
The carefully stated aim of Gould's book is to give as accurate an account as possible of the contribution made by Chrysippus to the philosophy of the Stoa. This aim encompasses an attempt to assess the originality of Chrysippus's positive contribution, the part played by Chrysippus in the development of the Stoic philosophy and, in turn, the place of Stoicism in the context of the development of Greek thought. Gould's method is strict, since he resolutely refuses to use any supposedly Chrysippean passage as evidence:

'. . . .unless the author of a cited fragment states explicitly in the body of the fragment that a given doctrine belongs to Chrysippus, that it is to be found in one of his books, or that the words themselves are taken verbatim from Chrysippus, it may not be admitted as evidence for any assertion about Chrysippus' philosophical position.' (p.1)

Passages which refer to general Stoic doctrines are used to elucidate doctrines explicitly ascribed to Chrysippus in other fragments which meet the requirements stated above. The method is a sound one and Gould adheres to it faithfully, always noting when a conjecture cannot be substantiated literally. By employing this method, Gould avoids falling into the same trap as Bréhier in *Chrysippe et l'Ancien Stoicisme* (Paris, 1951: originally entitled, significantly, *Chrysippe*) who provided a general book on Stoicism with reference to Chrysippus. Also in his opening chapter Gould shows his familiarity with the sources, both ancient and modern. Throughout the book one is favourably impressed by the way in which Gould takes stock of a particular author's own philosophical position and employs this knowledge to illuminate that author's comments on Chrysippus. This is especially true of evidence provided by those hostile to the Stoa such as Galen and Plutarch. Gould's own style strikes one initially as being rather ingratiating and mannered; the habit of almost always describing Aristotle, for example, as 'the Stagirite' tends to jar. However, not many of us can claim the fluency of a W.K.C. Guthrie and Gould's style is no worse than that of many.

In chapters two and three Gould shows himself to be a discriminating historian of philosophy when he firstly analyses ancient comment on Chrysippus and modern assessments of his position within the Stoa and, secondly, disentangles the intellectual threads of the third century B.C. into the patterns of which Stoicism
was born. One of Gould's major contributions is his dispassionate and unprejudiced statements on Chrysippus's effect on the Stoa. Discussing the four pigeon-holes of modern theory, namely that Chrysippus (a) was a systematiser and strengthener of Stoic doctrine, (b) more or less an original thinker, (c) a dialectician upon whose shoulders descended the task of defending the Stoa against scepticism and (d) the provider of a standard orthodoxy for Stoicism for centuries, Gould is quite sensible:

'No one of these categories excludes the others; in theory one's interpretation might embrace all four views.' (p.14).

That it is quite possible to treat Chrysippus in this catholic manner is amply illustrated by Gould's subsequent pages.

Gould's outline of the problems surrounding an understanding of the birth of both Epicureanism and Stoicism is exemplary. This should be warmly recommended to all students of the Hellenistic period whatever their chief interest. The notion that Hellenistic philosophy was a 'Lebensphilosophie' that abandoned the idealism of the fourth century is given particular scrutiny. Personally, I have always considered the 'Lebensphilosophie' idea more applicable to Epicureanism than to Stoicism, especially when one considers the 'folk-Epicureanising' of the Middle-New Comedy poets. It is probable that the formal founding of the school of Epicurus ante-dated the opening of the Stoa which may have represented an intellectual response to the, as it was thought, thinly disguised hedonism of Epicurus. Certainly Pohlenz1 believed that the foundation of Epicurus contributed to Zeno's decision to open a philosophical school himself. The distinctive character of Zeno's philosophy is sketched in by Gould, as is the contribution made by Cleanthes. Finally, it is against this background that Chrysippus's thoughts on logic, physics and ethics (Chrysippus's own tripartite division of the body philosophic) are discussed in chapters four, five and six.

Although I feel but poorly qualified to comment specifically on Gould's treatment of the more formal aspects of Chrysippean logic, there are a few criticisms of a general nature relevant both to chapter four and the remainder of the book that are worth making. Gould rightly stresses the importance of epistemology to the Stoa, a school believing implicitly in the possibility of knowledge, and also the importance of dialectic as a weapon of defence against the Academy.

Chrysippus, it is claimed, tightened up Stoic thinking in both these spheres of interest. For example, the difficulties of a material soul acquiring knowledge, or at least the difficulties involved in the mechanics of such a notion, were tackled by Cleanthes. He produced the analogy between the soul and the wax tablet. Chrysippus rejects this analogy on the grounds that the soul, if like wax, could only receive one impression (presentation) at a time. Accordingly, Chrysippus substitutes the air-model; rather than an impression on the wax, the presentation is like an ‘heteroiosis’ or alteration of the air which can receive many simultaneous modifications. Gould’s comment is as follows:

‘Chrysippus’ substitution of the air-model for the wax tablet model is a brilliant endeavour to make Stoic epistemology more tenable without abandoning its materialistic premises. . . . Chrysippus improves and makes palatable the Stoa’s psychological materialism; but he does not thin it out or weaken it.’ (p. 54)

Gould’s enthusiasm for Chrysippus here warps his usually clear judgement. All that Chrysippus does is make a more plausible model for the acquisition of knowledge by a material psyche; Chrysippus’ model is only more sophisticated, doing nothing to explain how a finite, material mind can acquire and store a seemingly infinite amount of information.

On a more mundane level, more quotation from the Greek sources, especially when complex matters are being discussed, would have been desirable. Instead of direct quotation Gould invariably refers to Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta. In fact, Gould assumes the presence of SVF at every student’s elbow; this is surely a dangerous assumption which detracts from the book’s clear value to the student reader. Gould certainly ‘plays fair’ in his references when one takes time off to look them up, but if his method of referral to SVF is in the interests of fiscal as well as spatial economy, I think the economy is a false one.

In the discussion of the physical theories of the Stoics, Gould again renders sterling service by setting Stoic ideas against the context of contemporary opinion. However, the treatment of the ‘pneuma’ contains only a brief reference to the influence of Heraclitus which does less than justice to this great pre-Socratic. Gould is skilled at placing Stoicism in its Hellenistic context in the discussion of natural philosophy, but not so concerned with placing Stoicism in the equally important context of Greek physical speculation as a whole. Admittedly this may lie outside the specific
scope of Gould’s work, but the neglect of the pre-Socratic contribution is to be regretted when there is talk of ‘pneuma’ in terms of the primary opposites and of the unity of the cosmos being preserved by the tensions produced in the ‘hyle’ by the ‘pneuma’—all very evocative of Heraclitean thought in particular and the more developed work among the pre-Socratics in general. This comment is especially fair in the light of Gould’s comment that:

‘Chrysippus was a philosopher who reflected upon and attempted solutions for some of the same problems that had preoccupied two of the giants in the Greek philosophical tradition.’ (p. 119).

Here, of course, the two giants are Plato and Aristotle, the former of whom was but little concerned with the likely story of physical science. A further comment from the same section, that:

‘...the Stoa concerned itself not just with moral problems, but with problems somewhat removed from the problems of human conduct.’ (p. 118).

is, I feel, a prime example of putting up a straw man for the sake of knocking him down. However, the remainder of the haystack of Stoic physics as presented by Gould is excellent with hardly a needle of criticism to be found. Of especial interest is the section on Fate, God, Determinism and Free Will, where Chrysippus’s difficulties are searchingly examined by Gould. One could almost say examined mercilessly; the struggles of Chrysippus and his attempts to paper over the basic crack in the Stoic structure between the demands of determinism and of human free will make engrossing reading. The ‘Soft Determinism’ of Chrysippus is shown to be no answer. The place of evil in the cosmos of the Stoics also receives exhaustive treatment, although Gould does not seem to have seen A.A. Long’s article on the same subject.

If I may be allowed to be flippant just for a moment, Chrysippus’s pig seemed like a golden opportunity for humour missed. The Stoics usually offer so few opportunites.

One of the major difficulties encountered by anybody producing a book such as the one under review is illustrated by the beginning of chapter six on moral philosophy. Having already praised Gould for, on the whole, keeping Chrysippus firmly in context and also castigating Gould’s lack of deference to the pre-Socratics, it may

seem rather hard, if I suggest he has fallen here between two stools. I mean the two stools of (a) a popular book on Stoicism and (b) a specialist work on Chrysippus more suited to the columns of Phronesis. However, as a rule Gould walks the tightrope between expansiveness and hard scholarship with fine judgement.

After the doubtful beginning, the chapter on moral theory is excellent and can be of especial use to those interested, like myself, in investigating the influence of Stoicism on non-philosophical literature. Gould again exposes another of the cracks in the Stoic edifice which Chrysippus was concerned to close. This is the incompatibility of a progress towards excellence based on material examples of good, whatever they may be called, and a concept of a 'summum bonum' which demands an abstract existence — a thing, of course, impossible in the material Stoic universe. This whole problem is crystallised by the discussion of the infernal Stoic 'sapiens'; Gould shows his feelings here as follows:

'...his (Chrysippus') concept of the wise man must be judged, in part, to be an awkward excrescence on the system rather than an organic part of it.' (p. 176).

In other words, the wise man, like the air-model of the soul, is nothing more than an attempt to illustrate the Stoical ethical system in action. The state of the wise man is an ideal at which one should aim. Finally in the chapter on moral philosophy, the section on the virtues is excellently done, especially the drawing of the relationship between wisdom, virtue, meaning the 'summum bonum' and the cardinal virtues. Also, the strange notion of the emotions being judgements becomes clear as Gould explains Chrysippus's line of thought with a fine choice of examples.

To sum up, I will allow Gould to speak for himself:

'This study of Chrysippus' philosophy ought, then, not only to help one to determine the extent of Chrysippus's influence on subsequent Stoic philosophers, but ought also to contribute to a history of the Stoa, in which more than before, lines of influence can be more finely drawn and sources of doctrines identified with more exactitude.'

Quite true.

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