
The International Library of Essays series attempts to bring together seminal (albeit previously published) essays on specific areas of military history as selected by each volume's editor. With respect to *The Armies of Classical Greece* this potentially thankless task fell to Everett Wheeler and the end result is twenty four articles separated into five parts: Archaic Warfare: 750-500 BC; Religious, Social, Economic and Legal Aspects; Classical Hoplite Battle; The Peloponnesian War: 431-404 BC; and The Age of Xenophon and Epaminondas: 400-362 BC. The publication commences with a lengthy introduction (fifty plus pages) in which Wheeler first outlines recent trends in Greek military scholarship, and military scholarship in general. His views here are likely to offend some but are refreshing if not a little hard hitting. For example, he is highly critical of both the *Annaliste* and 'face-of-battle' approaches to the study of warfare and also finds faults with new archaeology, conflict archaeology, and historical anthropology. On the other hand, he is somewhat more positive with respect to the current trend of looking at war as a product of culture. The remainder of the introduction serves to provide the non-specialist reader with sufficient background knowledge so that the articles may be read and understood in a deeper context than would otherwise have been possible (this is a requirement of the series). The articles themselves are all in English (another requirement) although to Wheeler's credit he attempts to provide comprehensive references to non-English publications throughout his introduction. The articles have also been reproduced in the format in which they were first published and thus retain their original pagination.
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Of the five articles in Part One, four, by A.M. Snodgrass, Everett Wheeler, W.R. Connor and Peter Krentz, argue against certain current or prevailing views. Snodgrass reassesses the conclusions of Joachim Latacz regarding the development of hoplite warfare and instead maintains that there was a 'long and gradual evolution'. Next, our editor Wheeler proceeds thoroughly to dispel the idea that there existed a prohibition of missiles in the war between Archaic Chalces and Eretia, whereas Connor disagrees with the idea that the Greeks were prone to war making and that it was endemic to their society. Finally, Krentz, who examines the idea of hoplite warfare as an agôn, believes that this only developed after the 480s and not during the seventh century. Three of the above four arguments are convincing. The exception is that of Connor which one feels is weakened somewhat by the articles of Wheeler and Krentz. The fifth article by W.S. Ferguson, which is the oldest in the collection (1918), takes a somewhat different tack by comparing Spartan social and military institutions to those of the Zulu. While an outstanding article, it is however an odd addition, especially considering its focus is primarily on the practices of the Zulu.

Part Two begins with a joint article by M.D. Goodman and A.J. Holladay who look at the impact of religious scruples on war making. This is a topic that definitely deserves attention as it is all too easy to dismiss the significant part that religion could play in military planning. Ronald T. Ridley's four part study examines the Athenian hoplite system. While he briefly descends into the face-of-battle approach (about which Wheeler is particularly judgmental) his study is nonetheless informative. The article of James A. Thorne attacks the prevailing view that the destruction of crops, livestock, and farming infrastructure during wartime was difficult to accomplish and resulted in only minimal economic impact. Thorne's argument is essentially correct, but one should not downplay, as he does, the difficulties involved in attempting to engage in wholesale logistic destruction. The final two articles deal with legal issues. That of J.L. Myres concentrates on the militarily
difficult phrase ἀκήρυκτος πόλεμος as found in Herodotus whereas the other by D.J. Mosley, examines the conventions of passing through neighbouring territories while under arms.

Part Three commences with Wheeler's second article which traces the transition of the role of the Athenian general from ideal Homeric warrior through to egalitarian Phalanx commander and down to the late fifth to fourth centuries when 'brains' were becoming more important than 'brawn'. David Whitehead's study is concerned with the employment of the ambiguous term κλοπή in military contexts which can have either positive or negative connotations. Why this is so remains uncertain. N. Whatley deals with the problems related to reconstructing ancient battles with particular reference to Marathon. His pessimism, while valid at the time of writing (1964), may now be countered somewhat through the increased use of computers which can help lift some of the 'fog of war'. Robert D. Luginbill successfully defends the idea that ὀθυσμός was an important if not the most important element of hoplite warfare, whereas Lawrence A. Tritle deals with the subject of mutilation of the dead. He quite rightly and vehemently attacks the 'romantic' if not naïve view that Greeks could not do such horrid things. Krentz' second article focuses on casualty ratios in hoplite battles and dismisses the popular idea that casualties, even for the victor, were light. Although working with incomplete data, his conclusions appear valid.

In Part Four, I.G. Spence re-examines the strategy of Perikles with respect to the defence of Attika. Spence attempts to prove that Athenian strategy was not as straightforward as reported by Thucydides, emphasising in particular the important role played by the Athenian cavalry. The article of Thomas Kelly nicely balances Spence's study in that he too notes inconsistencies in Thucydides' reporting with respect to Spartan strategy. His belief that Spartan strategy was more 'multidimensional' than Thucydides has led us to believe is entirely correct. As always with such reassessments,
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there is the risk of attributing to the ancients a level of strategic complexity greater than what may have been the case. Both Spence and Kelly just manage to avoid this trap. H.D. Westlake traces the development of the military phenomenon of ἐπιτείχισμος or the establishment of a permanent fortified base in enemy territory (most notably seen with Pylos and Decelia). The final article in this section, by Graham Wylie, reassesses the career of Brasidas and asks whether his positive reputation as a military commander (as championed by Thucydides) was indeed deserved. Given his rather colourful career, this is one topic that could be debated for some time.

Part Five leads with Neal Woods article examining Xenophon's theory of leadership and his attempts to draw parallels between the roles of generals and political leaders. While the article does readdress the somewhat underrated contribution of Xenophon to political thought, whether one can consider him 'an ancestor of modern political science' (474) is another matter. New Zealand's own Mathew F. Trundle looks at the idea of community among Greek mercenaries serving abroad and how they were able to maintain a sense of cultural identity and unity. Trundle correctly points out that true national identity or 'Greekness' was not among these unifying forces. Greeks were quite happy to fight other Greeks. Alexander K. Nefiodkin's article on Scythed Chariots traces their origins to Persia where they were likely employed against the heavy infantry of the Egyptians and later the Greeks. It must however not be forgotten that the impact of this weapon would have been more psychological rather than physical. Horses will not charge at unbroken masses of men. The final article in the collection is Victor Hanson's comprehensive reassessment of the military significance of the Battle of Leuktra (he discounts the supposed military revolutions that took place) and its reporting by Xenophon (whom he vindicates).
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All in all, Wheeler has done an admirable job in his selection of articles. The topics covered are varied and while there is some repetition of information and of certain concepts, this is kept to an absolute minimum. Indeed, in some instances this serves to remind the reader of the areas that are still being hotly debated. On the negative side, only two quibbles are worth mentioning. First, this publication does not include a full index (although a name index is provided). A more serious problem is the lack of dedicated maps for referral (this appears to be the case for the other publications in this series as well). One must instead rely on the maps within the articles themselves which can vary greatly in quality. Nevertheless, for the uninitiated this publication is a superb introduction to the subject of Classical Greek warfare. For the specialist or even the advanced student, however, this collection will not be adding anything new to the field beyond interest in who was included and who was not.

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