What Was Chabrias Doing at Eleutherae?

In the winter of the year 379/8 (probably in late December 379 or in January 378 BC)\textsuperscript{1} some Theban exiles living in Athens crossed the border from Attica into Boeotia, and succeeded in overthrowing the pro-Spartan government at Thebes. With the help of supporters, they then managed to obtain the surrender of the Spartan (and allied) garrison in the citadel of Thebes, the Cadmea (Xenophon \textit{Hellenica} 5.4.2-11; Diodorus Siculus 15.25.1-27.2; Plutarch \textit{Pelopidas} 7-13; Dinarchus I [\textit{Against Demosthenes}]38-39). The garrison had been there since a takeover by the Spartan Phoebidas (acting in collusion with a pro-Spartan Theban called Leontiades), on his way to the Chalcidice in 382 BC (Xenophon \textit{Hellenica} 5.2.25-31; Diodorus Siculus 15.20.1-3; Plutarch \textit{Pelopidas} 5-6). The successful coup staged by the exiles was followed by a Spartan expedition to Boeotia led by King Cleombrotus, on his first campaign. Whether because the garrison in the Cadmea surrendered before his arrival, or for some other reason, Cleombrotus did not attack the Thebans,\textsuperscript{2} but

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\textsuperscript{1} R.M. Kallet-Marx, 'Athens, Thebes and the Foundation of the Second Athenian League' \textit{ClAnt} 4 (1985), 127-51 at pp.135-6, explains the reasoning behind the time of year. Victor Parker, 'Sphodrias' Raid and the Liberation of Thebes: a Study of Ephoros and Xenophon' \textit{Hermes} 135.1 (2007), 13-33 at 15 n.8 describes this as speculation, and it is true that there are certain assumptions involved in the discussion, but Kallet-Marx has made good use of available calendrical information. His calculations, while approximate, are not likely to be seriously wrong. P.J. Stylianou, \textit{A Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus Book 15} (Oxford, 1998), 230, explains how the year has been obtained.

\textsuperscript{2} That he was aiming to arrive in time to help the garrison in the Cadmea is in accordance with the account of Diodorus Siculus (15.27.2-3), provided the Lacedaemonian force mentioned there was that commanded by Cleombrotus. Similarly, Plutarch \textit{Pelopidas} 13.2 has the retreating garrison meeting Cleombrotus at Megara. Modern suggestions as to the reason for the lack of action when he
he did install a Spartan called Sphodrias (Sphodriades in Diodorus Siculus 15.29.5) as governor of Thespiae before his return to Sparta (Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.13-15; Plutarch Pelopidas 13-14). At some stage, probably between mid-February and mid-April 378 BC, Sphodrias invaded Attica, ostensibly with the object of seizing the Piraeus, but he resorted to raiding when overtaken by daylight a long way from the Piraeus (Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.15, 15; Plutarch Pelopidas 14; Diodorus Siculus 15.29.5-6).

Ancient authors attest some kind of Athenian involvement on the side of the Theban revolutionaries just after the original coup and before the fall of the Cadmea, but it is unclear whether the aid given was official or not (Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.9-12, 19; Diodorus Siculus 15.25.4-26.1; Dinarchus I [Against Demosthenes]39; Plutarch Pelopidas 14). Some think, with Diodorus Siculus, that Athens was committed to Thebes from the outset (Diodorus Siculus 15.25.4-26.1); others, drawing on Xenophon’s statements about two Athenian generals who helped the Thebans after the coup, but were later condemned to death at Athens (Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.9-12, 19), that official support came later, after the arrived range from difficult winter conditions to the pursuance of a less aggressive policy than that of the other king, Agesilaus. The idea that the prior surrender of the garrison left him without an aim depends on the assumption that his task was to relieve the Cadmea before it fell. This is controversial. The expedition has been seen by some as punitive. For example, Kallet-Marx (as in n.1), 134 n.34, considers that Cleombrotus could not have set out until at least a week after the fall of the Cadmea. On the other hand, Stylianou (as in n.1), 233, regards the army as a relief force that arrived too late, as does Parker (as in n.1), 18-9. As Parker later observes: ‘If the garrison was still holding out when Cleombrotus left Sparta, then Cleombrotus had a clear objective.’ (Parker [as in n.1], 31). Earlier in his article he remarked concerning Xenophon, usually regarded as conflicting with the others on this: ‘Xenophon simply does not say how quickly the garrison surrendered.’ (Parker [as in n.1], 18. Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.10-12 tells of the fall of the Cadmea, and in 13 he relates the execution of the harmost who had not waited for τὴν βοήθειαν (‘the help’). The help mentioned here could have been the force under Cleombrotus, although Xenophon then goes on to say that the Spartans called up a force to go against the Thebans, seemingly after the fall of the Cadmea, so the matter is not clear.

3 See Kallet-Marx, ‘Athens, Thebes and the Foundation’ (as in n.1), 135-7, for discussion of the factors that determine the approximate date.

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raid of Sphodrias. The timing of official Athenian help affects the way in which the actions of the Athenians and Spartans towards each other are viewed. If Athens supported Thebes officially before the raid, Sphodrias' invasion of Attica can be seen as a reaction to provocation, and as an attempt to discourage further Athenian cooperation with Thebes. In addition, if part of the Athenian effort on behalf of Thebes was to set in motion the process that led to the formation of a new league, known to us as either the Second Athenian Sea League or the Second Athenian Confederacy, at some stage prior to the raid, the Spartans can be seen as concerned about Athenian ambition. If neither of these conditions was fulfilled, it must be assumed that Sphodrias was simply seizing an opportunity, without real justification, with or without Spartan government encouragement, and that the Athenians reacted to provocation from him, as indicated by Xenophon (Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.34).

Over the years there has been much debate about these issues. Often it has amounted to a question of whose account should be trusted, or which elements of the various accounts should be incorporated into a composite picture. In an article published in

4 This League is known from Diodorus Siculus 15.28.2-4, 29.8 and from inscriptions, especially IG 2¹ 43. It is possibly referred to obliquely by Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.34 and Plutarch Pelopidas 15.1. The timing of its foundation is disputed. Diodorus Siculus relates it between the Spartan invasion and the raid of Sphodrias. If Xenophon and Plutarch do refer to it, they place it after the raid. The 'Charter' inscription (IG 2¹ 43) is later than either, but the inscription shows that the League was already in existence and had a few members by that time.

5 There are ancient claims that Cleombrotus was bribed—by the Thebans, according to Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.20; by the Spartans, according to Diodorus Siculus 15.29.5, who has 'Sphodrias' persuaded by Cleombrotus. Some have suggested a personal desire for glory, but Buckler has advanced reasons for thinking that Sphodrias would have realised that he could not reach the Piraeus in an overnight march from Thespiae: John Buckler, Aegean Greece in the Fourth Century BC (Leiden and Boston, 2003), 221; also John Buckler and Hans Beck, Central Greece and the Politics of Power in the Fourth Century BC (Cambridge, 2008), 80-1.

1973 G.L. Cawkwell challenged the then accepted view that the Athenian League was formed after the raid of Sphodrias and as a reaction to it. He also challenged the associated view that any aid offered to the Thebans by Athenians before the raid had been strictly unofficial. The Athenian commander Chabrias was seen by him as a key to removing the stalemate between those who preferred Xenophon with his apparently unofficial help, and those who preferred Diodorus, backed up by the orator Dinarchus (Against Demosthenes) with his Athenian decree authorising a military expedition to go to Thebes. 8

Cawkwell pointed to a statement in Xenophon’s account to the effect that Chabrias was guarding the road through Eleutherae with some Athenian peltasts at the time of Cleombrotus’ invasion of Boeotia (Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.14).9 Xenophon adds that Cleombrotus ‘went up’ (άνεβανε) by the road that led to Plataea, so avoiding the road on which Chabrias was stationed (Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.14).10 The fact that Cleombrotus went by another

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He supplements the account in the Pelopidas with contributions from Xenophon’s Hellenica, which, however, he sometimes rejects in favour of Plutarch’s account. For DeVoto Diodorus Siculus is a minor source and unreliable, as are Nepos and Polyaeus. On the other hand, Kallet-Marx, ‘Athens, Thebes and the Foundation’ (as in n.1) and Stylianou, Historical Commentary (as in n.1) treat the account of Diodorus Siculus as an important source and as generally reliable, while R.J. Buck, ‘The Athenians at Thebes in 379/8 BC’ AHB 6.3 (1992), 103-109 favours Xenophon and sees support for him in the orators Isocrates and Dinarchus, but distrusts the account of Diodorus Siculus.


8 Cawkwell, ‘Foundation’ (as in n.7), 57-8. As indicated above, one interpretation of Dinarchus has him supporting Xenophon rather than Diodorus Siculus. Buck, ‘Athenians at Thebes’ (as in n.6), 107, suggests that there was a decree moved by Cephalus, but that it did not authorise entry into Boeotia, but merely a force to guard the border.

9 Cawkwell, ‘Foundation’ (as in n.7) 57-8. Eleutherae was a border place, at one time disputed between Boeotia and Attica, but in the fourth century BC treated as Athenian. It was in the north-west of Attica.

10 Whether Cleombrotus changed his mind about his route or not is another matter.
route, allegedly forced to do so by Chabrias, is taken by Cawkwell as evidence that the Athenian state was committed to helping Thebes before the raid of Sphodrias, confirming the account of Diodorus Siculus, who says that aid to Thebes was voted on in the Athenian assembly after the initial coup at Thebes and before the Spartan invasion (Diodorus Siculus 15.25.4-26.1). Since Cawkwell’s article appeared, others have incorporated Chabrias into their discussions, although not all draw the same conclusion. John Buckler, for instance, is broadly in agreement with Cawkwell: ‘The Athenians obviously had every right to protect passage through their own territory, but at the same time Chabrias’ assignment indicated Athenian support of the Theban uprising.’ Josiah Ober, on the other hand, comments: ‘Chabrias obviously did exactly what the Athenian government intended him to do: protected Athenian territory without committing Athenian troops or provoking another incident with the Spartans.’

Cawkwell’s comments appear in a context in which he is arguing that Xenophon’s omissions do not mean that the events omitted did not take place. He asks: ‘Is this evidence of an official and large expedition to be rejected because Xenophon omits any mention of it?’ In Cawkwell’s eyes, Xenophon has betrayed his realisation of how things really were in his remark about Chabrias. If Cawkwell was right in taking Chabrias’ position on the road to Eleutherae

11 Cawkwell, ‘Foundation’ (as in n.7), 57-8.


13 Josiah Ober, Fortress Attica: Defense of the Athenian Land Frontier, 404-322 BC (Leiden, 1985; = Mnemosyne Supplement 84), 211.

14 Cawkwell, ‘Foundation’ (as in n.7), 57.
as proof that the Athenians were supporting Thebes officially at the time of Cleombrotus’ invasion, the timing of official support would be settled in favour of Diodorus Siculus, as Cleombrotus’ invasion preceded the raid. That Chabrias was serving in an official capacity can be accepted. Whether the peltasts under his command were Athenian citizens or not,15 they would have needed payment, which presumably Chabrias did not make out of his own pocket for the sake of Thebes.16 On the other hand, it is not so obvious that the purpose of Chabrias’ force was to prevent Cleombrotus from reaching Thebes. It can be argued that Chabrias’ force was purely defensive and was not intended to benefit anyone but the Athenians.

Cawkwell’s opinion that Xenophon’s statement reveals more about Athenian actions than appears on the surface is examined in this paper. My contention is that Chabrias’ presence on the road through Eleutheræae does not imply official Athenian action on behalf of Thebes at that stage, as Cawkwell maintains, which means that it cannot be used to support the accounts of such authors as Diodorus Siculus and Dinarchus, with their official expedition voted by the assembly. Xenophon’s mention of two Athenian generals on the border, who crossed into Boeotia after the coup and were later condemned to death at Athens (Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.9-12, 19), has often been seen as indicating that any support given was unofficial. While there have been attempts at interpreting Xenophon differently, the circumstances make it likely that the force

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15 Xenophon has Αθηναίων πελταστάς (‘peltasts of the Athenians’), which can be interpreted either way. H.W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers from the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus (Oxford, 1933), 76, regards them as poorer Athenians serving for pay.

16 For the need to pay both foreign mercenaries and poor citizens, see Matthew Trundle, ‘Coinage and the Transformation of Greek Warfare’ in Garrett G. Fagan and Matthew Trundle (eds.), New Perspectives on Ancient Warfare (Leiden and Boston, 2010), 230. It is true that in the fourth century there were times when the Athenians proved unable to supply adequate funds for campaigns and the generals had to resort to other means of securing pay for their forces, but there is a difference between being put into the position of having to do this and putting oneself in such a position.
commanded by the two generals was, at most, only semi-official, or that it was not meant to cross into Boeotia. This is consistent with the view, held by some scholars, that official Athenian aid to Thebes came after the raid on Athenian territory by Sphodrias. It is also consistent with the view that the Athenians did not start forming their new league until after Sphodrias’ raid, as Xenophon and Plutarch seem to indicate (Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.4.34; Plutarch *Pelopidas* 15.1). If the presence of Chabrias at Eleutherai carries no necessary implication concerning Athenian commitments at the time, it therefore provides no support for Cawkwell’s views on dating the formation of the Second Athenian Sea League. The chief argument in favour of imperialistic intentions then becomes the date at which the Athenians started to form the League, as distinct from entering into alliances with individual cities. Here it is argued that the formal League postdated the raid of Sphodrias and was part of the Athenian reaction to that raid. Another aspect of the reaction was the decision to go to war against Sparta, in alliance with Thebes, which became a member of the League (Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.4.34).

For the events in question the main narrative sources are Xenophon’s *Hellenica*, Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch’s *Pelopidas*. Other sources also make mostly brief contributions, particularly Dinarchus I (*Against Demosthenes*) and Isocrates *Plataecus*. Plutarch also wrote a philosophical work, *On the Sign of Socrates*, set in the context of the Theban coup, which does not agree in all respects with the *Pelopidas*. In his *Pelopidas* Plutarch relates the episode known as the ‘liberation of Thebes’ from a Theban perspective, as is to be expected in a biography of a leading Theban politician. Athenian aid to Thebes in the immediate aftermath of

17 This is noted, too, by Kallet-Marx, ‘Athens, Thebes and the Foundation’ (as in n.1), 132. Buck, ‘Athenians at Thebes’ (as in n.6), 105-6, sees Plutarch as concerned with symmetry here: ‘Thrasyboulos used a force of Athenian exiles, but no Boiotians; consequently Pelopidas must have used a force of Boiotian exiles, but no Athenians.’ Claude Mossé has argued that Plutarch regards the important players of the first half of the fourth century BC as the Spartans and the Thebans, not the Athenians, a situation reflected in the four men chosen to represent the period: the Spartans Lysander and Agesilaus, and the Thebans Pelopidas and Epaminondas.
the coup is not mentioned, although the Athenians are said to have turned their backs on an alliance with Thebes when Cleombrotus invaded (Plutarch *Pelopidas* 14), a claim that perhaps hints at initial Athenian aid, although Plutarch was probably wrong to claim that there was an alliance between Athens and Thebes.\footnote{Some scholars, such as Kallet-Marx (as in 1), 144, have treated this seriously, but it is problematic. If the Athenians were not prepared for the possibility of a confrontation with Sparta, why did they bother making an alliance in the first place?} It is doubtful that an alliance is compatible with the claim of Diodorus Siculus that the King’s Peace had not been broken before the raid of Sphodrias (Diodorus Siculus 15.29.5). There is also in the *Pelopidas* a description of Athenian activities that has often been taken as a reference to the formation of the League (Plutarch *Pelopidas* 15.1).\footnote{Here Plutarch refers to Athenian attempts to encourage rebellion against the Spartans, and alliance with themselves.} Plutarch places it after Sphodrias’ raid on Attica (Plutarch *Pelopidas* 15.1). Both Xenophon and Diodorus Siculus refer to Athenian

This is illustrated with the context of Plutarch’s mentions of the Athenian hero Thrasybulus, in the *Pelopidas*, where Pelopidas emerges in a more positive light than Thrasybulus, according to Mossé: ‘C’ est qu’en effet l’exploit de Thrasybule a bien retabli la liberté d’Athènes mais n’a pas mis fin à l’hégémonie spartiate, alors que celui de Pelopidas, chassant de Thèbes les hommes du parti prolaconien et la garnison spartiate a été le point de départ d’une série d’événements entraînant la fin de cette hégémonie.’ (Claude Mossé, ‘Plutarque, historien du IVe siècle’ in Pierre Carlier (ed.), *Le IVe siècle av. J.-C.: Approches historiographiques* [Nancy, 1996], 57-62 at 58.) If Mossé is right, Plutarch would not be inclined to emphasise the Athenian effort in the events of the coup, in any case. Parker, ‘Sphodrias’ Raid’ (as in n.1), 13-33, sees a similar tendency in Xenophon to play down the part played by the Athenians, but for a different reason. In this context Xenophon is emphasising the ousting of the Spartans at the hands of the Thebans as divine punishment for the seizing of the Cadmea by the Spartans: ‘To paraphrase: while one may recount many stories to prove that the gods punish wrong-doing, Xenophon will confine himself to the one at hand, in which the Lacedaemonians were brought down solely by the very men whom they had wronged...The “prologue” effectively contains the moral of the story. Here we also see something of Xenophon’s dramatic focus: the actors are the Thebans and the Lacedaemonians, the sinned against and the sinning.’ (Parker, ‘Sphodrias’ Raid’ [as in n.1], 14.) ‘Xenophon, however, rigorously excludes that the Athenians did anything to help expel the Lacedaemonians: for, according to his own programmatic statement, these were expelled solely by the Thebans.’ (Parker, ‘Sphodrias’ Raid’ [as in n.1], 16.)
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aid, but in different ways, as has been mentioned, and it is usually concluded that their accounts are to some extent incompatible with each other. Xenophon does not explicitly mention the foundation of the League, although he does at one point make a statement that could be taken to refer to it (Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.4.34), but Diodorus Siculus deals with it directly, placing the first stage of it after the invasion of Cleombrotus and before the raid of Sphodrias (Diodorus Siculus 15.28.1-5). The timing indicated by Diodorus Siculus is often thought unlikely because of the short amount of time available and the winter conditions that would have prevailed for part of that time. If Plutarch's and Xenophon's statements are regarded as referring to the foundation of the League, they agree with each other against Diodorus Siculus.

There are, in fact, difficulties facing anyone who tries to reconcile Xenophon and Diodorus. Diodorus Siculus claims that after the overthrow of the pro-Spartan government at Thebes, but before the capitulation of the Spartans in the Cadmea, the Thebans sent ambassadors to Athens, in anticipation of a Spartan invasion, to ask for help (Diodorus Siculus 15.25.4). He then reports an Athenian vote to send a force, which left at dawn the following day with the general Demophon as leader, while preparations were made for an expedition in full force, in case it was needed (Diodorus Siculus 15.26.1-2). This picture agrees with that of Dinarchus, an Athenian orator of the later fourth century BC. Dinarchus speaks of what appears to be unofficial aid, followed by official aid, voted

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20 Xenophon describes the Athenian reaction to the acquittal of Sphodrias at Sparta. The Athenians put gates on the Piraeus, outfit ships and help the Boeotians eagerly.

21 What is usually taken as a second phase appears in 15.29.5.

22 The arguments assigned to the ambassadors are a little thin. An appeal to return the favour bestowed on the Athenians at the time of the Thirty (when Athens was under oligarchic rule, and some Athenians went into exile in Thebes) is inappropriate, as the Thebans did not take part in the uprising against the Thirty. They had sheltered exiled Athenians, just as the Athenians had recently sheltered exiled Thebans, so no debt remained. Moreover, the Athenians could argue that the debt had been repaid at the beginning of the Corinthian War (395 BC), when Athens had consented to an alliance with the Thebans.
by a decree of Cephalus and clearly preceding the surrender of the Cadmea (Dinarchus I [Against Demosthenes]38-39).

Problems arise, however, when a comparison is made with Xenophon's *Hellenica*. Xenophon, too, speaks of an Athenian force, although it is led by two generals, unnamed. The Athenians, who have been waiting on the border, are in Thebes in time for the surrender of the Cadmea, and rescue some members of the garrison who would otherwise have been killed by the Thebans, in spite of the agreement to the contrary sworn to by them (Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.4.12). A little later in the account, Chabrias is found on the road to Eleutherae (Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.4.14). At first glance, Xenophon's account could be taken as complementary to that of Diodorus: the Athenian army present at the taking of the Cadmea could be that voted by the Assembly and the two generals could be Demophon and Chabrias. As Cawkwell observes in his notes on the Penguin translation of Xenophon's *Hellenica*, that will not work. He does not explain in detail the reasoning behind this, although he does observe that Chabrias held another command later in 378, but the case is strong. Diodorus' account makes it clear that Demophon set off from Athens the day after the decree was passed: he was not waiting at the border as were Xenophon's generals (Diodorus Siculus 15.26.2). Moreover, the two Athenian generals in Xenophon were condemned to death, although one already escaped before the verdict was given (Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.4.19). We do not know what happened to Demophon, but Chabrias was certainly not condemned to death. Whether or not he was an elected general for 379/8, Diodorus records him as one for the following year, 378/7 (Diodorus Siculus 15.29.7), the generalship referred to by Cawkwell. He must have been elected in the months

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23 Those rescued are sometimes assumed to be Spartans, but Parker, 'Sphodrias' Raid' (as in n.1), 16 n.14, regards them as Theban collaborators, and points to the mention of the slaying of their children as evidence. Similarly, Buck, 'Athenians at Thebes' (as in n.6), 109, describes those rescued as 'pro-Spartan Thebans'.


25 The date is an adjusted one, as Diodorus' dating indications produce a later year
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immediately following the invasion, so there was little time for a change of heart by the Athenian public. This leaves us with only one general, Demophon, who was in the wrong place at the wrong time for the idea to work. For the accounts to be reconciled, it must be assumed that the official expedition was separate from unofficial help given initially.

This is, in fact, what Cawkwell argues. Cawkwell tries to amalgamate the two accounts, with the help of Xenophon's reputation for leaving things out. He first argues that there was an official expedition, adducing the evidence previously mentioned. He then refers to the help offered by the two generals of Xenophon as unofficial. His argument appears to be that the action of the two generals preceded the vote of assistance by the Assembly and was, therefore, not sanctioned by the people. He states: 'It is therefore assumed in this article that Athens did follow up the unofficial help rendered by the two pro-Theban generals with a formal decree of help and the dispatch of an expedition.'

If this is so, the official expedition must have been voted hard on the heels of the departure of the unofficial one, for Diodorus places the appeal to Athens before the surrender of the Cadmea and notes a quick Athenian response, aimed at having a force on the spot before Cleombrotus could arrive. Demophon was, according to Diodorus, successful in this, arriving in plenty of time to take part in the siege (Diodorus Siculus 15.26.2-4). This means that there would have been two Athenian armies present at the surrender of the Cadmea: an unofficial one and an official one. According to Xenophon, the Athenian force waiting with the two generals moved in to help after the initial coup, but before the fall of the Cadmea (Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.9-12). According to Diodorus, Demophon led his army from Athens before the Cadmea was recovered by the Thebans (Diodorus Siculus 15.26-27.1-2). Neither author mentions a second army. Cawkwell complains about Xenophon's silences.

than is possible, as for all events of the early 370s.

26 Cawkwell, 'Foundation' (as in n.7), 58.
27 Cawkwell, 'Foundation' (as in n.7), 57.
but what about those of Diodorus? Is it, in any case, likely that two Athenian armies were present at the siege of the Cadmea at the same time? When the Athenians wanted to respond to the Theban request, why did they not simply give the go-ahead to the force already poised at the border, especially if it was really semi-official, as some think? There was a need for haste, so that the Cadmea could be taken before a relief force could arrive, according to the account presented by Diodorus Siculus (15.26.2).

If there were two Athenian armies present, it is hard to explain the treatment of the two generals of Xenophon, who were condemned to death, although one had already fled before the verdict was pronounced (Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.19). Xenophon claims that the Athenians took action against the generals through fear (Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.19); however, the Spartans are hardly likely to have been impressed by an argument that admitted state complicity in the taking of the Cadmea, but pointed to the condemnation of two men who had happened to act slightly ahead of the demos as a whole. Either Xenophon has the motive wrong, or there were not two Athenian armies involved. Perhaps there could have been an issue with disobedience, but given state participation at the same time as the allegedly unofficial participation, it seems unlikely. This brings us back to the ignoring of the existing force on the border in favour of a new one from Athens, in spite of the urgency of the situation. It is best to conclude that there was just one Athenian army present at the siege of the Cadmea. In view of the unlikelihood that an official or semi-official army already stationed at the border would be ignored in favour of a new force, it is reasonable to say that Xenophon's account is more likely to be correct than that of Diodorus Siculus.

In addition, the condemnation of the two generals has often been seen as casting doubt on Diodorus' account. While there have been attempts to make their condemnation compatible with Diodorus' claim that the Athenians sent out an official army (Diodorus Siculus 15.26.1), there are difficulties with this position. Some find the

28 For example, Kallet-Marx (as in n.1), 141-2.

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condemnation an insurmountable obstacle to accepting that the help was official. Burnett says of those who accept the contradictory behaviour of the Athenians as factual:29

They do not explain how, after two generals had been sentenced for following the people's will, others could be found to serve as strategoi, nor how two prominent Athenians could have been destroyed by the pro-Spartan party without causing a whisper of invective in the political speeches of the fourth century. Dinarchus treats this very episode, and he would have written a different sort of eulogy if some of the men he praised had so unjustly been made martyrs to the Spartan truce.

Not all are convinced by this argument, however. Apart from those that say either that the Athenians panicked and acted hastily, or that the generals had overstepped their orders by going to Thebes, or that they had acted incompetently, the validity of the point about contemporary criticism has been challenged. R.J. Buck uses as an analogy the fate of the generals at Arginusae, arguing that: 'The repercussions from the executions after Arginousai, however, have left few traceable echoes in the limited sources from the fourth century: there is not that much source material left.'30 The analogy is weak, for two reasons. Firstly, there is at least implied ancient criticism of the handling of the Arginusae trials,31 in spite of the paucity of source material; secondly, the generals who had

29 Anne Pippin Burnett, 'Thebes and the Expansion of the Second Athenian Confederacy: IG 2 43' Historia 11 (1962), 1-17 at p.16.
30 Buck, 'Athenians at Thebes' (as in n.6), 108.
31 Xenophon actually devotes a reasonable amount of space to the trials of the generals of Arginusae. Throughout his account, he makes his disapproval of the outcome plain. In Hellenica 1.7.5 the generals are not allowed to speak according to the law (that is, an illegal restriction is placed on their speaking). In 1.7.8 deception and bribery are practised by their opponents. In 1.7.14 some committee members object to an illegal proposal, and in 1.7.15 the philosopher Socrates refuses to break the law when others have bowed to pressure. Finally, in 1.7.35, when it is all over, the Athenians have regrets. Plato also refers in Apology 32b to the illegality of the situation, and the steadfastness of Socrates in the face of extreme opposition.
served at Arginusae were accused of something, however unjustly.32 Parker regards the offence as minor,33 but Chabrias’ reaction after the battle of Naxos in 376 (Diodorus Siculus 15.35.1), to which Parker refers, suggests that it was not minor to the Athenians. According to Diodorus Siculus, Chabrias was careful to retrieve those in the water, forgoing the pursuit in order to do so. If the two generals at Thebes at the fall of the Cadmea were part of an official expedition, it is hard to know what they would have been accused of. Incompetence is hardly an option, as the operation was successful, while disobedience to orders by moving from the border into Boeotia undermines the idea that the Athenians offered official aid to Thebes at this stage. Parker argues that there was authorisation, but not by the assembly, so that if anything went wrong the Athenians could deny complicity.34 Nevertheless, denial and, maybe, threats are one thing, but trials leading to the death penalty are another matter. A more comprehensible response is that resulting from the complaint by the Persian Pharnabazus about Chabrias’ support for an Egyptian rebel king just before the incident being examined here (Diodorus Siculus 15.29.3-4; Nepos Chabrias 3.1). The Athenians issued warnings to Chabrias,35 but immediately used him again in their service.

At this point the role of Chabrias on the road through Eleutherae can be considered. As mentioned earlier, Xenophon has Chabrias guarding the road through Eleutherae after the initial coup against the Spartans at Thebes, at the time when Cleombrotus invaded (Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.14). By Xenophon’s chronology as well as by that of Diodorus, the raid of Sphodrias took place after Cleombrotus had returned to Sparta, so Chabrias’ presence here clearly precedes the raid. This is seen by Cawkwell as constituting a

32 They were charged with failing to pick up the shipwrecked men (Xenophon Hellenica 1.7.4).
33 Parker (as in n.1), 21 n.33. Like Buck, he sees the Arginusae incident as casting doubt on the validity of Burnett’s contention.
34 Parker, ‘Sphodrias’ Raid’ (as in n.1), 31.
35 Nepos Chabrias 3.1 says that Chabrias was threatened with death if he refused the summons.
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difficulty for those who do not accept the account of Diodorus as it stands. He regards as inadequate the view that Chabrias was simply guarding the border: ‘If, as Grote supposed, Athens in alarm was merely covering her borders, Xenophon’s comment about Chabrias blocking the road through Eleutherae is oddly irrelevant. He should have recounted obstacles to Cleombrotus getting in to Attica, not to him getting out.’

Presumably, the assumption that lies behind these remarks is that Cleombrotus, to reach the road through Eleutherae, would have had to travel a certain distance through Attica, anyway, so a force stationed at Eleutherae would not have been an effective deterrent from entry into Athenian territory. Accordingly, the object of Chabrias’ force must have been to prevent the Spartans from advancing against Thebes along the road that led from Attica via Eleutherae to Thebes.

Still, the stationing of Chabrias on the road through Eleutherae does not necessarily imply that the Athenians expected Cleombrotus to march through part of Attica and then to cross the mountain by means of the pass near Eleutherae to reach Thebes. Apart from the fact that Cleombrotus did not go to Thebes, but to Plataea, that was not the normal route from the Peloponnese to Boeotia, in any case, in spite of recent statements to the contrary. According to the study by Hammond on the roads in the area, the main road did not lead through Attica at all, but through Megarian territory, a little to the west, and it is evident that Cleombrotus must, in fact, have taken that road. Hammond describes the route in detail, including such items as its width (‘generally a little more than nine feet wide and never less’) and its suitability for wheeled

36 Cawkwell, ‘Foundation’ (as in n.7), 58.

37 Stylianou, Historical Commentary (as in n.1), 235; Parker, ‘Sphodrias’ Raid’ (as in n.1), 16-7.

38 N.G.L. Hammond, 'The Main Road from Boeotia to the Peloponnese' ABSA 49 (1954), 103-22 is the article as originally published, but I have used the version in N.G.L. Hammond, Studies in Greek History (Oxford, 1973), 417-46.
transport. He walked from Boeotia to Megara along this route, of which the stretch between Kriekouki in Boeotia and Ayios Vasilios in the Megarid is particularly relevant here. At a fork in the road south of Kriekouki, still in Boeotia, Hammond went south-west, unlike an earlier traveller called Grundy, who had continued south and then turned south-east to the road usually regarded as that through Eleutheræa (assuming the identity of Eleutheræa and Gyphtokastro). Hammond also commented on the most direct route from Boeotia to the Isthmus of Corinth, again taking as a starting point Kriekouki, and again envisaging a journey through the Megarid to Ayios Vasilios, before branching off towards the Corinthiad. Of this route, Hammond comments: 'The route is far shorter than any route which passes through Attica and Megara.'

Stylianou has misunderstood Hammond on this matter. He takes it that Chabrias was guarding Hammond's road and claims that Hammond has the main road passing through Oenoe and Eleutheræa, which were both places in Attica; however, Hammond in various places indicates that an army using his road would not enter Attica, but would pass through the Megarid instead. This is particularly telling in the section in which he considers various

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39 Hammond, 'Main Road' (as in n.38), 418.

40 Hammond, 'Main Road' (as in n.38), 418. The location of Eleutheræa is debated, and this is reflected by the different positions assigned to it on modern maps, but it is commonly identified with Gyphtokastro. As Ober, 'Fortress Attica' (as in n.13), 223, notes, Pausanias, Strabo and Arrian all contain clues. Both Pausanias (1.8) and Strabo (9.2.31) indicate that the district of Eleutheræa was on the border of Attica, near Plataea. Pausanias also indicates that Eleutheræa had not always been part of Attica, while Strabo mentions disagreement as to whether it was part of Attica or part of Boeotia. Arrian refers to 'the gates leading to Eleutheræa and Attica' (1.7.9), and Ober (223) identifies these as the Kaza pass.

41 Hammond (as in n.38), 422-424.

42 Hammond, 'Main Road' (as in n.38), 424. This is endorsed by Mark H. Munn, *The Defense of Attica: The Dema Wall and the Boiotian War of 378–375 BC* (Berkeley, 1993), 139 with n.15.

43 Stylianou, *Historical Commentary* (as in n.1), 235. Stylianou also refers to Hammond's Figure, but the only road Hammond marks as entering Attica from Ayios Vasilios (which is Stylianou's point of entry into Attica) is shown in the key as modern.

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campaigns on which the road would have been used, including Cleombrotus' march of 379/8. One of his statements is: 'It appears, then, that he took the Road of the Towers through the Megarid to Ayios Vasilios, ascended the range of Cithaeron, and, instead of going to Kriekouki, turned aside to seize the alternative pass above Plataea.'

This is a summary in reverse of Hammond's walk from Boeotia to the Megarid. Hammond's Figure shows both the route to Kriekouki and that to Plataea as being wholly outside of Attica. Moreover, he also notes: 'It was only when Sphodrias raided the Eleusinian plain that Attic territory was violated and Athens went to war. Later in 378 and twice in 377 Agesilaus entered and returned from Boeotia by the eastern passes over Mt. Cithaeron.' That the road that led through the Megarid to Boeotia was the usual route for armies from the Peloponnese is confirmed by the consistency with which it was used at this time. It is possible that Hammond's mention of Grundy's route has caused the confusion.

It has been noted by several authors that the fortress at Gyphtokastro had not yet been built. Ober has attempted to date it by architectural and pottery evidence to the second quarter of the fourth century. In a review of Ober's book, P. Harding comments on the difficulty of dating any of the fourth-century forts on the basis of the kind of archaeological evidence available. All the same, he declares that: 'the majority of the forts analysed by Ober are most reliably datable to the mid-fourth century, or no more than a decade or two earlier: this archaeological fact is confirmed by the literary evidence.' Kallet-Marx, too, notes the approximate date supplied by Ober. He adds the observation that Sphodrias was able to get through Eleutherae both ways unhindered. If Ober's

44 Hammond, 'Main Road' (as in n.38), 434.
45 Hammond, 'Main Road' (as in n.38), 421.
46 Hammond, 'Main Road' (as in n.38), 434.
47 Hammond, 'Main Road' (as in n.38), 418.
48 Ober, Fortress Attica (as in n.13), 160-163, especially 162.
50 Kallet-Marx, 'Athens, Thebes and the Foundation' (as in n.1), 143 n.71. This is

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comparison with Messene is valid, the fortress belongs to the years around 370; in fact, it relates better from a defence point of view to the period when Athens was allied with Sparta against Thebes than to the preceding years. The Thebans are the ones most likely to have wanted to use the Kaza Pass to invade Attica, apart from Sphodrias in 378, but he was based in Boeotia, not in the Peloponnese at the time.

Stylianou also cites Ober in connection with the identity of the main road,\footnote{Stylianou, Historical Commentary (as in n.1), 235.} but Ober agrees with Hammond on this matter: 'Hammond's Road crosses the mountains into the Megarid, and turns west to cross the Geraneia range for the Isthmus of Corinth. The road lies outside of the Athenian border,....'\footnote{Ober, Fortress Attica (as in n.13), 120.} He does, however, note: 'but it would be possible for armies coming from either Boeotia or Megara to turn east at the Villia valley in order to enter Attica.'\footnote{Ober, Fortress Attica (as in n.13), 120, continuing from where the previous quotation left off.} This is, of course, not the same thing as saying that the main road went through Attica.

Once through the pass over Cithaeron on the Megarian side of the border, Cleombrotus, if aiming for Thebes, would have marched north-east until the road he was on joined the one that led through Eleutherae, when he would have gone north to Thebes. As it happens, he went to Plataea, so he would have turned north-west without encountering the junction with the road through Eleutherae. If Chabrias was stationed at Eleutherae, there is no reason to suppose that he would have met up with the Spartans at all as they proceeded on their way to Boeotia. To ensure an encounter, even if Cleombrotus was marching to Thebes, Chabrias would have had to move outside of Attica altogether, into Boeotian territory. Either the Athenians, even in the face of a Spartan invasion, were daring to operate in Boeotia, or Chabrias was not meant to prevent the invasion force from reaching Thebes. The idea also noted by Harding, ‘Athenian Defensive Strategy’ (as in n.49), 64.
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that Chabrias was operating outside of Attica may be dismissed in view of Athenian nervousness after Cleombrotus had gone back to Sparta, for it was then that the two generals were tried, according to Xenophon (Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.19). The nervousness should have been stronger still when Cleombrotus was yet to come. Moreover, the junction of the two roads inside Boeotian territory was not a suitable place for a force of peltasts to attempt to repel a complete army of invasion. The best hope of success for the peltasts lay in positioning themselves at the top of a pass, where the terrain would work to their advantage.

Ober writes as though Cleombrotus was forced to change his route because of Chabrias’ position: ‘When Cleombrotus neared the frontier he found that the road past Eleutherai (the Kaza pass...) was guarded by Chabrias at the head of a force of Athenian peltasts. Cleombrotus therefore “climbed the mountain by the road leading to Plataea” (Hammond’s Road, northern end...or the Lestori Road,...)”54.

We cannot assume, however, either that Cleombrotus intended to enter Attica, or that he knew of the whereabouts of Chabrias, or that the Athenians were fully aware of Spartan intentions. From the Athenian perspective, the example of Phoebidas a few years earlier may have caused concern. Buckler has made the point that Thebes was not on the direct route to the Chalcidice.55 If Phoebidas had been focused solely on his ultimate objective, he would not have gone to Thebes, but he evidently saw an opportunity and took it. The Athenians may have wondered if the new Spartan commander would seek some advantage over them on his way to Boeotia. There were opportunities for Cleombrotus to turn into (or send a small force into) a route leading to Attica, instead of taking the obvious route directly from the Megarid to Boeotia. For instance, Ober describes a road, apparently ancient, that he labels as the ‘Villia Valley Road’, which passes through Attica a little to the south of

54 Ober, Fortress Attica (as in n.13), 211. This is what Cawkwell, ‘Foundation’ (as in n.7), understood, too.
55 Buckler, Aegean Greece (as in n.5), 201.
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Gyptokastro, identified by many with Eleutherae. This possibility ties in with a comment by Xenophon on Athenian alarm at the invasion of Cleombrotus (Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.19).

Xenophon considered that the close proximity of the invasion route of Cleombrotus to Attica was sufficient in itself to cause concern, even though there had been no actual entry of Athenian territory on this occasion. He comments that the Lacedaemonians were now going past (παριόντες) Attica, and invading Thebes, in contrast to past times, when war was associated with Corinth. It was at this point that they initiated the trial of the two generals (Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.19). In other words, the Spartans were getting too close for comfort. No doubt Athenian fears would have been heightened by the awareness that at least some Athenians were sympathetic towards the Thebans and that the Spartans would have had the opportunity to learn this through the reports of Theban exiles (Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.14).

On the other hand, it might be argued that the language of Xenophon in section 14 supports the interpretation of Cawkwell. The reference to the posting of Chabrias on the road through Eleutherae contains a μέν, which is balanced by the δέ of the statement concerning the route taken by Cleombrotus. There is, it seems, a contrast between the road taken by Cleombrotus and the one that Chabrias was guarding. The two statements together read as follows: 'τὴν μέν οὖν δι* Ελεύθερων οδόν Χαβρίας είχον Αθηναίων πελταστάς ἔφυλαττεν· ὁ δὲ Κλεόμβροτος

56 Ober, Fortress Attica (as in n.13), 121-2.

57 Isocrates 14 (Plataecus)29 claims that Theban ambassadors sought recognition from Sparta in the aftermath of the coup. John Wickersham disputes the accuracy of this, claiming that Isocrates 'is here indulging in a fallacy that runs throughout the whole survey of Theban activities in this portion of the Plataean speech: namely, he fails to distinguish the actions of the Laconizing party of the Thebans from the actions of their opponents.' If there is any truth to Isocrates' "Plataean" speaker's assertion that such promises were made in Sparta, then I would insist that the so-called ambassadors who made them were actually pro-Spartan refugees from the purge that followed the liberation and the surrender of the garrison of the Cadmea.' (John M. Wickersham, 'Spartan Garrisons in Boeotia 382-379/8 B.C.' Historia 56.2 [2007], 243-246 at p.246.)
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άνέβαινε κατὰ τὴν ἐς Πλαταιὰς φέρουσαν.' (‘Now Chabrias was guarding the road through Eleutherae with Athenian peltasts, but Cleombrotus went up by the road leading to Plataea.’)

The implication might seem to be that the Athenians were expecting that Cleombrotus would decide instead to ‘go up’ by the pass through their territory as a means of entry to Boeotia. Nevertheless, this is not a necessary conclusion. Even if there was an Athenian fear that Cleombrotus would enter Attica from Megarian territory, Chabrias could still have been guarding only against his entry into Attica or, at least, his progress into the townships or to the city of Athens itself. Xenophon does not say that Chabrias was at Eleutherae waiting for the Spartans to march through Attica on their way to an alternative pass to Boeotia, and blocking their entry to it. He says simply that Chabrias was guarding the road that led through Eleutherae. In other words, the concern of Chabrias could well have been to forestall or turn back an invasion of Attica. A force situated on the road through Eleutherae could have been intended to repel such an invasion, whether it came over the Megarian border or through the mountain pass. The former would have been the more attractive route if the Spartans had any intention of entering Attica at all. It was more direct and did not involve the risk of crossing two mountain passes, but Chabrias’ position had the potential to cover both options.

In addition, part of the contrast in Xenophon’s mind could have been between Cleombrotus’ apparent destination (Thebes) and his actual destination (Plataea). Cleombrotus not only took the road that led to Plataea, but he went to Plataea. Given, incidentally, that Cleombrotus was heading for Plataea, it is even less likely that he would have wanted to take the road through Eleutherae, as he would then have needed to backtrack once he was on the main road, in order to take the road leading to Plataea. At all events, that Cleombrotus should wish to cross the mountain range by the pass in Attica in order to reach Thebes is highly unlikely. He would arrive at the pass in Megarian territory first, the route was more
direct, and the Megarians were friendly, so there was no reason to avoid their pass.

There has been a suggestion that winter conditions could induce him to take the longer route. This is mentioned by Ober in a note, but elsewhere he states: 'The only disadvantage of the Kaza pass is that it is fairly frequently closed by snow and is therefore sometimes impassible during the winter months, but the same is true of all the passes through the northwestern mountains.' There was, therefore, no particular reason to prefer the Athenian road to the Megarian.

If, in addition to all this, Cleombrotus could not rely on Athenian goodwill, there is positive reason for a preference for the Megarian pass. Chabrias, then, was doing what Grote said he was doing: guarding the border. When Cleombrotus invaded again, later in the war, and the Athenians really were interested in blocking his progress into Boeotia, they sent troops to the pass that mattered, joining the Thebans in fighting against Cleombrotus' peltasts at a pass on Hammond's road (Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.59). They apparently knew where Cleombrotus was likely to go, and it was not to the road through Eleutherae in Athenian territory.

Meanwhile, the Thebans seem to have had their own ideas on how to hinder the progress of Cleombrotus on the first occasion, for they had a force guarding the pass on Hammond's road, a group of men who had been freed from prison (Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.14). Best imagines that these are the men under Chabrias and that they have been released from an Athenian prison. This would make nonsense of the geographical indications given by Xenophon: the ex-prisoners are at a different pass from the one guarded by Chabrias. These men have, in fact, been mentioned before by Xenophon, in the account of the revolution in Thebes, where Phillidas is said to have released the men in the prison at Thebes

58 Ober, Fortress Attica (as in n.13), 211 n.5.
59 Ober, Fortress Attica (as in n.13), 120. The Kaza pass is the one associated with Eleutherae.
60 J.G.P. Best, Thracian Peltasts and their Influence on Greek Warfare (Groningen, 1969), 96 n.90.
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and to have armed them (Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.8). The men under Chabrias would not have seen any action on this occasion, especially as Cleombrotus, once through the pass in Megarian territory, went to Plataea instead of Thebes. In other words, he did not continue along the road that joined with the one that went through Eleutherae.

Chabrias, then, cannot be used to show that the Athenians were already officially supporting the Thebans before the raid of Sphodrias. Xenophon’s account does not reinforce Diodorus even at the one point where Cawkwell spotted a chink. Diodorus Siculus, however, was following fourth-century tradition. He is commonly believed to have used Ephorus, and on the crucial matter of the assembly vote he is in agreement with the late fourth-century orator, Dinarchus, who also speaks of a decree authorising a force to be sent to help the Thebans before the fall of the Cadmea (Dinarchus I [Against Demosthenes]39). It has been suggested that maybe Dinarchus has repeated a version of events in which the facts have been manipulated in order to show Athens playing a more active part in the affair than was actually the case. The desired effect could be achieved by moving back a little in time the date when official Athenian aid was granted. If this happened, Dinarchus’ support for Diodorus evaporates.

At this point in Dinarchus’ speech, which was directed against the orator Demosthenes, he contrasts the behaviour of other Athenians, including the heroes of the past, with that of Demosthenes. Ian Worthington observes: ‘In section 25 the context is Demosthenes’ betrayal of Thebes despite its help in 404/3; in 39 the context is Athens’ support for the Thebans in 379/8, thanks to the leaders then.’

61 This is noted, too, by Ober, Fortress Attica (as in n.13), 211.
62 Burnett (as in n.29), 15.
63 Ian Worthington, Greek Orators II: Dinarchus and Hyperides (Warminster, 1999), 155.
Some scholars have been reluctant to dismiss Dinarchus' claims, in spite of the rhetorical context in which they are made. Arguments in favour of statements made in speeches tend to run along the lines that the orator could not hope to get away with obvious distortions of fact, when men involved in the situations referred to are still alive. Dinarchus, does, indeed, refer to men who are still alive and were involved in helping the Thebans (Dinarchus I [Against Demosthenes] 38), but how many of these men in their mid-70s or older were in the courtroom when the speech was delivered, or read the published version when it was circulated? In addition, there is always an element of uncertainty about how faithfully the written text corresponds to the speech as delivered. Thomas Hubbard has argued that orators were not interested in preserving an exact record of what they had said, but had other priorities. Among the general comments that appear ahead of his examination of examples, Hubbard has this: 'The temptation to control public memory by "getting the last word" or "setting the record straight" was in many instances irresistible and frequently took the form of responding to arguments an opponent made in his speech that could not possibly have been anticipated in the speaker's original speech delivered in court.'

Worthington, incidentally, prefers Xenophon's account to that of Dinarchus and Diodorus: 'Xenophon's account should be preferred, and it is likely, then, that both Dinarchus (at 1.39) and Diodorus have confused the ψήφισμα of the Assembly after Sphodrias' attempt with the action of these so-called volunteers.'

The alteration of the facts may not be deliberate on the part of Dinarchus. Burnett rejects the implications of his account, and suggests that the original source of the error she believes he is

64 Thomas Hubbard, 'Getting the Last Word: Publication of Political Oratory as an Instrument of Historical Revisionism' in E. Anne Mackay (ed.), Orality, Literacy, Memory in the Ancient Greek and Roman World (Leiden and Boston, 2008 = Mnemosyne Supplement 298), 185-202.

65 Hubbard, 'Getting the Last Word' (as in n.64), 186-7.


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perpetrating was Ephorus: ‘The pro-Theban touches in Diodorus’ account make one suspect that it was Ephorus who first shifted the events of early summer back to mid-winter; probably he was unable to admit that Athens had played so unimportant a role in the drama of the Kadmea.’

Ephorus, however, may not have been the culprit; he may have fallen prey to earlier Athenian propaganda that sought a slice of the glory for the freeing of Thebes. Fourth-century Athenians were not averse from tampering with historical facts to make them more palatable. Consider, for instance, the remarks of Lewis and Stroud concerning the way the Athenians manipulated the circumstances of the naval battle at Cnidus in 394 to avoid acknowledging the fact that it was a Persian victory:

Euagoras was being praised for his services to Hellas, but in truth his principal claim to Athenian gratitude lay in his introduction of Konon to the Persian Pharnabazos. We have here our earliest evidence for the way in which the Athenians faced, or rather, avoided, the uncomfortable fact that the fleet with which Konon had broken Spartan power was a Persian fleet, built in Persian-controlled harbors and financed with Persian funds. For this fact Euagoras was a comfortable cloak. Isokrates would eventually assert (IX.56) that he had contributed the greatest part of Konon’s force, and meanwhile it was his statue which was put alongside Konon’s and the statue of Zeus Soter; Pharnabazos, Konon’s fellow admiral, presumably his superior, had the tact not to come to Athens and received no honors there.

Before Ephorus wrote, there may already have been a popular Athenian version that confused the official with the unofficial actions of Athenians and removed all reference to the death sentence imposed on the two generals who had actually dared to help the Thebans. This version seems already to be reflected in Isocrates Plataeacu, for which the dramatic date is 373, although it could have

67 Burnett, ‘Thebes and the Expansion’ (as in n.29), 15.
been written later. In this context the purely defensive force posted with Chabrias near Eleutherae could also be transformed into a menace to the Spartan presence, unless the scholiast on Aristides Panathenaicus 172.10, who has a battle fought between the troops of Chabrias and those of Cleombrotus, has confused the first with the second invasion of Cleombrotus, which did meet with real resistance and had to turn back (Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.59).

Eventually, the Athenians did decide to join Thebes against Sparta, but the Spartan failure to condemn Sphodrias for his raid, not the invasion of Cleombrotus, is given by Xenophon as the reason for the Athenian step (Xenophon Hellenica 5.4.34). Xenophon's reference at this point to the Athenians doing all they could to help the Boeotians has sometimes been seen as his way of referring to the foundation of the Second Athenian League. If so, he disagrees with Diodorus on the timing of it, just as he apparently disagrees on the timing of official aid to Thebes.

Diodorus Siculus places the first moves of a two-stage process in forming the League between the invasion of Cleombrotus and the raid of Sphodrias (Diodorus Siculus 15.28.2-4). Often Diodorus' date is thought to be unlikely because of the time of year (winter) and the relatively short period between the invasion and the raid. Nevertheless, in his article Cawkwell challenged the then accepted view that the Athenian League was formed after the raid of Sphodrias and as a reaction to it.69 Instead, he followed Diodorus Siculus in placing its formation between the invasion and the raid. Those who are unconvinced by Cawkwell's argument place the beginnings of the League either before Cleombrotus' invasion as an active attempt to counteract Spartan power and regain lost empire,70 or after the raid of Sphodrias as a defensive response to Spartan activities at that time.71 Again, as in the case of official support for Thebes, timing is important for an understanding of the raid. Those

69 G.L. Cawkwell, 'Foundation' (as in n.7), 47-60.
70 Kallet-Marx, 'Athens, Thebes and the Foundation' (as in n.1), 128.
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who date the start of the Second Athenian League before the raid
can point to an additional concern that Sparta was likely to have
about Athens: not only was she supporting the Thebans, but she
was making a new bid for empire. Kallet-Marx goes to a great deal
of trouble to show that Diodorus is wrong in trying to squeeze the
foundation of the League between the end of Cleombrotus’ first
invasion and the raid of Sphodrias.72 He proposes that it should be
moved to an earlier time, before the Theban coup. Along with this
proposal comes an interpretation of Athenian actions in terms of
aggressive imperialism.73 There is, however, no evidence to support
this suggestion.

There is, in fact, nothing to stop us from moving the foundation
of the League back to where Plutarch appears to place it: after the
raid of Sphodrias (Plutarch Pelopidas 14-5). It should be noted
that Diodorus places the second phase in the process too early.
He identifies it as part of the Athenian response to the raid of
Sphodrias, which means that it precedes Agesilaus’ invasion of
378 (Diodorus Siculus 15.29.7-8). The inscription known as the
‘Prospectus’ or ‘Charter’ of the League shows that the second phase
belongs to the early months of 377, after Agesilaus’ invasion of
378, and that there were only a few members at this stage, which
indicates that the first phase was not much earlier. The observation
about the small number of members at the beginning of 377 has
also been made by Rhodes and Osborne in their commentary
on the inscription.74 This inscripational evidence is a problem for
anyone wishing to assign an early date to the start of the process. If
Diodorus has dated the second phase too early, it is likely that he
has also dated the first phase too early. It would make sense to place
the first phase where Diodorus has the second phase: after the trial
of Sphodrias and before Agesilaus’ invasion. This would harmonise

72 Kallet-Marx, ‘Athens, Thebes and the Foundation’ (as in n.1), 133-137. On this
matter, Hamilton, ‘Diodorus’ (as in n.71), 96-7 is in agreement.
74 P.J. Rhodes and Robin Osborne, Greek Historical Inscriptions 404-323 BC
(Oxford, 2003), 100. The inscription is number 22 in their collection. Hamilton,
‘Diodorus’ (as in n.71), 97-8 also comments on this.
with the indications in Xenophon's account (Xenophon *Hellenica* 5.4.34) and in that of Plutarch (Plutarch *Pelopidas* 15.1).

There is, then, no convincing evidence of overt Athenian defiance of Sparta prior to the raid of Sphodrias. Xenophon's mention of Chabrias does not necessarily hide a contradiction between his picture of the Athenians being spurred into action by the failure to condemn Sphodrias and a more aggressive reality. The Athenians may have turned a blind eye to private supporters of the exiled Thebans, or they may have sent forces to the borders with instructions to be on the defensive, only to have some of those forces act on their own initiative when the coup took place, but the condemnation of the leaders shows an unwillingness to upset the Spartans at this point. Both the formation of the Second Athenian League and the official cooperation with Thebes make best sense as different aspects of the reaction of the Athenians to the raid of Sphodrias.

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