In *Arctos* 10 (1976), pp. 105-117, Holger Thesleff makes the claim that the *Hippias Major* forms part of a Socratic revival within the Academy, which may be dated to around 360 B.C. The author, while not Plato, he supposes to have been an Academic with insight into the nature of Plato’s thought, style, and development. While Thesleff’s arguments, taken individually, are never totally conclusive, they do add up to the most impressive case yet for the spuriousness of the dialogue, and they afford it an entirely convincing context: one which could explain some of Plato’s preoccupations early in the *Philebus*, which would have been written shortly after it.

If the *Hippias Maior* is indeed an attempt to revert to the Socratic period of Plato’s work, and to develop that foundation independently of later influences on Plato, then it is of special interest that it alludes principally to the *Protagoras* and to the early part of the *Gorgias*: before the notorious ‘Callicles’ comes to the fore at 481b. The principal area of contact with the *Gorgias* is the analysis of τό καλόν at 474d ff, though an earlier passage distinguishing means from end (467c ff) may also have influenced the anonymous author. This influence of the *Gorgias* is entirely understandable as soon as one realizes that the anonymous is trying to suggest, *via* the strange device of Socrates’ alter ego, a return to an ethic based ultimately upon hedonism, where pleasure is the end and the value of all else is assessed on its ability to provide pleasure. For *Gorgias* 474d ff and *Protagoras* 351b ff are the only passages in Plato (apart from *Laws* 732e ff, which postdates 360 B.C.) which employ an ultimately hedonistic system.1

1. There are many who would regard both passages as being of an *ad hominem* character, which does not involve any approval by Plato (or Socrates) of the theory employed to refute the opponents involved. The difficulties for those who take this view of Prot. 351b ff are well put by John Cronquist in *Prudentia* 12 (1980) pp. 63-64, who also provides some useful bibliography. There is an extent to which most early Platonic arguments are *ad hominem* and do not involve complete commitment on the author’s part to either premises or conclusion. But they still were such that Plato took great interest in them and sought to elicit some truth from them; certainly he did not regard those theories upon which he builds his greatest and most important arguments as mere heresy. Had Plato been of the same anti-hedonist views as when he wrote *Go.* 493a ff when he wrote either *Protagoras* or *Gorgias* 474d ff, then he would not have tolerated premises which attach so much value to pleasure. It should be noted that the primary reason for regarding Prot. 351b ff as *ad hominem* argument is that both *Gorgias* and *Phaedo* (which do not follow by many years) adopt an anti-hedonist line. The present paper offers reasons for the rapid change in Plato’s attitudes, namely that this short period saw highly significant changes in Plato’s philosophical orientation stimulated by turbulent events, chiefly in Sicily. It also shows that not the whole of *Gorgias* is contrary to the spirit of Prot. 351b ff.
The *Hippias Major* was probably written at a time when Eudoxus was championing hedonism within the Academy, certainly so if Thesleff is correct in seeing a play on his name at 287e5. Moreover the final attempt to reach a definition of τὸ καλόν (297e ff) uses hedonistic values; this is important since the bulk of the serious theory of a Socratic definition-dialogue conventionally appears in the final episode.

The *Hippias Maior*, then, attempts to revive the Socratic stage of Plato’s work, and it attempts to do this by reverting to theory prevalent in the *Protagoras* and the first half of the *Gorgias*. Presumably the author sees these works as the natural culmination of Plato’s Socratic thought, and this is not strange to those who recognize the latter half of the *Gorgias* as the beginning of Plato’s preoccupation with Pythagoreanism: a preoccupation which recent studies have shown to be very deep-rooted.2 Was the author aware that some great turning-point in Plato’s career came in the course of his writing the *Gorgias*? Was he aware that it is a divided dialogue?

Such a question might never have occurred to myself if I had not constantly found it necessary to divide my treatment of the work when studying the theory of pleasure and pain in Plato. For 474d ff employs a view of τὸ καλόν which reduces to hedonism, where all καλά are so either because they are pleasant or because they contribute to some other end; but that other end, if καλόν, must either be pleasant itself or it is not an end. The hedonistic foundation of such a system looks back to the *Protagoras*. But at 493a ff we meet an anti-hedonist episode, which introduces for the first time the view of pleasures as replenishments, a view which will persist until Plato’s late period and which is related to the new Pythagoreanism. The contrast between the value attached to pleasure at 474d ff and its complete lack of value at 493a ff (notably 498bc) is difficult to ignore, but another factor is even more striking. At 474d ff pain is assuredly the opposite of pleasure (475a4), while at 493a ff this is not so. While pleasure is a ‘filling-up’ process, pain is not an ‘emptying’ but rather the ‘empty condition’. Moreover it often accompanies pleasure, and the pleasure ceases when the pain (i.e. the emptiness) is removed; while, according to 495e, the fact that two things are simultaneously present in the same body excludes their being opposites.

There is thus no question that two views of pleasure and pain are present in the work, nor that the early view bears some resemblance to that adopted in the *Protagoras* (though rejecting the odd contributory sense of ‘pleasant’ from *Protagoras* 351e1, and thus creating a disjunction between the pleas-

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ant and the good),\(^3\) and the later view being similar to that of later works. This is a further reason why one should ask whether the Gorgias was written or planned in two separate stages.

The work strikes most scholars as being both powerful and successful; the later pages seem to emerge quite naturally from the earlier discussions, widening their scope and increasing the reader's conviction in the validity of the early message. I do not wish to challenge the accuracy of this impression, and do not believe that I should be doing so if I suggest that Plato had little idea how the work would finally conclude when he wrote the earlier pages. Musical works have often been completed long after they were begun, sometimes by the addition of new material to what had been conceived of as an independent work; Walton felt unable to tackle the conclusion of his first symphony until after the initial three movements had actually been performed without it. But such inauspicious beginnings do not prevent the final movement from being closely related to earlier material, and do not prevent the ultimate effect from being one of total integration.

If one considers the case of other Platonic works it ought to be obvious that nothing prevented Plato from commencing a work without having planned the whole of it. The Republic may be a powerful work, but surely the final book had not been planned at the time of writing books ii-iv, from which its main themes of poetry and the tripartition of the soul are taken. Surely the programme of higher education in book vii had not been prepared in detail when Plato tackled basic education in book iii. And what of book i? Had it already been written as a separate aporetic dialogue before it came to serve as an introduction to this lengthy political work? If

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3. *Pleasant* and *Good* could only be equated in *Protagoras* because both terms were given both a final and a contributive sense (i.e. 'good', 'pleasant' were terms which were applied to acts whose consequences would *eventually* prove good/pleasant, not just to those which were good/pleasant *per se*). It is *vital* to the theme of *Gorgias* that the contributive sense of 'pleas­ant' be abandoned, and that the adjective should apply only to the immediate effect of an experience upon the perceiver; by contrast 'good' has a tendency to be used rather in the contributive sense (e.g. 'Polus' at 475a3), and would apply to the ultimate effects of a given course of action. For this reason the distinction between 'crafts' which aim at the good and 'knacks' which aim at pleasure (464cd) may be reconciled with an ethic based ultimately on hedonism: those 'knacks' which attempt to produce pleasure are concerned only with the *immediate effects* upon those whom they 'flatter', for *eμειρία* can do no more than give one expectations of the immediate effects of a given method; but the corresponding 'crafts' will seek out through science and calculation the best method to produce the best *ultimate* effect. In terms of the theory of *Prot*. 356a ff, a 'craft' will differ from a 'knack' by its employment of a 'measuring art', in order to calculate the long-term balance of pleasure over pain rather than judge by the pleasure of the moment. Thus *Go*. 464cd is perfectly compatible with the ethics of *Prot*. 351b ff, except in its rejection of the unnatural contributive sense of 'pleasant' which appeared there.
not, then why is Plato's presentation so much more dramatic in the first book? It may be a very appropriate introduction to the whole, but is this evidence that it was planned as part of the whole, or merely that later books were written in such a way as to cause us to reflect upon earlier material? Or could it have been revised after its final purpose had been determined? Diogenes Laertius (3.37) tells the tale of Plato's revision of the opening words.

It may be argued that the Republic, being about three and a half times the length of Gorgias, is not a fitting comparison. The Timaeus is a little shorter, and thus more suitable. But Gorgias was a large work by early standards, and before it Plato had had little opportunity of handling large amounts of material, for the Protagoras, by far the largest work of those usually thought to precede Gorgias, is slightly less than two thirds of its size. Even if it had originally been intended to include only the arguments with 'Gorgias' and 'Polus', Gorgias would have been planned as the second longest work which Plato had so far written. As Dodds, on p.20 of his fine edition of the work, points out, Plato did not believe in learning pottery on the big jar. By the time that he wrote Timaeus he was more used to large forms: but even here we are confronted with an apparent second start to the work at 47e, throwing a new light upon the alleged first-principles of the universe; and even at 34b10 Plato seems to have repented of the order in which he had so far been tackling his subject. Also in the late period comes evidence that Plato sometimes failed to complete his initial plan: Critias is (presumably) unfinished, and the Philosopher was never started.

Moreover I doubt whether Plato achieved a more unified result in those dialogues which were planned in detail than in those which relied more upon spontaneous artistry. The Phaedrus probably owes its superficial impression of poor integration to a very artificially contrived plan worked out according to the requirements of 270b ff. Once Plato's artistry deserts him we also find that his works fail to strike one as natural and well-integrated.

Therefore let us not be led to assume that the Gorgias was planned as a whole simply because it leaves us with an impression of natural and continuous development. Let us ask ourselves why the attempted Socratic revival seen in Hippias Maior uses the earlier material and not the later. Is 'Socrates' portrayed differently—less Socratically—after 481b? Do his doctrines involve material from outside the Socratic circle? Both these ques-

4. More than any other dialogue Phaedrus blends the είδη of Platonic discourse (oratory, myth, dialectic?) in such a way that it must, if it is to conform with its theory of persuasive speech (269d ff), be addressing a complex soul: for a definite number of types of speech corresponds to a definite number of types of soul (271d). It may be that the soul addressed is that of Isocrates, which has a philosophic element (279a), though not so strong as to dominate others.
tions can unhesitatingly be answered ‘yes’. Regarding the treatment of ‘Socrates’ E.R. Dodds p.16 asserts ‘His tone is different; more exactly, it becomes different in the course of the dialogue.’ ‘And in the last pages of the dialogue the transformation is complete: he speaks in the ringing tones of the prophet . . .’ Dodds sees a gradual development, marked by increasing confidence in the validity of what is said and by increasing bitterness concerning Athenian politics; he sees too a greater use of long speeches by ‘Socrates’ himself, ‘an exceptional borrowing from an unsocratic source’, and ‘important additions to his small stock of positive beliefs’ (p.17).

Since we wish to establish whether the arguments with ‘Callicles’ are of a new unsocratic nature such as cannot be found earlier, we must examine Dodds’ claims to be able to perceive the ‘new Socrates’ before 481b. Firstly he sees the ‘bitterness’ occurring at 471e-472b, but one may come to one’s own conclusions as to whether this is really a ‘passionate bitterness that strikes us as new’. One should be on one’s guard against reading such bitterness into the passage after one has detected more obvious examples of it after 508c.

At 473b Dodds feels that ‘he asserts a positive doctrine with a certitude . . . which also appears new.’ Certainly b10-11 does seem surprising, but it does deal with doctrine which, we are assured, had always been Socratic (482ab, 527b, cf. 508e-509b), and the certitude is scarcely unexpected to those who have read the Crito.5 Once again one has to treat this isolated case with caution; it is much less striking than the overall confidence of 500a ad fin.; much less definite a statement of Plato’s commitment than 508e-509a, where he speaks of ‘iron and adamantine bonds’, and appends the kind of concession to ‘Socratic ignorance’ which in no way weakens the impression of conviction.6 One may certainly claim that 471-473, both by way of bitterness and in the strength of the writer’s conviction, foreshadow the later pages of Gorgias, but one cannot claim that this foreshadowing is greater than such as could be found in a quite separate work. And the same can be said for the use of extended speech by Socrates at 464b-465e, which is an isolated case by comparison with material from 507 to the end of the work, and less striking by far than Protagoras 342a-346e.

Dodds’ case for a gradual development in the characterization of ‘Socrates’ is thus less than conclusive. At best it rests on 471-473, which could have been revised when the later material had been collected; it could even have been interpolated.

Dodds’ conviction of the unity of the work has also led him to exaggerate

5. See particularly 49el: ήμοι μέν γάρ καὶ πάλαι οὔτω καὶ νῦν ἐτί δοκεῖ, . . . also 48a7 (αὐτῆ· ἡ ἀλήθεια), 68d5 ff, 46b6-7.
6. ‘Socrates’ claims not to know that he is correct, but to have met nobody who is able to maintain the opposite thesis without becoming a laughing-stock, 509a4-7. Compare Meno 98b.
the extent to which the two main themes are intertwined (p.3). This ‘alleged intertwining’ is Dodds’ reaction to the debate on whether rhetoric (a) or happiness (b) (εὔσεβεία) is the proper subject of the work. There is no doubt that (a) dominates before 481b, while (b) dominates thereafter. Dodds (p.2) fails to convince one that Plato took any steps to introduce (b) during the arguments with ‘Gorgias’, and his claims to see (b) at 466a-480a during the discussion with ‘Polus’ require scrutiny. Up to 466a the whole dialogue had appeared to devote itself to the question of ‘what is rhetoric?’.

We then enter a dispute concerning the alleged power (δύναμις) of rhetoric, which inevitably introduces material of great political significance, though not immediately raising the question of what sort of life we should live. The discussion of the δύναμις of rhetoric has been no surprise, indeed ‘Socrates’ had asked ‘Gorgias’ at 456a5 to reveal the δύναμις of rhetoric in terms which show, with 447c2, that this had been the issue all along. To write of rhetoric and its δύναμις would be a logical task to follow Protagoras, a work which could conceivably be argued to be examining sophistry and its δύναμις. To ask the nature of anything often involves asking for its δύναμις also: in setting out to praise Eros, ‘Aristophanes’ praises its δύναμις (Symposium 189cd), just as Eryximachus had concluded by praising its δύναμις.

In asking ‘Laches’ to define courage, ‘Socrates’ had invited him to point to a particular δύναμις (Laches 192b). In Euthydemus the sophists are invited to give a display of the δύναμις of their wisdom (274d2). The Republic asks what justice and injustice are, and what δύναμις they have in a man’s soul (ii 358b4-5). Thus it is clear that to inquire about something’s δύναμις is, for Plato, the natural extension of asking what it is. Once Plato has given us his view of what rhetoric is, he can begin to examine the question of what sort of thing it is, and then tackle its potential:- much as the Symposium makes it the rule to say who a God is, plus what sort he is, and then what his gifts or accomplishments might be (201e1-2, cf 195a1-5). Thus Gorgias 466b ff continues to discuss the proposed subject—rhetoric and its power—without any immediate suggestion of a digression.

It is a fact that the discussion of rhetoric’s power came to be a discussion of political power, and we should expect nothing else. But as yet Plato is not asking the question of how one should live, he is merely exposing the hollowness of so-called ‘power’ without the knowledge of how to use it. The subject of happiness (εὔσεβεία) and its opposite is introduced by ‘Polus’ at 470d and continues to 473e, but the reader is not really conscious of a digression. There are many reasons for this, one being that orators were associated quite naturally with other myopic power-seekers (cf. 479a:

7. For the principle of establishing ‘what it is’ before ‘what kind it is’ see Meno 71b3-8, 86e1, 100b4-6.
'Archelaus . . . and the other tyrants, orators, and dynasts'), and another that it challenges the ethical postulates through which rhetoric had come to be respected. More importantly the theme of rhetoric is kept in the foreground by the fact that 'Socrates' keeps chiding 'Polus' for the use of what he regards as an inferior kind of 'refutation' peculiar to rhetoric (471d-472d) or for other rhetorical devices (473d3, e3). Such emphasis on the weakness of rhetorical refutation enables Plato to present the dialectical argument from 474d to 478e in the best possible light. Of itself this argument has little to do with either rhetoric or happiness until 478c where its consequences for happiness are spelt out, consequences which are brought directly to bear upon the use of rhetoric at 480a-d. After this the discussion of the \( \delta \omega \alpha \mu \iota \varsigma \) of rhetoric is complete and there is nothing new to be said about it in the rest of the dialogue.

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that discussion of happiness in the arguments with Polus is (a) limited to 470d-473e and 478c-479e, and (b) subordinate to the discussion of the \( \delta \omega \alpha \mu \iota \varsigma \) of rhetoric. Since Plato has no time for any 'power' unable to contribute to life's goal (= happiness), a discussion of happiness has become necessary.

From 481c, where 'Callicles' remarks that 'Socrates' is turning man's life upside-down, the chief theme unquestionably becomes how we should live. Since Plato inevitably concentrates on Athenian public life rhetoric will still play a part in the conversation, but as a main theme it will be recalled rather than developed. Dodds sees rhetoric as of some significance at 482c-6d, but I regret that I cannot see this. Likewise he seems to think that it is given equal weight in the conclusion (526b-7e), whereas it only seems to surface (insignificantly) at 527c3-4. His claims of interweaving thus rest on his two remaining passages, 500a-503d and 515b-521a.

At 500ab the distinction between a skill and a flattery is brought back without mention of rhetoric, and 500b6-d5, though mentioning rhetoric (c6), is still concerned with what life we must choose to live. 500d6-502d1 discusses skills and flatteries without a mention of rhetoric, which leaves 502d2-503d3 to discuss rhetoric, and even this is more concerned with Athenian orators than with rhetoric itself. The theme is remembered no more than it has to be in order to give the work a semblance of unity, and it is remembered in the particular context of Athenian life so as to raise the names of Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Pericles (c1-2).

These names feature again in Dodds' remaining passage of alleged significance to the theme of rhetoric. 'Socrates' wants to know whether they made the Athenians better citizens, evidence is brought forward to support a negative answer, but the evidence suggests not only that they were not true orators working in accordance with some skill, they were not even 'orators' who could conform with Socrates' concept of oratory as a 'flattery'
(517a4-6). It is true that the distinction between the political art and the knack of giving the citizens what they desire is still made relevant (517b-519b), and so the theme of rhetoric is rather artificially reawakened. But the reawakening adds nothing to the concept of rhetoric; it serves chiefly to discredit allegedly successful politicians through the analogy of delayed illnesses caused by the flattery of elaborate cookery, since Plato can blame these politicians for fattening up the city, with delayed ill effects. The close relation between rhetoric and sophistry also emerges, allowing Plato to make an Isocratean argument against fee-taking sophists work against rhetoric as well (519b-520e). But at 521a we finally see the purpose behind the discussion of Athenian statesmen: it is their life that 'Callicles' aspires to, and 'Socrates' wishes to contrast it with his own. How one should live remains the crucial issue; all else is peripheral.

Dodds has fought bravely to show that the two themes of the Gorgias are interwoven with 'the movement . . . of an ascending spiral' (p.3), and, as if this did not suffice, he has proceeded to suggest that the themes are not as separate as we might suppose. Certainly Plato associated the two themes, for otherwise he would never have appended the arguments with 'Callicles' to what had preceded, but this cannot obscure the fact that there is a radical division of the work at 481b. The arguments with 'Gorgias' and 'Polus' interlock, and the personalities of the two teachers of rhetoric interact. The arguments with 'Callicles' move in a different world, a world upon which 'Gorgias' and 'Polus' do not presume to comment; they are irrelevancies left far behind. It is not they who have influenced Pericles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Themistocles; it is not they who have moulded men to conform with the Calliclean ideal. Whereas the close comparison of the roles of sophist and orator had seemed entirely natural at 465c when it was teachers of rhetoric who were being considered, the comparison is strained and artificial at 519c-520b when the 'orators' are practical politicians.

An important question is whether the arguments with 'Callicles' are in any way foreshadowed in the earlier part of the work. We will leave aside 470-473, without which the appearance of a unified work would be almost completely forfeited, and concentrate on still earlier material, bearing in mind that Plato habitually includes in his introductions material which can

8. Isocrates had argued that a sophist's failure to trust his pupils to pay the fee after instruction was inconsistent with the claim to be able to teach virtue/justice (c.Soph. 5.6). Plato shows his agreement with the principle (519cd), and sees the case as analogous to that of an orator-statesman whose people turn against him. If he had really improved his city, then he could trust it to treat him fairly. The argument may have preceded Isocrates (Dodds, p.365), but it has become more than 'an old joke against the sophists' in Gorgias, where it is Plato's concern to make both public orators and teachers of rhetoric (460a-461b) accept responsibility for the conduct of those whom they claim to serve.
set one thinking about the chief subjects which he intends to tackle. What impression do we receive of ‘Callicles’ himself in these earlier pages? He is a man of sufficient means and distinction to be able to entertain Gorgias, influence him, and provide him with the facilities to give an ἐπίσεις in his house (447b); and yet he is not otherwise known to us. He looks to be a kind of host-figure, destined to play the same role as ‘Callias’ in Protagoras. Indeed, ‘Callias’ had only provided the facilities for discussion (317d) and kept the discussion going when it was in danger of breaking up (335cd). These are the original roles which ‘Callicles’ plays, appearing as host at 447a-c, and encouraging ‘Gorgias’ and ‘Socrates’ to continue (458d). Indeed since both ‘Gorgias’ and ‘Socrates’ appear with their henchmen ‘Polus’ and ‘Chaerephon’ we are probably expecting ‘Callicles’ to be a rather neutral figure. If the name ‘Callicles’ did not appear four times in the text and once in the list of characters, then we should probably have assumed that the figure whose words were prefaced with the letters ΚΑΛ. was Callias: at whose house we might expect Gorgias to have stayed, seeing that it had attracted Protagoras, Prodicus, and Hippias.

At 447a-c we learn a little of the role of ‘Callicles’, but what do we learn of his character? Naturally he has some brief words of praise for his guest (a5-6), and naturally he expresses polite surprise that ‘Socrates’ wants to listen to an oratorical display (b4-5). Too little is known to assess the exact tone of his opening words (a1-2), but it is certain that there is nothing there to prepare us for the ‘Callicles’ of the later pages. The alleged colloquialism of c5 might conceivably assist if we knew more about the phrase, but the rest of c5-8 is again unhelpful. More promising at first sight is 458d1-4, the only other place where ‘Callicles’ has anything to say before 481b, for the verbs ἥσυχα and χαριεύει which are put into his mouth suggest that he judges such λόγοι as he now hears by the criterion of pleasure. But on fur-

9. I think particularly of the references to knowledge and ignorance early in Meno, along with the remembering-words there (71c, 71c10, 73c7, 76b1), and the introduction of the recollection-theme in Phaedo (73a5, a6, b7, b8). The subjects of Laches, Euthyphro, and Lysis are all introduced informally before the philosophical discussion begins. The author of Hippias Maior imitates this tendency excessively, the use of καλός at 281al, 282bl, d6, e9, 286a5, b4, being too obvious.
10. See Prot. 311a1-2, 314b8-c2, 315d2-4; for Callias’ association with Gorgias see Xen.Symp. 1.5. Axiocnus 366c also shows us that Callias’ house was large enough for a sophist to give an ἐπίσεις there; indeed it is the only text where we are led to suppose that an ἐπίσεις at a private home had been planned, for, though a kind of ἐπίσεις is given in Prot. (328d3), it is not planned; and ‘Callicles’ gives the impression that the same kind of impromptu display can be given at his house (Go. 447b). The normal scene for a planned display is a gymnasion or other public place, see W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy iii (Cambridge, 1969), pp.41-42.
11. Dodds, ad loc.; the imitation of the phrase by ‘Chaerephon’ (481b9) suggests that it would have been noticed by the reader.
ther examination we are disappointed. ‘Prodicus’, in his usual pedantic fashion, describes the exact type of pleasurable reaction appropriate for the audience at such a dispute (Protagoras 337c). There is nothing remotely unusual about ‘Callicles’ reaction, and his ἕδην may be little stronger than the very common ἠδέως ἀκούω, the use of which could not possibly indicate that the speaker was a hedonist. Slightly more interesting is χαριέιον, but only because the ability of rhetoric χαριζεσθαι is about to become the subject of a sharp exchange between ‘Socrates’ and ‘Polus’ (462cd) and the central point in the concept of rhetoric which we are there offered.

If anybody still feels that 458d1-4 already marks ‘Callicles’ as the hedonist of 491-499, let him ask himself what kind of hedonist ‘Callicles’ is. His ideals are not so much ἥδονη as τρυφη, ἀκολαοία, and ἐλευθερία (492c). He is an impatient and ambitious young man who admires deeds rather than words, and who has nothing but contempt for sophistry (520ab). Are we to believe that this impatient young man would have taken such delight in the conversation between ‘Socrates’ and ‘Gorgias’ from 448d-458b that he would be delighted to hear the same kind of thing all day? How is it that these λόγοι are thought to differ from those of sophists? What practical application have they? What attraction for a man who believes that philosophy wrecks those who pursue it after a certain age (484c ff)? The ‘Callicles’ of 485d thinks that mature men who engage in philosophy deserve to be beaten. How is it that the ‘Callicles’ of 458d can take such pleasure in Socratic discussions between mature men? For sure the later ‘Callicles’ is delighted (ἄγαμαι, 485c4) to see youths engaging in philosophy, just as he is pleased (χαίρω, 485b4) to hear boys lisping; but the implication that he takes no such pleasure when mature men do such things is absolutely clear. ‘Callicles’ is often compared with the ‘Thrasymachus’ of Republic i, but we find a striking contrast between the way in which the two characters react to Socratic discussions. ‘Thrasymachus’ reacts with the impatient hostility that we should expect from one of his disposition (336b-d); ‘Callicles’ (at 458d at least) is thoroughly enjoying the discussion, so much so that he would gladly devote the whole day to it (d3-4). Nor can he be excused because of the special nature of the discussion which he has just heard, for it is clear that he has already spent a good deal of time listening to other λόγοι (d1-2) and that he has been pleased too with the rhetorical display given by ‘Gorgias’ before the arrival of ‘Socrates’ (447a5-6). It is difficult to escape the fact that at 458d Plato had had no thoughts of characterizing ‘Callicles’ in the manner, the consistent manner,12 of 481b ad fin.

12. I do not question the fact that ‘Callicles’ might not always be consistent in his views (481de), but he is consistent in his attitudes after 481b, where Plato’s characterization of him is particularly convincing.
Just as the principal theme and the picture of ‘Socrates’ seem to undergo a change at 481b, so we have seen that ‘Callicles’ changes too. In fact the portrait of ‘Callicles’ is less consistent than that of ‘Socrates’. Assuming that this is not entirely due to his alleged tendency to change his mind as soon as his loved ones do (481de), it surely means that either the earlier ‘Callicles’ or the later ‘Callicles’ was not a historical figure: if indeed there was a historical Callicles at all. If there was no historical Callicles then we must certainly demand a reason why Plato adopts the unusual procedure of introducing a fictitious character in a major role in this particular work. And we also have to explain why he gives so many details about this character’s background: a deme, a lover, and three close associates.

Our observations about a change in the dialogue suggests a possible explanation for both these problems. Initially the fifth character had been a real person, Callias the son of Hipponicus, who paid Gorgias a great deal of money for his services (Xenophon Symposium 1.5), and who might have been expected to give him accommodation:- especially when one considers that he converted rooms to accommodate additional men of wisdom (Protagoras 315d). Callias is far more likely to have enjoyed spending unlimited time listening to ‘Gorgias’ and ‘Socrates’ than is the later ‘Callicles’. When, however, Plato decided that his dialogue must be extended and that he required a character to propose quite openly so amoral a theory as that of ‘Callicles’, then he was faced with a choice. Either he had to introduce an entirely new character, or he had to make Polus propose it (thus making Polus look far too competent), or he had to father the doctrines upon the host character who had so far played a colourless role. The last choice was clearly the best from an artistic point of view, but he could hardly go on calling this character ‘Callias’. The name was thus changed in the five places where it occurred in full, and the host then took on a new character. Being unknown to the readers, this character had to be set in an appropriate context. This context, his two loves (481d) and his associates (487c), is designed to explain the origin of his views. A deme is given to him because it is required for a legal formula. There is even a possibility that the dramatic

13. Certainl there are fictitious characters in Sophista and later works, but Plato is not there trying to write Socratic dialogues. Diotima of Mantinea (Symp. 201d ff) may well be fictitious, but is not present at the scene. Antimoerus of Mende (Prot. 315a) may also be, but does not speak. Other characters may be depicted so as to suggest contemporary opponents rather than historical figures; we cannot tell.

14. Lover, associates, and deme. In my view none of these details can be used for or against the historicity of ‘Callicles’, pace Dodds p.12. Plato feels the need to establish a context for him, and thus for the views which he expresses, but there are three explanations which may be used: (a) that he was not well known; (b) that the context can explain the views attributed to him; (c) that he was the paradigmatic product of such a context.

15. See Dodds on 495d3: ‘... a legal deposition (in which the name of the opponent’s deme has to be stated, in order to excuse mistakes of identity).’
date of the dialogue has undergone revision in order to make his context a little more specific, for 481b *ad fin.* would seem to be set in the mid 420's, while 447a-481b is set after 413.\(^\text{16}\)

There is nothing particularly ‘ingenious’ about this theory as might appear at first sight. It is the simplest answer to the problem of ‘Callicles’, and it fits the facts available. It matters little whether Plato recalled the name of some figure to whom he could attribute the necessary doctrine, or whether he had to invent the name. The chief reason for the choice of ‘Callicles’ may have little to do with views held by a historical character; it is dictated by the need for a name which will require the minimum revision of the text which had been written. ‘Callicles’, if he ever existed, is presumed to have been a failure: ‘but as for you they will perhaps lay hands upon you, unless you are careful’ (519a7).\(^\text{17}\) Indeed it would have been against Plato’s interests to have put these crucial views into the mouth of a man who had made a name for himself; it is best if the doctrines of one’s opponents can be seen to fail in practice, as in the case of Archelaus,\(^\text{18}\) and of Pericles, Cimon, Themistocles, and Miltiades (516a-e). It is tempting to suggest that if Callicles had been well known, and known for the views attributed to him, that the dialogue would have come to be named after him; but this would be to build on straws.\(^\text{19}\)

16. It is dangerous to attach importance to anachronisms in Plato, but *Gorgias* errs more than any other dialogue to which the historical setting is important. The date of a play such as Pherocrates’ *Agroi* (Prot. 327b) or Euripides’ *Antiope* (Go. 485e) is not remembered well enough to detract from the context which Plato presents. The indication of date most likely to have been remembered before 481b is at 470d, where Archelaus is supposed to have come to power only recently. The allusion to the trial of the generals after Arginusae at 473e is kept very vague, helping the reader to remember what sort of man Socrates was without compelling him to connect the incident with six years of Socrates’ life. Apart from the use of Euripides’ *Antiope*, all factors after 481b point to a date before 415, when Demus could still be an eligible beloved, Alcibiades had not fallen from grace (519a), and Pericles is only ‘recently’ dead (503c). This would seem to put Andron, son of Androtion, at the right stage of life (see Dodds on 487c3).

17. Dodds (p.13) follows C. Ritter (*Untersuchungen über Platon*, p.136) in seeing a prophecy *post eventum* here. But it is unlikely that Plato’s audience would have been moved by such a device: there had been too many political deaths between 415 and 403.

18. 470d ff: an unfortunate example of the happy man for ‘Polus’ to have chosen, since he soon met his deserts.

19. Dodds speculates about the reason for the present title on p.15. Normally a dialogue, when named after a *person*, would take the name of the chief interlocutor, but there are many exceptions: *Philebus*, *Cratylus*, *Phaedo*, and from the early period *Charmides* which might rather have been *Critias*, just as *Laches* could equally well have been *Nicias*. But the dialogue is in fact named after the speaker who appears to be in the best position to know about the subject, possessing the quality or skill under discussion. Here *Meno*, *Menexenus*, *Crito*, and *Phaedo* may be exceptions, but at least one does not feel that the work should have been named after any other participant.
The test of the present theory is not so much whether Plato would have used a fictitious or insignificant character if circumstances required, but rather whether circumstances had in fact changed so as to require it. What would have caused Plato to alter his plan for the dialogue? What prompts him to add material of a non-Socratic nature, what makes him say so explicitly what he thinks of Athens’ institutions and achievements? Why does Plato choose this occasion to deliver an *apologia pro vita sua*? The usual dating of the work between 393 and 385 means that it was written at a time when Plato’s life was far from settled: this is the period when a new wave of teachers began to stake their claims at Athens, and in the middle of it falls the crucial visit to Italy and Sicily which clearly did much to mould the shape of Plato’s thought over the next decade. We have little reason to doubt that at one stage of this visit Plato was exposed to threats to his life or liberty. At such a time there was probably a number of occasions when a work might have been left unfinished, only to be resumed at a later date when Plato’s fresh experiences had suggested to him fresh ways of concluding the dialogue. But the most important possibility is that the work was left unfinished when he embarked upon his western visit, and was resumed on his return.

If we examine the evidence that is usually produced in order to date the work we shall find useful information by preserving a distinction between the two parts. Dodds first considers the stylometric evidence, which is unlikely to settle the issue (p.18-19). Ritter’s evidence assists our case a little, insofar as his examples of late features of style in the *Gorgias* are, with one unremarkable exception, drawn from after 481b. The adversative *μην* occurs at 493c4 and 526a2 and nowhere else before *Lysis* and *Euthydemus*. Ritter cannot find any parallel to ως αν ούνωμαι βέλτιστος ών (526d7) before 20. See below, pp.16-17.

21. 515b-519b. One had not previously been led to believe that Plato had a low view of his city; ‘Socrates’ is happy with the way that the laws of the Athenians had treated him, and abides by them to the end in *Critio*. His fellow-citizens are proclaimed to be wise in their political behaviour at *Prot.* 319b.

22. This popular idea is discussed by Dodds (p.31) and there is no reason to doubt its value; but why should a work on rhetoric (or even on happiness) be the best place for such an apology?

23. Principally Isocrates and the three groups of Socrates whom he opposes at the opening of the *Helen. Busiris* might suggest that we should include Polycrates too, though this might be moving further away from philosophy proper.

24. To argue this point in detail is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is not highly controversial.

25. Circumstances of Plato’s return from Sicily are nowhere reliably recorded, but the story of D.L. 3.18-20, one version of which came from Favorinus, probably had some unpleasant truth behind it.

Menexenus 248e1. His three cases of χάριν + gen. are all drawn from the later pages (485a4, 502a2, 505c6), and the only earlier use is Protagoras 324b4 which is (a) used for variation and (b) put into the mouth of ‘Protagoras’ during his famous display. The one late feature from the earlier pages of Gorgias that Ritter has contributed to the debate is the και?άπερ at 451c1, which is part of a formulaic expression (see Dodds ad loc.), and is indicated by Plato as such: ώσπερ οί ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συγγραφόμενοι. The evidence is hardly such as to prove that 481b ad fin. is much later than the earlier pages, but it certainly is quite compatible with such a theory.

After considering the relevance to chronology of the bitterness of the work, considered by us above, Dodds asks what may be deduced from the length of the work. Here we shall just observe that the unprecedented length (for an early dialogue) might well have been the result of Plato’s introducing new material. In themselves the earlier pages contain nothing to warn one that such a considerable debate will follow. Next Dodds considers the tone of Socrates, again considered above, and the introduction of speculation concerning an afterlife. Such speculation goes far beyond the essentially agnostic attitude found at the close of the Apology (40c ff); a more confident belief in the afterlife has assisted Plato in abandoning the hedonist’s justification for the good life so as to forfeit the link between ‘good’ and ‘pleasant’. In the arguments with Polus that link, in some significant form, is still present; in the argument with ‘Callicles’ (497e-498c) it is abandoned. Naturally Plato makes it plain that he has Italian and Sicilian views in mind when he introduces the afterlife etc. (493a6), and it is not unnatural to assume that this theme, confined to the later pages, has been inspired by Plato’s western visit. It should be remembered that both times when it is introduced (493e, 523a) it is the cause of mythical material put into the mouth of Socrates. Up to this time Plato had only allowed an interlocutor to relate myths (Protagoras 320c ff); the device does not seem to be Socratic, but Gorgias 493a and 493d5-6, taken together, indicate that it was the standard didactic method of a western Greek ‘school’. Thus these considerations support the theory that the later arguments were only written, indeed only planned, after the western visit.27

After the afterlife Dodds considers Pythagorean influences in general, enabling 507c8-508c3 to be taken into consideration in addition to 492d1-493d4 and 523a1-524a7. This further passage, whose debt to the Pythagoreans was recognized in the ancient world, increases the range of Pythagorean influence to embrace cosmology and politics as well as ethics and eschatology. Once again the material had not previously been put into the mouth of ‘Socrates’. It is with this passage in particular that one

27. I hope to argue elsewhere that 493a ff is Pythagorean in character and deviates sharply from Plato’s previous beliefs.
associates Cicero’s view that Plato blended Pythagorean material into his ‘Socrates’ out of his devotion to him.28

Dodds’ claim that Gorgias contains foreshadowings of important doctrines which are absent from earlier dialogues also needs our attention. The presence of the distinction between knowledge and opinion/belief is not necessarily a sign of its being later than Protagoras, for the distinction seems not to have been unknown to Plato there (358b7, c4), and it had appeared in Isocrates Contra Sophistias 8. There is thus no need that its presence anywhere in the Gorgias should imply a date later than about 392. There are several other minor features of the Meno’s epistemology that seem to be foreshadowed, mostly details linked with the distinction between knowledge and opinion/belief.29 It need not deter us that such details occur early in Gorgias, for the details of such a distinction needed to be worked out as soon as Isocrates began to extol the virtues of opinion (δόξα). More interesting are the notion of ‘binding’ opinions by argument30 and the suggestion that repetition and variation can confirm the hearer’s belief,31 both of which may be foreshadowings of the Meno and occur only in the later pages.32

Besides this material which seems to point forward to the Meno, one has to take note of the appearance of a new picture of the ideal statesman, an ideal with which ‘Socrates’ alone conforms (521d); whether or not we should regard this as the origin of Plato’s ‘philosopher-king’, it must certainly be compared with Euthydemus 292bc,33 and thus provides a link between the later pages and a dialogue now normally thought to belong to the 380’s.34 Dodds’ claim to have found linguistic links with Euthydemus at

28. De Re Pub. 1.16, Fin. 5.87.
29. e.g. that knowledge is acquired by a teaching/learning process and is always true (454d), entails the ability to state the cause and give an account (465a, cf.501a), and has ‘intelligence’ (466e).
31. 513c8-d1, cf. Meno 85c9-d1.
32. I do not rule out the possibility that Meno may precede Go. 481b ff, and can think of no important argument for determining the priority of either. I tend to regard Meno as a resumption of Protagoras’ main themes in much the same way as Go. 481b ff is a resumption of the earlier questions. Once again I see new ideas, triggered off by Pythagorean teachings, as being the cause of the resumption. But Protagoras had previously been finished and published, so that a new work was required, while Go. 447a-481b had yet to be given a satisfactory conclusion.
33. Here it is the royal art which is said to crown all other arts by making men wise and good, in much the same way that ‘Socrates’ alone has the good of his fellow-citizens in mind at Go. 521de, trying actually to make them good (521a).
34. Dodds seemed to favour a date before Gorgias (p.27), but R.K. Sprague’s work on the dialogue (Plato’s Use of Fallacy, London, 1962) has done much to question the immature appearance which some have claimed that it gives. In her introduction (p.vii) to her translation of the dialogue (Bobbs-Merrill, 1965) she discusses the date, placing it shortly after the western visit, that is after 388/7, but before 380, wisely avoiding any attempt at greater precision.
447c3, 454b6, 458a3, and 464d2, all in the earlier pages of *Gorgias*, are not impressive enough to suggest proximity of date.\(^{35}\) Certainly the early pages of *Gorgias* still echo within Plato’s mind, but it would have been more surprising if they had not done so.

The proximity of *Gorgias* to Plato’s first visit to Italy and Sicily is easily inferred from *Epistles* vii 326a, provided that the author was in a position to know the facts.\(^{36}\) Once again it is chiefly the closing pages which enable the connexion to be made.\(^{37}\) When one asks the question of the exact relation of *Gorgias* to the western visit, one finds that only the later pages contain signs of western influence. This influence is not merely confined to traces of Pythagorean teachings (above p.16), but extends to the Sicilian cook-book of Mithaecus (518bc). The quotation from Epicharmus at 505e1 is only a minor point, but it is certainly tempting to suppose that the observations on tyrants at 509c-511a owe their vividness to Plato’s own recent experience of Dionysius I in Syracuse. If there are no certain signs of Sicilian influence in the later pages, one cannot complain that this is a surprise. Socrates had never been near these western communities, and the work was clearly written for an Athenian market. More important is the fact that there are no signs of such influence at all before 481b, unless one is tempted to follow Olympiodorus’ ill-directed conjecture that Gorgias’ highly contrived language at 450b9 is a feature of Sicilian dialect.\(^{38}\)

We have seen that all significant indications of a fairly late date for the *Gorgias* (i.e. a date in the mid 380’s) are to be found in the later pages of the work. It is less easy to argue for an earlier date (e.g. about 390) for the earlier pages, except by default of indications of lateness. Moreover considerable caution is required when assessing the value of individual indications of lateness; many are naturally found late in the work because that is where Plato tackles Athenian politics and compares the ‘happiness’ of various life-styles. Thus we do not expect to find very much contact with *Menexenus* in the earlier pages, nor do we expect to encounter the germ of Plato’s ‘philosopher-king’ concept. Again we do not expect to find any signs there that Plato intends, either directly or obliquely, to reply to

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35. Dodds, p.22 n3. As with *Meno*, I do not wish to rule out the possibility that *Euthydemus* precedes *Go*. 481b ff, nor can I firmly establish that a date after the western visit is necessary. 36. It seems likely that the author of the bulk of the work is close to Plato, for otherwise it is difficult to find a motive for so long a literary exercise, cf. L. Edelstein, *Plato’s Seventh Letter* (Leiden, 1966), 56ff. 37. I cite no particular passage, but current political attitudes are revealed chiefly in the latter part of the work. 38. Clearly the terms χειρουργημα and κύρωνις are not from popular speech, but are rhetorical contrivances designed to imitate Gorgias’ style; cf. Dodds, *ad loc.*
Polycrates’ notorious Accusation of Socrates.  

There is no proof that the later pages of the Gorgias have been written after the Accusation of Socrates by Polycrates. But it remains a credible theory (a) that they were, and (b) that the defence of Socrates’ role in the Athenian community which these pages offer is in part a response to this work. The charge of Polycrates which most worried Xenophon (Memorabilia 1.2.12-48) was that Socrates associated with Critias and Alcibiades, of whom the former had been most renowned for his greed and violence (1.2.12: πλεονεκτίστατος καὶ βιαιότατος) and the latter for his profligate and hybristic life. The implication was clearly that Socrates had encouraged such trends in them (Memorabilia 1.2.9, 1.2.49, cf. 1.2.2.). What better defence of Socrates could be presented than showing how he publicly argued against greed, violence, and profligacy? The life which ‘Callicles’ had advocated was one of greed (πλεονεξία, 483c etc.), contempt for the traditional laws (483b etc., cf. Memorabilia 1.2.9), violence (488b), and profligacy (491e ff). ‘Socrates’ argues convincingly against such a life. But in spite of the adequacy of his education and his goodwill towards ‘Socrates’ (487b6-7) ‘Callicles’ remains unconvinced (513c): unconvinced because his political allegiance (or rather his political ambitions) will not allow him to be. The best of intentions on Socrates’ part will not save him unless he is more careful (519ab). ‘Socrates’ may warn him, but nothing can teach him ἀρετή unless it be a better statement of the same case frequently repeated (513c). Since ‘Socrates’ cannot convince ‘Callicles’, and since he neither claims to be a teacher of virtue nor takes a fee for it (519c-e, cf. Memorabilia 1.2.6-8), he is absolved from the responsibility which Polycrates evidently thought he should accept for his pupils.  

It is also interesting that Plato chooses his ‘Callicles’ as a mouth-piece for another charge against Socratic philosophy that was made by Polycrates: the charge that it enfeebles its adherents and makes them unable to lead a politically active life. There is a certain irony here, for Plato appears to be

39. The chief sources for our ‘knowledge’ of this work are Isocrates Busiris, Xen.Mem. 1.2, and Libanius’ Apology of Socrates. All three are hostile towards it. A.H. Chroust (Socrates: Man and Myth (London, 1959) ch.iv) has attempted a reconstruction, but it is better to rely on the original sources. The absence of apologetic material in the early part of Gorgias suggests that the Accusation was not then in the forefront of Plato’s mind.  
40. Particularly Xen.Mem. 1.2.12ff, but also Lib. op. cit., 136.  
41. This appears to be a charge to which Xenophon replies at Mem. 1.2.2 and 1.2.4, where the accusation was that ‘care for the soul’ led to bodily neglect, cf. Lib. op. cit., 132. Note that the charge must be directed against Socratic theory and not against the actual conduct of either Socrates or Antisthenes.  
42. Another part of the charge of making men ‘idle’ (Lib. op. cit., 127ff), the criticism of Socrates’ political inactivity, appears at Lib. 133. Xenophon had already shown Socrates to have been active in public at Mem. 1.1.2 and 1.1.10.
taking what Polycrates sees as democratic ideals and having them espoused by the type of character which Polycrates sees as the principal threat to democracy and potentially tyrannical. What other line of defence is there? Plato cannot claim that Socrates was politically active or of the ‘hard-headed’ mould which Polycrates would respect; but he can claim that such values are most clearly to be found among the type of young men which Socrates was accused of producing, men upon whom the democrats will frown. If these pages of Gorgias are in any way a reply to Polycrates then they are a subtle and perceptive reply. Is Socrates a tyrant-teacher? No, he despises the tyrannical ideal (510a-511a). Does he rob Athenians of their free-speech? No, he encourages it (487ab). Does he ill-treat fine poetry? It is ‘Callicles’ who carves up poetry like a bad butcher, misunderstands it, and fails to remember it.

What we see is that after 481b the argument of Gorgias immediately becomes relevant to the questions which Polycrates either had just made or was about to make. There appears to be enough to show that either Plato was reacting to Polycrates or Polycrates was reacting to Plato. The latter possibility is distinctly unlikely, particularly since it has struck scholars that Polycrates is accusing the ‘Socrates’ of Antisthenes. He would have had great difficulty in building up his picture of Socrates from the works of Plato. Dodds speaks of the possibility that the political material of Gorgias 515-519 may have ‘roused’ or ‘provoked’ certain responses from Polycrates (p.29), but this assumes that Polycrates felt strongly about supporting democratic values and about the threat to them which Socrates posed. In reality the Accusation of Socrates was probably the same kind of shallow show-piece as the Defence of Busiris, showing total disregard for the truth of what was said, inventing a wealth of ingenious arguments, and attempting to run down the principal Socratic teacher at Athens, i.e. Antisthenes. Isocrates implies that his motive in writing was purely financial. Why then should the Gorgias have so offended him? Was it the concept of oratory that did so? But there are no signs that his attack on Socrates constituted a defence of rhetoric. One strongly suspects that Polycrates lacked

44. Lib. op.cit., 148 only.
46. For his ability to recast poetry in prose see 485e-486c; for his misunderstanding of Pindar see 484bc with Dodds’ note; he confesses that he does not remember all the poem at b10, and we must guess as to whether he misquotes it at b7. It would be consistent for him to have done so.
47. I suspect that in Protagoras (notably 338e ff) Plato attacks some of the same features of the Antisthenean ‘Socrates’ that Polycrates objects to, but cannot expand on this here.
48. In view of the contempt which Isocrates shows for Polycrates early in his Busiris, it is tempting to relate him to the truth-indifferent speech-mongers of c.Soph. 9-10.
both the ability and the inclination to contend with so weighty a work as the Gorgias; the paradoxical and extreme views of Antisthenes, whose essence was far more provocative and far more objectionable in Athenian eyes, provided an easier and more prominent target and a better opportunity to impress. If we place the Accusation after Gorgias we must allow that any reference or reply to the material of Gorgias is merely incidental; that Polycrates was content to use against Plato much the same material as Plato had already put into the mouth of ‘Callicles’; that he thought popular Athenian statesmen could still be used as examples of the benefit of a non-philosophical education, and that the long walls could still serve as a fine example of achievement; finally that the unremarkable accusation that philosophy made men idle was considered an adequate response to the notion that the great politicians made men idle.

Thus it seems far more reasonable to recognize the priority of the Accusation; to realize that almost the entire work can be regarded as a response to a handful of Antisthenean doctrines found at Diogenes Laertius VI, 12-13 and collected at an earlier date by one Diocles, most probably from a single work; and that the political consequences of Socratic teaching are more logically introduced into the debate by the accusers than by the defenders. This would then lead one to the conclusion that Plato aims to defend the political consequences of Socratic teaching in the later pages of Gorgias at the same time as showing how such teaching was able to restrain, though not stop, men like ‘Callicles’. The apologetic element of these pages is explained, as is the fact that they constitute an apology for Plato’s own

49. Antisthenes’ sentiments were both anti-democratic and anti-Athenian (frs. 100, 102-4, 123, 169, 195 Caizzi).
50. i.e. the charge that Socrates made young men incapable of higher things through too much philosophy, Lib. op. cit., 127ff.
51. Polycrates had spoken with approval of Miltiades and Themistocles (Lib. op. cit., 155), whom Plato attacks (516de); but we do not know that Polycrates also defended Pericles and Cimon, whom Plato includes in his denunciation (515d-516d); Polycrates seems to have approved of Aristides, but here Plato agrees (Lib. op. cit., 155, Go. 526b). Themistocles and Pericles had been mentioned by ‘Gorgias’ at 455e as being orators who have done great service to Athens, so that 515-6 is quite explicable without Polycrates.
52. Polycrates had referred to the rebuilding of the Long Walls in 394 B.C. (Favorinus in D.L. 2.39, Lib. 104); and Plato takes the opportunity to question their value (517c, 519a). ‘Gorgias’ had mentioned the walls of Athens at 455e as an illustration of the power of rhetoric, so that their appearance later need not be explained with reference to Polycrates.
53. Polycrates charged Socrates with making people idle (Lib. op. cit., 127), while Plato makes the same charge against Pericles (515e).
54. I believe that this is the Heracles Maior (or whatever work is referred to simply as Heracles at D.L. 6.104 and 105).
activities as well as those of Socrates. The ‘bitterness’ is explained as the legitimate reaction to a work which needlessly made false accusations against Socrates. The condemnation of popular statesmen is explained by the need to question the entire system of values which Polycrates’ work had supported and exploited.

After due consideration of the evidence concerning the date of the *Gorgias* it seems to me most reasonable to explain the apparent shift of subject at 481b and the accompanying change of tone on the basis that 447a-481b had been planned in full and (for the most part) written before Plato embarked upon his western visit. When he returned to finish the work his mind had been indelibly impressed by his own experience of a tyrant’s nature and by his philosophical exchanges with learned men of Italy and Sicily. Circumstances at home had also changed when he returned, and in addition to the threat that Isocrates would soon overshadow them the Socratics had now to meet the unsubtle but damaging charges of Polycrates. Nothing less than a thorough attempt to undermine the values upon which political life in Greece was founded, and to justify the values in accordance with which Socrates had lived, would now suffice. Fortunately Plato had already formed the opinion that political life was in an almost incurable state (*Epistles* vii 326a), and this task came naturally to him. The arguments with ‘Polus’ already showed what Plato thought of Greek political life and of the law-courts; the work could easily be extended so as to show the benefits of the Socratic approach to public life and to pay particular attention to the failure of the political machine in Athens.

55. For if Polycrates’ attack is aimed at Socratic philosophy in general rather than at the historical Socrates (and rather than at Antisthenes, however much the picture of Socratic philosophy he attacks is taken from Antisthenes), then Plato’s reply will be a defence of Socratic philosophy in general: but as he himself sees it and practises it.