In the early fifth century AD or thereabouts John of Stobi compiled an anthology of extracts from philosophers, poets and the works of earlier doxographers for the education of his son, Septimus. It is thought that Stobaeus was a pagan, since Christian writers were not among the works that he commended to his son for his education. Stobaeus’ anthology of selections contains much that is valuable. His selections may shed light on differences in manuscript traditions for various authors whose works we possess from other sources. However, some lost works like Aristotle’s *On Good Birth* are known almost exclusively from Stobaeus. Such is the case with Arius Didymus’ *Epitome of Stoic Ethics*.

Book II, chapter 7.5–12 of Stobaeus is headed Ζήνωνος καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν Στοικών δύναμεν περὶ τοῦ ἱθωκοῦ μέρους τῆς φιλοσοφίας. Stobaeus does not tell us the source of this extract. The section that follows it is headed Αριστοτέλους καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν Περιπατητικῶν περὶ τῶν ἱθωκῶν and in IV.29.38 he identifies the source of material on Aristotle similar to this as ‘Didymus’. On the basis of similarities of style and content between these sections, August Meineke argued that the authors are the same and, moreover, are to be identified with the writer of the work referred to in Eusebius as ‘The Epitomes of Arius Didymus.’ This person, in turn, was identified by Meineke as the Arius who was a companion of Augustus. Diels also accepted this identification in his *Doxographi Graeci*, and though it has been questioned by some, it is nonetheless widely accepted. It has also given this portion of Stobaeus’ *Eclogae* a certain added authority on the topic of Stoic and Peripatetic ethics, since its author is now thought to be, not a sixth century doxographer, but rather a philosopher of the first century BC.

But this should not lull us into thinking that what we have here is a simple case of an excerpt from a philosophical work carefully reproduced by a doxographer. Even if there are reasons for thinking that Stobaeus’ method in compiling his anthology was to copy his sources mostly verbatim, we must not forget that much has happened to his work since its composition. Photius copied out a table of contents of the work and a comparison with our manuscripts reveals that much of it has been lost: of
46 chapter headings recorded in the ninth century, we have only 13 and some of these are surely very truncated. The state of our text, which derives from only two manuscript families, is rather ragged. Wachsmuth, in his 1884 edition of the text, is rather free with emendations and supplements. So the time is ripe for an edition of portions of Stobaeus’ text.

Arthur Pomeroy’s slim hardback includes a brief introduction, a text with facing page translation, twenty-four pages of notes, a brief bibliography and a Greek-English glossary. The glossary includes occurrences of words other than common verbs, particles, definite articles and so on. It also provides some examples of the way a given term has been translated at various points, as well as listing occurrences of the Greek word in the text. Pomeroy has helpfully listed variations from Wachsmuth’s text on two and a half pages at the end of the introduction. These exhibit very good sense. So, when Arius discusses the Stoic claim that the wise man does all things well, he notes that this means that he does well all the things that he does—not that the sage who has never surfed nonetheless surfs well. Where Wachsmuth’s text reads ναί [ού] for the καί [ου] of both F and P, Pomeroy, following Long and Sedley, sensibly changes the two problematic occurrences of καί to καθ’, mirroring the use of κατά τὴν αὐλησιν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν κιθαρωδίαν in the previous sentence. Thus:

(Pomeroy) 2.7.5b10.5-6 πάντ’ εὖ ποιεῖν τὸν φρόνιμον, καθ’ ὅσα ποιεῖ καὶ οὗ μὰ Δία, καθ’ ἀ μὴ ποιεῖ.

(Wachsmuth) πάντ’ εὖ ποιεῖν τὸν φρόνιμον, καὶ ὅσα ποιεῖ ναι [οῦ] μὰ Δία, καὶ ἀ μὴ ποιεῖ.

On the whole, Pomeroy’s editing is pretty conservative. He reverts to the manuscript readings in eight places. In several others, he follows von Arnim.

I think the most adventurous is in 7e. Wachsmuth prints:

Τῶν δὲ κατὰ φύσιν τὰ μὲν καθ’ αὐτὰ ληπτὰ ἐστι ν, τὰ δὲ δι’ ἕτερα. 
Καθ’ αὐτὰ μὲν, ὅσα ἐστὶν ὀρμῆς κινητικὰ προτρεπτικῶς ἐφ’ ἐαυτὰ ἦ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀντέχεσθαι αὐτῶν, οἶον ὑγίειαν, ἐναιθησιάν, ἀπονύαν καὶ
Pomeroy notes that the scholia to Lucian, examined by Hahm in his article for *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 36.4 (1990), suggest καταστρεπτικῶς for προστρεπτικῶς. (At least that is what the critical apparatus intends: a mistake in type-setting has left καταστρεπτικῶς at the second occurrence.) This, together with von Arnim’s ἀνενεκτικῶς, yields a pair of sentences that Pomeroy translates as:

Some of the things in accord with nature are worth acquiring for their own sake, others for the sake of other things. For their own sake are those things which in a self-referential fashion are stimulative of an impulse toward the laying hold of themselves, such as health, good perception, lack of pain and beauty of the body. Worth acquiring as productive are those things which by reference to something else are stimulative of an impulse toward other things rather than in a self-referential fashion <towards themselves>, such as wealth, reputation, and things like these.

As can be seen from this sample, Pomeroy’s translation is pretty literal and sometimes sacrifices readability for closeness to the text. Compare this with the translation of the same passage offered in the second edition of Inwood and Gerson:

Of natural things, some are worth taking in themselves, some because of other things. In themselves: everything which is stimulative of impulse in such a manner as to encourage [someone] to pursue it or to hang on to it, such as health, good sense perception, freedom from pain, bodily beauty. Instrumentally: everything which is stimulative of impulse by reference to other things and not in such a manner as to encourage [someone to pursue] it, such as wealth, reputation and things like these. (*Hellenistic Philosophy* [Indianapolis, 1997], 214)

In spite of the fact that Inwood and Gerson is sometimes an easier read, closeness to the text may have its reward. So consider 2.7.5b4.12–16:
"Ωσπερ τε τὸ κάλλος τοῦ σώματος ἐστὶ συμμετρία τῶν μελῶν καθεστώτων αὐτῷ πρὸς ἀληθὰ τε καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος ἐστὶ συμμετρία τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῦ πρὸς <τὸ> ὅλον τε αὐτῆς καὶ πρὸς ἀληθὰ.

Pomeroy translates:

And just as the beauty of the body is a due proportion of the limbs as they stand in relation to each other and in relation to the whole, so too the beauty of the soul is a due proportion in reasoning and in the parts of reasoning in relation to the whole of the soul and in relation to each other.

Inwood and Gerson miss the potentially post-Posidonian implications of ὅλον τε αὐτῆς and translate the last part of this sentence as ‘the beauty of the soul is a symmetry of reason and its parts with respect to the whole of it and to each other.’ The feminine Greek pronoun makes it clear that ‘it’ is the soul, but a casual reader of the English might suppose that it referred to reason. Is there any deep implication here about the existence of non-rational parts of the soul? Probably not: the point may only be to contrast the ἡγεμονικῶν with the other seven parts of the soul—five senses, seed and utterance, cf. SVF ii.836—but why not spell it out and let the reader draw his or her own conclusion?

If there is an aspect of Pomeroy’s book that is less than satisfactory, it is the notes. It is not that I find anything mistaken or misleading in what Pomeroy says. It is simply that one wants him to say more. For example, at the very opening of the work Arius lists goods that are not virtues and they include χαράν δὲ καὶ εὐφροσύνην καὶ βούλησις καὶ τὰ παραπλῆσια. Pomeroy simply comments on this passage that βούλησις is a positive form of rational desire. And so it is. But Diogenes Laertius also identifies it as one of the εὐπαθεία, opposed to ἐπιθυμία and consisting in εὐλογος ὅρεξις. Moreover, another of Arius’ goods that are not virtues, χαρά, appears as genus of Diogenes’ εὐπαθεία and ranked under this genus as a species is Arius’ εὐφροσύνη. Finally, in Arius’ list of bad things that are not vices are two of the genera of passions: λύπην δὲ καὶ φόβον καὶ τὰ παραπλῆσια. In his discussion of the passions, Arius does not deal with the εὐπαθεία, but these close connections between his account of goods and evils and Diogenes Laertius’ discussion of the good
feelings surely cries out for some more detailed comments than the true, but somewhat bland observation that \( \beta \omega \lambda \nu \tau \sigma \iota \) is a form of rational \( \delta \rho \xi \iota \). Even a cross reference to the discussion of impulses at 9–9b would be helpful. Similar remarks apply for the tantalising suggestions about the unity of the virtues thesis in 5b5. Pomeroy refers us to Long and Sedley and provides a short paragraph in which he briefly develops a line of thought on the matter.

Here then we have two hot topics in Stoicism, and a text that contains a relatively full discussion of at least one of them, but the opportunity for trying to spell out the details rigorously is passed over. This invites the question of the \( \tau \epsilon \alpha \lambda \omicron \sigma \) of this volume. The introduction does not discuss in any great detail the issues raised about Arius as a doxographer by Hahm. The edition of the text is a reasonably conservative one. The largest category of deviations from Wachsmuth’s text involve simply returning to the manuscript readings, followed closely by emendations adopted by von Arnim. The translation seems pretty meticulous, but the volume cannot be justified simply on the grounds that it provides the first English translation of the entirety of an important philosophical text. Though Pomeroy does not refer to it, the second edition of Inwood and Gerson that translates the whole of the Arius’ Stoic doxography has been available since 1997. It seems to me that the remaining need is for a detailed commentary on the text—one that both compares the Stoic doxography with the Peripatetic one and takes fuller account of points of comparison with other sources, in particular Diogenes Laertius. A very simple first step toward the former goal would be to include an outline of the topics dealt with in both doxographies so that the reader can see the parallels in the way in which Arius structures his discussion of Aristotelian and Stoic moral philosophy.

I would certainly recommend this book to anyone seriously interested in Stoicism. It is a handy little volume. I wonder, however, whether it would make it onto a scholars’ equivalent of Desert Island Discs.

Dirk Baltzly
Monash University