again, Antipater introduced the adverb because it was uncertain if it were disposition or relative disposition, as the following case makes clear.\(^{45}\)

<table>
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<th>Disposition</th>
<th>Relation to Disposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The</td>
<td>insecticide</td>
<td>quickly/kills</td>
<td>mosquitoes/in the garden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The</td>
<td>insecticide</td>
<td>kills</td>
<td>mosquitoes/quickly/in the garden</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, the boundary between Subject-Quality and Disposition-Relation is absolute, a similar division to that of Chomsky's *NP* and *VP* 'strings'.\(^{46}\)

How then would Stoic syntactic theory cope with the ‘badly formed’ types of sentence in Chomsky's *Aspects of Syntax*?\(^{47}\) In analysing I shall insert articles where Greek would need them.

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Quality</th>
<th>Disposition</th>
<th>Relation to Disposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The</td>
<td>colourless green ideas</td>
<td>sleep</td>
<td>furiously</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The</td>
<td>boy</td>
<td>frightens</td>
<td>sincerity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stoic analysis shows that cancelling out of the stated relation between *qualities* and/or conflict between *disposition* and a *relation* are proofs of abnormality.

An important dispute arose between Aristotelians and Stoics about the doctrine of *definition* held by Antipater of Tarsus. Antipater defined the *definition* as ‘a logos uttered precisely according to analysis. An *illustration* is a logos introducing things “in outline”, or a logos introducing more simply the force of the definition.’\(^{48}\) The Peripatetics insisted that the Stoic view of *definition* was merely a *property*: they would have been fairer to regard Stoic *illustration* in this light. The point is that language is more often exemplary than explanatory. We can say by *definition*: ‘Death is total

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44. ibid., p.61.
45. ibid., p.61.
47. Chomsky, ibid., pp.75-111. Here again, the example of deviant sentences he partly inherits. J.R. Firth, *op.cit.*, pp.8-9 applies his context of situation explanation to some of the same examples.
collapse of body function and central consciousness'. But we can say by
*illustration* that ‘Death is an everlasting sleep’. In literature and in oratory,
as distinct from philosophy, more impact is made on the hearers by using
*illustrations* rather than *definitions*. The imagination can always extra-
polate a definition from a striking illustration. For instance ‘But comrades,
should we fail in this gallant venture, what more can await us than death,
that everlasting sleep?’, gives us a sharper picture than ‘death, that total col-
lapse of body function and central consciousness’.

Similarly, Antipater’s monolemmatic syllogisms were stigmatised by the
Peripatetics. ‘The statements called monolemmatic seem to be syllogisms
through the hearers’ adding the other premiss because it is so familiar.’ The
monolemma ‘You breathe, so you are alive’ seems syllogistic because of his
own accord the hearer prefixes the other well-known premiss ‘everyone who
breathes is alive’. This is actually perverse, because monolemmatic
thought has made science possible. Whenever we hold all variables constant
except one in an observation or experiment we are using the principle of the
*monolemma*, and nothing has done more to extend human knowledge.

(C) *Ethics and Politics*

Stoic ethics, as we saw, depends on the two primary impulses of regard
for self and regard for others. Unless we love ourselves enough to take care
to survive as sentient tensional fields we shall lose the power to love and
help others. Stoicism properly is neither self-hating nor life-denying. Our
duty to other rational beings is due to the affinity of our hegemonic parts,
our reasonable duty to the rest of the universe we ought to derive from
watching our senior rational partners.

To Zeno our founder the ethical good is ‘living harmoniously’; Cleanthes
his successor added ‘with Nature’. Zeno simply saw the need for a wise
man to have his *hegemonikon* devoid of *ptoia*, so that it might be in tune
with the cosmic rationality and make spontaneous effortless and inerrant
moral judgments. Cleanthes’ great hymn personifies Nature in a rational
personal Providence called Zeus, and doubtless stressed the need for har-
mony between my *hegemonikon* and the providential cosmic *pneuma* of
Zeus. The goal is to achieve *eudaemonia*, loosely ‘happiness’, which Zeno
defines as a ‘smooth flow of life’—seemingly a further reference to regular
pneumatic vibration in a wise man’s *hegemonikon*. Virtue is a ‘disposition
in harmony’, and to be sought for its own sake. With the rest of men vir-

50. Stobaeus Eclogae II, 134, p.75 (Wachsmuth).
51. Stobaeus Eclogae I, p.25 (Wachsmuth).
tuous acts are a result of good intention plus good luck, and thus have no moral worth. In this sense all sins are equal in character, though not of course in gravity.

Chrysippus' view that good wise men might lose virtue through drink or brain damage opened the door to the converse; fools might progress towards becoming sages. This doctrine of profectus achieved by study practice and force of will enabled a man to get his pneuma into tune with the Cosmos step by step, till, like the last note tuned on a piano, one last step makes him no more a fool but a sage in tune with Providence itself.

Virtues to the Stoa are things that share in virtue like wisdom, courage, justice and temperance: vices are things sharing in vice like folly, cowardice, injustice and indulgence. But pairs like riches and poverty, health and sickness, glory and nonentity are morally indifferent. Things preferred can contribute to a wise man's happiness but have no power to help a fool. Instances are intelligence and skill, health, strength and beauty, or wealth and repute. Things to be avoided do the wise no harm but injure the foolish. Instances are stupidity and clumsiness, disease weakness and ugliness, poverty, vulgarity and obscurity. As there are virtues and preferred things, thus there are virtuous acts (katorthômata) and preferable (or 'middle') acts (kathêkonta), for which rational beings can give a reasonable justification. Instances are marriage, going on embassies and debating public issues.

Everything occurring in a reasonable creature contrary to kathêkon is hamartêma, or sin. Kathêkonta with perfect justification are katorthômata; but only a sage has power to perform them, though the kathekonta of proficients come closer with progress. Yet a Stoic belief in Fate was designed to explain the 'luck' element in moral profectus as due to providential goodwill rather than chance. Inevitably it came to limit the belief in free action, but not to limit free choice in one's goals.

The moral utility of this perspective is considerable. It allows men to will and plan good even under wicked coercive regimes, whilst it has an international ecological and unselfish view of utility. The notion of value and the concept of things indifferent are valuable antidotes to our modern consumerism. The 'acquisitive personality', whether under capitalist multinationalism or international Marxism, is concerned with ever growing production and development as the sole basis for happiness. The Porch must

56. Stobaeus Eclogae II, 90, p.57 (Wachsmuth)—a direct quotation from Zeno.
59. Stobaeus Florilegium, 103, 22.
object that external indifferents have been made the sole goods by unwise men, and therefore will bring misery rather than joy. Further in these societies competitive education, advertising of goods, and state propaganda serve to accentuate pathē and discourage eupathy in the ordinary citizen.

Of considerable interest to the euthanasia debate was the Stoic view of suicide. The soul persisted till the ecpyrosis, but without its body it was not tense enough to perceive: thus it waited from death till the consummation locked into its dying state of mind. Thus peaceful suicide was better than anguished fatal illness or violent execution. However, it was no help to the souls of distraught persons. Stoics might accept abortions genuinely sought for the good of the rest of a family. Zeno approved homosexual relations between wise men and youths of promise, but in the modern debate he would probably only wish to licence persons of intelligence, good character and generous purposes to practice such things. Finally, he was insistent that wise men must share in public affairs. Would that they did!

From this it will be seen that the world view and attitudes of my school add an interesting and relevant perspective to many aspects of the modern debate, and like Thomism, does so from a self-consistent systematic position.

63. Stobaeus Eclogae II, 184f, p.94 (Wachsmuth).